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THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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THE ANNALS

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THORSTEN SELLIN, *Editor*

UNIVERSAL MILITARY TRAINING AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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FOREWORD

THE proposal of compulsory military training is not an entirely new idea to the American people. On three occasions we have passed legislation requiring able-bodied citizens to serve their country in time of war. After World War I we first debated the possibility of compulsory peacetime training and now again we are considering the same problem in a new perspective.

The issue has already received wide discussion in the press and over the discussion table. Bills are before the houses of Congress. The Select Committee on Postwar Military Policies has held hearings and made further recommendations, and regular legislative committees will thoroughly investigate the subject from all angles. It is desirable that every phase of the problem receive appropriate discussion.

The reader may note some discrepancy in figures from one article to another. Attempt has been made to eliminate these wherever possible, but in certain matters there are no official figures. The volume is focused on a discussion of the present plan of the armed services and does not consider all possible variations of military training. As public discussion continues, these variations may be weighed for whatever merit they may have.

An excellent bibliography on this subject has been compiled by Frances Cheney and published by the Library of Congress.

PAUL RUSSELL ANDERSON

National Security in the Postwar World

By Paul Russell Anderson

EVERY nation deserves security, based on the doctrine of sovereign equality. Every nation desires security, since it makes possible all other cultural values. What is more, every nation demands security, for its very existence is dependent upon it. One of the searching issues facing this generation is that of how to provide security for each nation at the same time that comparable security is made available for all.

Collective Security *vs.* National Security

There are those who believe that we should give exclusive attention to plans for collective security since this alone brings national security. There are, on the other hand, those who argue that we should emphasize a strong, independent plan for national security since collective security is at best a profession of faith. There is a growing number of people who feel we must work for collective security wherever possible, but also develop our own plan for defense and that these activities are correlative, not antithetical. Of one thing we in America are certain: we shall not again be caught unaware and unprepared. We shall preserve the peace in co-operation with others if we can, but we shall be prepared to defend ourselves alone if need be. This is good sense.

The danger of too exclusive preoccupation with collective security is that we may lose touch with tangible forces. The danger of overemphasis upon our own defense is that we may lose sight of the obvious ideal—the common security of mankind. We must find a balance between co-operative agreement and independent action. We must in good faith enter into common agreement with other nations and restrict our own plans for defense so as not to attract suspicion. We must also keep our own bastion of defense sufficiently strong so as to protect our rights and fulfill our obligations, even alone if necessary. To do all of this at once is not easy. Even a carefully developed balance may not prevent another war; in any event this is the only real hope we have for peace.

Isolation Impossible

America has long depended upon natural water barriers as the chief line of defense. We have not been alone in this but we have been outstanding. With thousands of miles of water separating us from other great continents we have inherited a spirit of isolationism. The difficulty with isolationism is not that it is unpatriotic but rather that it is outmoded; we in fact have no island fortress, not even a remote island, any more. We are part of an active, interdependent world. Our contacts are close. With modern airpower developed even further than it is today, we may well expect that geographical contact will be easier with European powers in the future than it has been between New York and New Orleans in the past. Space has been conquered by modern science. There are still natural hazards, but there are no insuperable physical obstacles keeping nations apart from one another. This fact is basic to any realistic appraisal of America's plans for security.

Time, as well as space, is less of an obstacle to intercourse between nations than before. The art of warfare as practiced in the present conflagration is adequate testimony to what can be done in a few days. Think back to the early

conquests of Hitler in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere. Remember the quick landing in Normandy, the short final conquest of Germany, the terrific battering given the cities of Japan in a few days—these facts remind one of the mastery over time which is ours. The manufacture of weapons is a complicated process, although we are constantly increasing our production tempo; the destruction which these can effect overnight is appalling. With new weapons, ever more destructive, being developed, the potential annihilation of a city or a nation in a day or a week becomes easier. Combine the spatial and temporal factors in the creation of a weapon such as the robomb and you can readily realize that no nation, unprepared, can long survive the concentrated attack of an armed opponent. If time has thus become an element of offense, it must likewise be made a part of the strategy of defense. No longer can we permit it to be said "Too little and *too late*."

Industrialization is not a completed phenomenon. Further advanced in America than elsewhere, its benefits are such as to demand continuation of expansion for decades to come both here and abroad. Industrialization increases the demand for raw materials and this in turn necessitates wider and more entangling economic contacts. Industrialization has also made possible wider distribution and this, too, adds to our foreign economic ties. Properly speaking, there is no economically independent nation in the world. Russia and the United States come closest to achieving this objective but even they suffer from prolonged separation from markets. Economically speaking, what happens elsewhere has its impact on what happens here. We cannot escape the implications of our growing contacts with the rest of the world.

With our relationships to other nations bound to increase rather than to decrease we can no longer be unconcerned about what other nations do. Likewise we must realize that what we do has its proportionate effect upon others. We cannot "live alone and like it." We cannot even live alone. We are members of a community with all the moral rights and duties which such membership imposes. We must devise effective techniques for the handling of our common problems, or we must acknowledge the certainty of further wars. The first plank, therefore, in any program of national security is that of peaceful collaboration.

SALIENT FEATURES OF CHARTER

The United Nations Charter devised at San Francisco provides the framework in which co-operative security measures must now be viewed. It is not to be assumed that this is a perfect document. Revision and expansion may later be in order but provision is made for this. The Charter is realistic without being cynical; it is idealistic without being utopian. It offers real hope for group action by nations, great and small, toward the elimination of those forces which lead to war and against the aggressor if all peaceful means of adjudication fail.

The Charter is a considerable improvement over the Covenant of the League of Nations. One of its real contributions is the establishment of an Economic and Social Council whose objectives are to study those economic and social ills from which wars develop and to keep the new international instrument constantly informed concerning the real "sore spots" on the globe. This Council is instructed to promote higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress; to promote solutions of international economic, social, health, and other related problems, and educa-

tional co-operation; to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights, without distinction as to race, language, religion, or sex. It can summon international conferences on economic, social, and humanitarian problems. It is expected to study conditions of international trade and the problem of raw materials. It can recommend to the Assembly legislation having to do with problems in its sphere. The creation of such a Council is a decidedly progressive step in increasing the means for peaceful resolution of common social problems.

A second important development in the new Charter is provision for a Trusteeship Council, based on stated principles governing the administration of territories containing dependent peoples. This statement of principles pledges the administering nations to promote, not only the improvement of social conditions, but also self-government and ultimate independence. It is well to note that this section applies to the peoples in colonies as well as to those in trusteeship territories. Again, the creation of a Trusteeship Council to carry out these objectives offers a real juridical basis for the handling of certain hazardous interracial and international problems.

A third decisive improvement over the Covenant of the League of Nations is the acceptance by each nation of an obligation to use a portion of its armed power to enforce peace under the direction of the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council. Article 10 of the League of Nations was weak. There are some who believe the present Charter is also weak. There is, however, good reason to believe that the present statement is sufficiently strong that when it becomes defined in terms of concrete responsibility it will be effective in preventing aggression—at least for this we must hope.

There are, of course, criticisms which can be made of the Charter. Some of these may be obviated at a later date; others may be unworthy or retracted. The most general criticism which has been made is that the Security Council is undemocratic and that the whole organization is run by the big powers. This criticism is more valid on the basis of principle than it is on the basis of realistic appraisal of the problem. Power is not equally divided in the world and there is little to be accomplished by talking as if it were. Power will maintain the peace and power must be found where it is. Whether this balance (or imbalance) in the Security Council will have good or bad results will depend entirely on the integrity of the nations concerned.

THE UNITED STATES MUST LEAD

The new Charter may well have been ratified by the United States before this article appears. We will have then pledged our allegiance to the use of international instrumentalities for the handling of disputes between nation and nation. Whether or not the new organization is effective will depend entirely upon the attitude of the member states, particularly that of the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France, and China. The people of the United States muffed the ball over twenty years ago; there seems to be firm desire on the part of the entire nation that we not make the same mistake again, that we co-operate to the hilt in orderly international arrangements, even that we accept positive leadership in so doing.

Practically speaking, this means that we shall need a Department of State properly manned for this task. No policy of watchful waiting will be adequate. We shall need men of broad understanding and vision to represent us in every contact abroad. We shall need a clearly defined policy in advance of possible eventualities and men who are

able to present and defend this policy with reasonableness and conviction and yet who know the art of compromise. In short, if we are to play the part in world affairs which we can and should play, we shall have to overcome our traditional reticence on the international scene and replace it with a dynamic foreign policy in line with the basic principles of the new Charter. Only as we take every step possible to make the new organization effective will we be discharging our accepted responsibilities. A defeatist attitude stirred up by disillusioned perfectionists and extreme nationalists (what strange bedfellows!) may be dangerous; honest reservations as to the outcome of the new venture in collaboration are healthy and in turn provocative of worthy improvement and the creation of positive safeguards.

Granted, then, that our first line of national security is honest and faithful collaboration, most Americans are today asking the question, what shall be done in case this first line of defense fails? This is a proper question. It deserves the most thorough consideration of thoughtful minds. Only when we have given attention to the problem of national security in its entirety and have made concrete plans in terms of this over-all picture will we have a right to say that we have found even a temporarily satisfactory answer to the problem.

FURTHER STEPS UNITED STATES MUST TAKE

Military security rests fundamentally upon knowledge of likely conflicts with proper advance preparation for them. Our first necessity, therefore, is an adequate intelligence service which can keep us at all times adequately informed of military, economic, and political developments elsewhere. Those who argue for a large reserve of manpower do so partly on the basis that we may expect a surprise attack from any quarter. Granted that even the best intelligence service may not have prior knowledge of all eventualities, certainly the better the service the less likely the surprise. Before the war we were far understaffed in such activities and this has been well known abroad. Adequate attention to this problem would do much to give us advance notice of what degree and amount of military preparation is needed. No precisely calculated policy of military demands can be formulated in advance of knowledge of the probable conditions of battle—climatic, geographic, topological, and so forth. No nation in the world is capable of continuous preparation for mass activity under all possible circumstances even if it were maintained as an armed camp. The result is that constant vigilance in seeking knowledge of the plans and policies of other nations is almost the barometer of military need. To know what is likely is to save wasteful expense in manpower and production. Pearl Harbor probably could not have been avoided, but who knows but that the destruction might well have been minimized if there had been adequate listening posts and active air reconnaissance?

Scientific development

Another important plank in any platform for national security is concerned with scientific development and research. Even an elementary knowledge of the progress of this war will provide convincing testimony of the importance of scientific achievement as an implement of war as well as of peace. Thousands of scientific minds have worked day and night, in this country and elsewhere, improving and refining the machinery necessary for the successful prosecution of war in a mechanical age. New developments such

as radar have had an incalculable importance in saving life and in conquering the enemy. So important is scientific advance that it is almost a truism to say that the nation which excels in this area, other factors being relatively equal, holds the key to victory in any war. No wonder, then, that one of our first steps in planning for the postwar period is consideration of setting up a research board to co-ordinate all scientific activity concerned with security; announcement of the details of this plan will probably have been made before the publication of this article.

Scientific advance has a threefold importance in a plan for security. It develops the latest and best instruments of war. It enriches the life of a nation and hence makes it strong internally. It also serves as a silent warning to any possible aggressor, for where scientific pre-eminence exists there also is to be found the greatest *potential* instrument of war. To further our already significant record in scientific achievement is to possess strength within and potential power without, even when scientific genius is not directly engaged in planning for war.

Industrial production

Dependent upon scientific development as a means of national security is our industrial capacity; in fact, industry is merely applied science. In molding an adequate program for national security we must not lose sight of the tremendous significance of industrial production. We felt this deeply at the beginning of the war when we had men but not implements. The conversion of machinery was a more complicated process than the conversion of manpower. We have since seen what can be done in modern warfare with adequate supplies and matériel. Our victories in the Pacific are, of course, great tributes to the valor of individual men; more recently we have come to realize how important the physical instruments of war are and how saving in manpower they may become. Continuous analysis of our productive capacity and the natural resources at our disposal are essential for adequate defense. It should be added that this analysis must include diagnosis of the entire problem of conversion lest the next time we enter a war, if such be our misfortune, we repeat the mistakes of the present one.

DISPOSITION OF MANPOWER

All of this leads to one final plank in the platform of military security, namely, the need for adequately trained manpower. Two considerations must here be kept in mind. One is that in modern warfare we need increasingly specialized personnel (involving longer training), and the other is that manpower without immediately available matériel is practically useless. The first of these suggests the need for a professionally trained military force, whatever the size. The second argues for a program of training geared to our productive capacity for military purposes.

Adequate military force

Both of these considerations have implications for the present discussion of universal military training. A professionally trained military force is essentially a *competently* trained military force. Competence depends upon ability and the length of training program necessary to develop facility in operation. In the United States, our first demand will be for a military force adequate to fulfill our commitments under the United Nations Charter. Unquestionably, we will think it wise to maintain a standing force somewhat larger than this, depending upon the size of other national military establishments and upon the trend of international affairs. As a rule of thumb, we

need a military force large enough to meet our obligations for collective police duty plus a highly mobile force strong enough at any one time to meet the possible urgencies of that date, with a sufficiently large reserve force to meet less likely eventualities of the future. For better or for worse, we are all reconciled to a larger permanent military force than we have ever had before, particularly in terms of air force and navy personnel since these are the first arms of defense. Just what size our military force should be must be determined through further deliberation on our commitments and needs. But that we must have such a force is clear and that it must be extremely well trained in the use of the latest instruments of war is equally obvious. Consideration of this permanent military establishment is related to the discussion of universal military training on two bases: (1) the larger the permanent force, the less the necessity or desirability for universal military training, and (2) the more highly specialized the services, the more carefully planned any program of temporary civilian training must be if it is effective at all in terms of relating this training to real military needs.

Universal military training has been proposed by the Army and Navy as a necessity for adequate military protection. The plan, as explained later in this volume, will affect practically three-fourths of our male youth by taking a year out of their lives for military training. Whether or not we should have compulsory military training depends upon numerous factors: our military demands, our relations with other nations, the plans of other nations, the total effect upon our culture, and a consideration of other possible means for securing trained manpower. It is no slight departure from traditional American policy in peacetime, and must therefore receive wide and serious discussion. For those who are inclined to oppose universal military training, it is important to give consideration to other positive proposals for securing trained manpower. For those who urge adoption of universal military training now, it is important to justify this as the best means for the training of personnel, and also to establish why the decision need be made at this time in view of the tremendous reserve power we shall have at the end of the war.

Adequate civilian resources

The possibility of universal military training must be viewed in the light of the existence of a permanent military force of determined size and in relation to other factors in an adequate program for national security. Trained manpower is important, but trained manpower involves a variety of types of training dependent upon the function performed. We must not overlook training for highly specialized civilian pursuits for which there is an exact counterpart in the military services—medicine, dentistry, and certain types of engineering, for example. We have done poorly in conserving our supply of technical and scientific specialists in this war, and recently have practically closed off the flow of men into these fields by ill-advised policies discontinuing deferments; even the Axis countries have shown more concern for the continuance of a flow of trained specialists than we. This must certainly be given more favorable consideration in planning for our security in the postwar period.

The problem of manpower is not concerned with mass armies as such in modern warfare; the problem is essentially one of securing *adequately trained* personnel equipped with an *abundant supply* of the weapons of war. We must, therefore, never lose sight of the importance of matériel in our discussion of training, for trained men are but

targets if they lack adequate weapons. Our plans for security should seek to keep in proper ratio the factors of men and matériel.

Morale

An oft neglected factor basic to national security is that of morale. Men fight to win, but they fight because they have stakes in the battle. These stakes, however they may be phrased, are essential ingredients of our national culture. Slogans such as "the war to save democracy" and the "war to end wars" have not been as prevalent in this war as in the last, but the cultural distinction between the warring parties has been in fact much more apparent this time. Great issues have been at stake, and the issues have been worth fighting for because they were great. This is but a way of saying that only as we have common belief in certain basic moral concepts are we likely to have that courage and valor in defense of country which a vital conflict demands. In order finally to be strong in external relations we must be strong within. Tanks and planes and ships are instruments of war. Trained men control the instruments. But conviction and will control men. These are forces, indirect as they may seem to be, which play a prominent part in the final result of war as well as in any other significant human enterprise.

National security, therefore, has far broader implications than purely military ones. The ends of life are peaceful ones. We dare not sacrifice the ends of peaceful democratic society for a false numerical or quantitative plan for security even though we recognize that we must have physical power to give strength to our moral objectives. But we must somehow return to a civilian world as rapidly as possible, give time to the rectification of social ills and to the enriching of our culture, for herein lie the fruits of democratic living. It can also be said that the more we can do this and the less we need in the way of direct military preparation, the more solid our national morale will be. Let us do what we have to do in the way of protecting ourselves from threats abroad; let us not create threats before they exist. Let us be *potentially* powerful, based on strength of character as well as on military might.

It is not easy to have your cake and eat it too, but it is not impossible in this instance. We must make our life more abundant in peace, but we must be alert to the dangers of war. The first must be accomplished without pious self-satisfaction; the second must be achieved without creating false suspicions or fears. To such a line we must try to hew, for with it lies the greatest possibility of both security and peace.

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Universal Military Training in Modern History

By Robert A. Graham

THE liability to military duty by every able-bodied male citizen has long been an accepted principle wherever communities have banded together for their mutual benefit and protection. Membership in a community from which one receives benefits carries along with it certain corresponding duties. In the words of George Washington: "It may be laid down as a primary position . . . that every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a portion of his property, but even of his personal services to the defense of it." What the first President laid down as a first postulate of his defense plan was nothing new to the thirteen Colonies of his day, which had carried across the Atlantic the English concept of the militia. Already on July 18, 1775, the Continental Congress had put among the earliest measures for the common defense the recommendation that "all able-bodied, effective men, between 16 and 50 years of age, be formed into companies of militia. . . ." Such a proposal was neither new nor startling. It was merely a reaffirmation of the principle of universal liability to military duty for the common defense.

The comparison of the militia draft of the Colonies with the fully developed conscription system that later took its rise in Europe should not be pressed too closely. Both systems were based on admittedly the same postulate enunciated by George Washington. But the elementary form of military duty performed in the tribe or the ancient city-state bears only remote resemblance to the "nation in arms" which appeared in Europe and elsewhere with the rise of the modern state. The militia system as it was known in the days of the Revolutionary War was concerned with local defense, seldom involved duty of more than three or six months, was constitutionally undisciplined as well as untrained, and could not be used for military expeditions outside the country or region.

For practical purposes, therefore, writers of military history usually date the system of universal military training and service only as far back as the French Revolution. The term "conscription," used to describe compulsory military service, was first used at this time when the Conscription Law of 1798 was enacted in the face of a grave threat to France's security. This law called for five years' service for all able-bodied men between the years of 20 and 25. As a word and as an institution conscription has figured largely in the military and political history of modern times. When the system proved successful the example of France was imitated and other nations began to improve on the method as a means for maintaining a high level of preparedness. As a peacetime practice, conscription became a solidly established military policy of practically all European states after 1870.

Prussia's Contribution

If the French were the first to launch a program of conscription, it was left to Prussia to develop the system and to exploit it to its full worth as a permanent peacetime policy. By the Treaty of Tilsit of July 1807, following the disaster at Jena in 1806, Prussia was obliged to limit its forces to a mere skeleton force of 42,000. Thinking of Frederick's traditional large standing armies, Napoleon obviously believed he had crippled Prussia's military strength.

To circumvent this restriction, Scharnhorst elaborated a plan of training whereby short periods of compulsory service supplanted the old program of long-term professional volunteers. Through the large turnover effected in this way Prussia soon possessed a large reserve of trained men whose value became evident in 1813 when the war with Napoleon was renewed. Von Boyen's law of September 3, 1814, which recognized the permanent value of Scharnhorst's emergency method, was the first scientific military law for universal peacetime military service.

SPREAD OF THE SYSTEM

By 1870 Europe had found in Prussia a military machine that had proved its efficiency against Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and against the regulars of Napoleon III in 1870. The lesson was not lost on contemporary Europe. From this period we find Austria (1868), Greece (1869), France (1872), Italy (1875), Rumania (1866), and Russia (1874), embarking on a program of peacetime conscription in varying degrees of thoroughness. France in particular, which had allowed conscription to lapse after 1814, took it up again after her defeat by the Prussians, with a fervor that made military service almost literally universal.[1] By the opening of World War I, practically no country involved was without a large body of citizen soldiers trained for combat through conscription in peacetime. The sole exception was Great Britain who relied for her security upon a great navy based on voluntary recruitment, supplemented by a relatively small professional army. A recent student of military history has written:

> Nothing succeeds like success. Had the French long-service regulars won in 1870, then the world might have returned to armies of high quality. The Prussian victory, following so promptly upon their other victory over the Austrians, persuaded almost every other civilized power to reorganize a mass army on the Prussian pattern.[2]

GEOGRAPHICAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS

A study of the rise of conscription in modern Europe must necessarily include attention given to the political atmosphere and the geographical factors operating in the formation of such a philosophy of the mass army. Full justice cannot be done at this place. It may help, however, to give a lucid summary by Dickinson in which an explanation is attempted of why the system was not taken up on this side of the Atlantic. He says:

> A people will not willingly submit to the obvious economic waste of elaborate military training unless the dominant public opinion among them is habituated to regard large-scale warfare as an ever-present possibility and normal incident of national life. That was the case in Europe during the fifty years preceding the war (1914–1918). Rival nations crowding each other geographically and laboring under the fear of impending over-population accepted whole-heartedly a tradition of national antagonisms.[3]

The theory that wars could be averted by keeping armaments at a high level was commonly advanced as a justification for the extensive program of personal service and taxation. So closely linked to the philosophy of war did conscription become that efforts were made at the Versailles Peace Conference to abolish and outlaw compulsory military service. Jan Christiaan Smuts termed it the "tap-root of militarism."

[1] See also article in this issue of THE ANNALS by André Mesnard.

[2] Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde, 1793–1939* (New York: Putnam, 1940), p. 198.

[3] John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (New York: Century, 1922), p. 386.

CONSCRIPTION AT VERSAILLES

The proposal to outlaw compulsory military service by an international convention was not considered very long by the delegates. It is interesting to note that the French opposed this step on the score that among the French conscription was regarded as "a fundamental issue of democracy" and "a corollary of universal suffrage." The importance of conscription as a military instrument was recognized, however, and in the terms of peace with Germany the vanquished country was prohibited from re-enacting military conscription. How large a part this played in the disarming of Germany was indicated in the complaint of a German Chief of Staff who wrote in 1933 that "the most important and far-reaching encroachment involved in the peace terms was the ban on universal compulsory military service."[4] In consequence of this conviction it is scarcely surprising that the date of March 16, 1935, on which Hitler repudiated the ban and reinstituted conscription, was hailed by the Nazis as the birthday of the new Reichswehr. It is unlikely that after the present war any attempt will be made to outlaw conscription generally, such as that made in 1920. But there is no doubt that the ban on compulsory military service will be included in provisions taken to keep the Axis powers permanently disarmed.

BRITAIN'S EXPERIENCE

Great Britain had not before 1914 followed the pattern of conscription set by the Continent. She had always regarded the volunteer system as satisfactory and adequate both for the military and the naval forces. Until wars reached the major scale of World War I, the Empire was able to raise what troops it needed on a volunteer basis. But in 1914, as the first rush of volunteers subsided and fervent appeals for more failed of their objective, it became evident that the old policy was untenable and disastrous. Poorly conceived and administered the experiments at raising troops by the draft yielded valuable lessons for the United States which was to undergo the same crisis a few years later.[5] But with the end of the war in 1918 the British reverted to the volunteer principle. It was only on April 27, 1939, after the Munich pact, that with great reluctance compulsory training and service was reintroduced.

GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLICY

A study of the military history of the United States, from the point of view of recruitment, shows a steady trend in the direction of abolishing voluntary service in time of war.[6] The clear verdict of experience has definitely established the draft in wartime as a basic principle of United States military policy. Beginning with the complaints of George Washington against short-term voluntary service of the militia down to the enactment of selective service in 1940 before our entry into World War II, the trend has been steadily in the direction of universal obligation. The question quite naturally asked today is whether or not, in view of the certainty of universal service in any future large-scale war this country might become engaged in, a program

[4] von Seeckt, *Die Reichswehr*, 1933. Quoted in *Hitler Rearms*, ed. by Dorothy Woodman (London: John Lane, 1934), p. 41.

[5] A good account of Britain's experiences in achieving a workable selective service is given by Major General E. H. Crowder, *The Spirit of Selective Service* (New York: Century, 1920), pp. 176–220. See also article by A. P. Young in this volume of THE ANNALS.

[6] Cf. Frederick Morse Cutler, "The History of Military Conscription With Especial Reference to the United States," *The Historical Outlook* 14: 170–75, May 1923.

of universal training in peacetime should be the only logical preparation.

THE LESSONS OF OUR WARS

George Washington never hesitated to make public his dissatisfaction with the militia system of his day. Sad experience with bodies of soldiers which dissolved each year, leaving the Revolutionary leaders the annual task of forming a new army, led to repeated protests against this system and to demands for a permanent army which by the continuance of the same men in service would be capable of discipline and training.[7]

The protests of Washington left seemingly no impression upon the military policy of the Nation. The events of the War of 1812 demonstrated tragically the inefficacy of the militia system then current. Throughout this war the untrained volunteers of the militia gave a very uncreditable account of themselves at Detroit, Queenstown Heights, and Bladensburg. But the public supported Daniel Webster's eloquent attack upon a conscription bill introduced in 1814 when the volunteer system had failed by a good margin to meet the needs of the war.

The Civil War saw this country's first experiment in compulsory service. The first days of the crisis witnessed Lincoln's call for 75,000 volunteers for three months. Frantic efforts to prevail upon the several states to provide the necessary militia proved unavailing. Meanwhile the Confederacy had called men for a full year's service and before the year was out had replaced volunteer enlistments by universal conscription. Finally, compelled by both necessity and the example of the Confederacy, the Congress passed the Enrollment Bill on March 3, 1863, two years after the military crisis had broken out. The "Draft Act," as it was called, was designed more as a means of coercing those who had declined to volunteer rather than as a means of orderly mobilization of the Nation's manpower. Its administration was marked by blunders and violence. Riots broke out in New York City and elsewhere, when attempts were made to enforce registration and enrollment. Ninety-eight Federal registrants were killed or wounded in the first four months of operation. At the end, although 1,120,000 men were reportedly drafted in the remaining years of the war, only 42,347 were actually inducted into service. The rest were volunteers who joined up in anticipation of the draft or were induced by the generous bounties offered.

At our entrance into World War I, on April 6, 1917, this country had before it not only the example of the Confederacy and our own muddled job in the Civil War, but the experience of Great Britain since 1914. On May 18, 1917, six weeks after our declaration of war, Congress passed the Selective Service Act, which made subject to the draft all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 21 and 30. Soon voluntary enlistments were discontinued. Blanket exemptions were abolished. Selective service became an accepted policy for manpower procurement in time of war. When France collapsed in the spring of 1940 bringing the threat of war close to our shores it was possible, without debate unduly prolonged, to put selective service in operation well in advance of our entrance into World War II. We had learned our lesson since the belated "Draft Act" of 1863.

INDUSTRIAL DEFERMENTS

Side by side with the adoption of the draft in wartime has grown the increasing role of deferments for essential industrial and agricultural occupations.

[7] Cf. John McAuley Palmer, *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: Three War Statesmen* (New York: Doubleday, Doran, 1930), pp. 25–27.

Von Boyen's law provided exemptions for certain kinds of artisans. The Conscription Law of the Confederacy exempted from service those in a specified list of occupations. But the real military importance of the defense worker was not apparent until World War II. It is estimated that perhaps 37 per cent of all men between 18 and 38, and otherwise fit for military duty, have been kept out of uniform by their local boards. If this parallel trend continues, future defense plans must be based on the probability that a still higher percentage of such deferments will be necessary in years to come. This in turn raises the interesting question whether the newly found importance of the civilian defense worker may not throw entirely new light on the wisdom of universal training in peacetime.

ATTEMPTED PEACETIME LEGISLATION

Does the trend of American military policy towards the abolition of the voluntary principle in time of war include a parallel tendency towards universal military training in peacetime? At this stage it is important to insist that a clear line of demarcation lies between the two issues. It is quite hazardous to translate an emergency policy into a long-term program of national defense. It is obvious that the wartime draft and universal peacetime training are closely related. But they are not so closely related that they can be discussed as though they were one and the same problem involving identical factors.[8]

The distinction between the two issues, wartime selective service as against universal training, is sufficiently clear from the fact that both the national selective service acts of 1917 and 1940 were frankly emergency measures and were never presented as a permanent policy. The act of 1940 was passed before our entrance into the war but it was formed under the threat of war and in the visible presence of war beyond the ocean. It was not a peacetime measure in the sense of the word used here. While this nation has reluctantly seen the necessity and efficiency of abolishing the voluntary principle in wartime, no thorough consideration has ever been given to peacetime universal training as a means of building up a reservoir of trained manpower for any future national emergency. But in this respect it might be noted in passing that such lack of consideration is only part of a lack of understanding by the American people of defense policy generally.

WASHINGTON'S PLANS

George Washington had very definite ideas on the military policy suitable to American institutions. We are indebted to General John McAuley Palmer for scholarly research in this field. Part of Washington's program towards "a well-regulated militia" was universal training. On January 21, 1790, he transmitted to Congress a plan providing, among other things, for a system of universal training for young men between 18 and 20. For the first two years these trainees were to spend thirty days in camp. The third year they were to spend only ten days. This was a revision of an earlier plan submitted to the Continental Congress by Henry Knox which had provided for military training for young men over 18 and under 21. These were to spend six weeks in camp each year for three successive years. After this they were to be put

[8] The peculiar problems attached to the abolition of the volunteer system in wartime have been briefly recorded in *American Selective Service, a Brief Account of its historical background and its probable future form*, prepared under the supervision of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1939.

in a "main corps" but no further training would be required of them.

Neither of these proposals was accepted. Washington's ideas of a "well-regulated militia" ran counter to the political atmosphere of the day. Strangely enough it was apparently not so much the universal training feature of the plans which aroused the most opposition, but certain other aspects of the reform of the militia beyond the scope of this paper.

The concept of the "citizen army" (Washington's "well-regulated militia") is not identical with or even necessarily inclusive of the idea of universal training. In his directive of September 2, 1944, the Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, called for a national security establishment which would consist principally of a nonprofessional peacetime trained force outside state control, fully organized, manned, and staffed in peacetime in the form in which it would be used in war. Key positions in this force would be occupied by trained civilian officers instead of by a superimposed strata of suddenly elevated professionals. Such a reserve army need not, theoretically at least, be based upon universal peacetime training.[9]

UNIVERSAL TRAINING IN 1919

On August 3, 1919, Secretary of War Newton Baker sent a bill to Congress which included provision for three months compulsory military training for youths between the ages of 18 and 19. The Kahn-Chamberlain bill called for six months training of all young men who upon completion of this period were to be subject for five years to additional training. The Army Reorganization Act which eventually became the National Defense Act of 1920 originally contained a section providing for universal training. Sponsored by James Wadsworth in the Senate and Julius Kahn in the House, this bill provided that all youths of 19 were to undergo compulsory training in military camps for four months. Upon completion of such training they were to be enrolled in the organized reserves for five years. The young men trained under this program were to take subsequent refresher courses for two summers, but they were not liable to the performance of any military *service*. It was estimated that through this program about 640,000 nineteen-year-olds would receive military training each year. Supporters of the bill estimated that the expense would be around $168,000,000 annually, though this was challenged by the opposition as grossly misleading.

Debate on the universal training feature of the Wadsworth bill, rightly regarded as the most controversial element of the whole Army Reorganization Act, began on April 5, 1920, in the Senate. By April 8, it was "perfectly obvious" to the protagonists of the measure that the proposal lacked sufficient support. At this point Senator Frelinghuysen, an ardent supporter of the bill, conceded defeat and introduced an amendment replacing the compulsory provisions by voluntary ones. This was accepted and thus the Citizens' Military Training Camps came into being. After barely a few days of debate, universal training as a peacetime policy was defeated again.

One would like to be able to say that the Wadsworth bill had been considered and rejected on its own demerits. In

[9] For an unusually competent study of the "citizen army" cf. Lloyd Eugene Hedberg, *A Critical Consideration of the History and Development of the Basic Organizational Policy of the Army of the United States up to the Passage of the National Defense Act of 1920 in Relation to the Theory of a Citizen Army.* Dissertation submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Graduate Division of Georgetown University. January 1945.

1945 we would then be in possession of data which would prove invaluable in determining a preparedness policy for our own generation. Unfortunately, if we except the scholarly work of General Palmer, there is small evidence that universal military training was seriously studied in all its implications, economic, social, political, moral, or even military. Ardent pacifists, with equally ardent advocates of preparedness, took the spotlight while opportunities for a scientific study of the problem were neglected. The bill was apparently rejected in Congress because "the sentiment of the country was against it." This was perhaps a valid reason in a democracy but scarcely satisfying to the present generation faced by the same question.

According to the version of General Palmer [10] the Democrats decided at this time to oppose the bill of Republicans Wadsworth and Kahn as a party issue. On February 9, 1920, at a caucus of the Democratic party of the House convened to determine what attitude should be taken towards universal training, a vote of 106 to 17 was given against the bill. It is regrettable that such a policy of broad national import was never permitted to be adequately discussed on its own merits.[11]

WHAT POLICY FOR THE FUTURE?

The precedent set in two world wars and the steady though slow trend of our national military practice through a century and a half scarcely leave doubt that another world conflict, should such a crisis develop despite all efforts to avoid it, will see universal and equal liability to military service. From the point of view of military efficiency selective service makes possible a more steady control over the flow and quality of inductees. In addition it takes the burden off those citizens more keenly alive to national crises who volunteer at great personal sacrifice to themselves and their families. In turn, selective service makes possible more systematic planning for the benefit of the whole Nation under a wartime economy.

Proposals for universal training in peacetime have sprung from native American experience. The draft policy of this country has grown almost exclusively out of actual wartime lessons. Our acceptance of the draft has been quite pragmatic. Compulsory service has not played a role, as in Europe, in the foreign policy of our Nation. A philosophy of militarism has never been invoked to justify it. The promptness with which the draft was dropped after termination of hostilities shows that it was distinctly a war measure and had little relation to full-blown theories of militarism or militant nationalism.

All this is, of course, no guarantee that such maladies will not develop under a permanent peacetime policy. It would be a mistake to assume uncritically that what has proved feasible and safe in wartime will not be inefficient or harmful in the long days of peace.

[10] John McAuley Palmer, *America in Arms* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 179.

[11] For the varying fortunes of the universal training bills of 1919–20 cf. Dickinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 323 ff., Ch. IX, "The Army Act of 1920."

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Procurement of Manpower in American Wars

By Lewis B. Hershey

NO nation in the history of the world possesses a military history richer in terms of individual valor, resourcefulness, and permanent achievement than the United States. We Americans are all familiar with the highlights of that history. We have an excellent general picture of the difficulties and obstacles which confronted our armies at the outset of each war and at the beginning of each major campaign of each war. Yet it has only vaguely occurred to many of us that procurement of manpower has constituted one of our gravest military problems every time it has dawned upon us, as a Nation, that we faced inevitable war.

The Problem in Colonial Days

As a Nation we have fought seven wars including World War II, but it must be remembered that the history of our country did not begin with the Revolution.

Existence in the Colonies from the very earliest days of Jamestown and Plymouth depended upon military protection. The problem of manpower procurement, though simple almost to the point of nonexistence, was there nevertheless. Jamestown's professional "army" was led by Captain John Smith. Miles Standish of Plymouth was commander in chief of an "army" which, if we are to believe the poet Longfellow, was small enough to enable Standish to declare: "And like Caesar, I know the names of every one of my soldiers." Nor was Standish necessarily boasting, for his army was composed of all of 13 soldiers!

Obviously, these early Colonies and others to be established later could not rely upon their professionals in case of dire emergencies and it was taken as a matter of course that every able-bodied man must be prepared to fight with the "regulars" when occasion demanded. That was selective service reduced to its most primitive form, for there was a "selecting" process. It consisted of selecting virtually every adult male and assigning him to a definite duty, whether that duty consisted of going out to attack the Indians or staying at home to guard the women and children, at the same time pursuing his usual activities.

Actually, the system was an adaptation of the English militia system, the principles of which were thoroughly imbued in the colonists and further ingrained by the knowledge of the brutal fact that any settlement in the new wilderness which hoped to exist must consist of individuals prepared to fight to the last man if necessary.

As the Colonies expanded in population, and as diversity of interests and other considerations began to complicate the economic and political structures which originally were the essence of simplicity, the task of adjusting the original English militia system to meet the changing conditions became proportionately difficult. It was one thing for the Governor or the ruling body of a compact settlement of a few hundred persons or less—such as composed the original nucleus of every colony—to maintain a military system for mutual protection, but quite another thing to maintain an adequate protective force for a colony which had branched out to numerous towns and even cities and homesteads in between. The well-recognized obligation of every man to bear arms for his country, which had its roots in the earliest Anglo-Saxon history, was not forgotten, but before long there was a tendency to ignore the full

import of its significance, except as it applied to the colonist's own settlement or community, or to the protection of his immediate family. And the colonists themselves, during the Revolution, found it most difficult to think of their militias in any terms other than a local defense force. Of this, more later.

So it may be stated that the militia system upon which the individual Colonies depended for protection was found wanting in many respects, most important of which had to do with the facts that enlistments were of short duration and that each Colony was either reluctant, or bluntly refused, to send its militia outside its own borders. There may have been—in fact were—political angles concerning the relationship between the Colonies and Great Britain that somewhat beclouded the issue, but it is still a rather embarrassing fact that for many years frontier colonial settlers were dependent almost entirely upon British Regulars from the motherland for protection against the frequent raids and depredations of the Indians and later of the French and Indians.

FLAWS IN MILITIA SYSTEM

Before pursuing the faults and shortcomings of the militia system as it has affected our wars, I should like to emphasize my conviction that the Anglo-Saxon principle on which it is based is as sound as other institutions on which our Nation has its foundation. Any cursory examination of the manner in which the principle was applied is extremely dangerous, for it may lead to the conclusion that the militia system itself is worthy only of condemnation, while a more careful scrutiny of the facts must lead us to a conclusion diametrically opposite. It was not the theory that was faulty; there was no sound application of the theory.

Analyzed, the militia system, administered ideally, in a very real sense is the ancestor of the Selective Service System and the direct descendent bears a very close resemblance to its illustrious forefather. In the first place, the militia system assumed at the outset that everyone was liable for military duty, that everyone owed an obligation to bear arms for the protection of his country. That is one of the cardinal principles of Selective Service and Selective Service has only broadened the application of the principle and made the application fit a modern nation, whose social, economic, and political aspects are thousands of times more complex than they were in colonial days.

In the second place, the militia system adherents recognized—even though vaguely at times—that a reservoir of trained men must be available to meet emergencies when they arose, and that this reservoir would comprise part of a nucleus around which to build a much larger force in case of war. That idea certainly is not inconsistent with the Selective Training and Service Act as passed September 16, 1940. So we must guard our conclusions carefully before smothering the militia system in a blanket of condemnation.

The shortcomings in the application of the militia system were emphasized to such an extent during the Revolution, nevertheless, that a war which conceivably might have been concluded in a matter of months instead dragged on for seven long, desperate, and discouraging years. The greatest military strength used against the Colonies by Great Britain in any one year was 42,000, while we employed a total of nearly half a million—420,000—ten times that paltry 42,000!

A report compiled some time ago under supervision of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee sums up the reasons for the prolongation of the Revolutionary War and the fact that our armies repeatedly were faced

with what seemed certain extinction—avoided only by the grace of God—and the genius of George Washington:

1. The only effective troops were those enlisted for the duration of the war.
2. The method of voluntary enlistment was not able to supply adequate men.
3. State troops were not satisfactory instruments for the National Government.
4. The militia system was wasteful of money and completely ineffective as a means of conducting war.

NEED FOR ACT OF CONGRESS

The question naturally is posed: "Why was so much dependency placed on the militia in view of its dismal failure?" The answer may be briefly given as follows: The Thirteen Colonies at this time were in no sense a nation; they were thirteen little nations banded together by the loosest kind of federation for the purpose of fighting a common enemy, but without any real sense of unity and torn by commercial and political jealousies. And in every Colony there were strong and vociferous minorities who were either Tory or had Tory leanings. There were relatively few leaders with any conception of the Colonies as an embryonic nation. The Colonies were fighting for their independence with varying degrees of enthusiasm, but they were fighting to gain independence, individually, as separate states. Small wonder that no system of bounties could be devised that was attractive enough to keep Washington supplied with sufficient men against the well-trained British regulars and that he was compelled constantly to call upon reluctant legislatures for the poorly-trained, ill-equipped, and short-term militia troops.

The lesson to which the experience of the Revolution and colonial days pointed was plain enough. George Washington saw it. So did Jefferson and Madison. Washington proposed to Congress that in place of indiscriminate levies on State legislatures for nondescript, untrained troops of all ages in times of emergencies, the men be classified for physical fitness basically in the same manner in which they are classified today, and that men between the ages of 18 and 25 be separated into separate technical units for intensive military training. But Congress turned a deaf ear, and likewise ignored the subsequent pleas of Jefferson and Madison.

The measure passed in 1792 during Washington's administration was worse than a stopgap. Nominally it called for universal military service, but it provided no penalties for violation, with the result that the companies, brigades, and regiments which were formed in the respective states under its terms were scarcely more than holiday mobs, in some instances meeting only once a year and then only for a grand celebration, replete with strong refreshments.

The "pay-off" came during the War of 1812. Congress authorized an army numerically and theoretically adequate to bring the war to a close in a reasonable period of time. Great Britain never put into the field more than 16,500 troops against the total of 527,000 men we employed. But the volunteer army Congress had authorized could not be recruited, despite the offer of liberal bounties, and the military reluctantly turned to the state militias, with the result that the experiences of Revolution and colonial days were repeated again. Raw, untrained troops, led by incompetent officers, were pushed into battles with disastrous results. Further complications followed when

the militia contended they were organized to repel invasion and were constitutionally exempt from serving in any invasion force. Refusal of militia troops to cross the boundary into Canada resulted in utter catastrophe to another American force which had already crossed the border.

Meanwhile, futile efforts had been made in Congress to obtain passage of a national draft act. Congress was adamant. And the nation paid one more penalty when 4,400 militia, drafted only a few days previously, made a farcical defense of Washington, a defense that consisted of a completely disorganized rout immediately after they heard the rumbling roar of the first shots fired. The Government already had evacuated Washington, Washington was captured, the White House was burned, and the end of the war was many months distant.

In the war with Mexico in 1845, 40,000 troops completed their one-year enlistment terms when General Scott was at the height of his march on Mexico City. They went home while General Scott and his remaining men sat down and waited for replacements for the 40 per cent of his army he had lost. One more war had been added to the list that have been prolonged, at least partly, because of short-term enlistments.

CONSCRIPTION IN CIVIL WAR

The Nation still refused to profit by its earlier sad experiences, and the parade of mistakes continued into the Civil War when greater, and perhaps more costly, blunders were the order of the day.

Volunteer methods were tried first, and failed miserably. The volunteers signed up for short enlistments. We all recall how Union troops in the Manassas area actually marched away, homeward bound to the sound of enemy cannon because the enlistment period for which they had signed had expired.

Conscription was introduced in the North in the spring of 1863. The methods employed at once aroused public resentment to a high pitch. Since the draft had not been introduced at the beginning of the war, it became a method of coercing those who had refused to volunteer. Voluntary recruiting continued after conscription was introduced, and the draft was applied only in areas that had failed to fill their quotas with volunteers. The inevitable result was that public odium quickly attached to the drafted individual. The draft machinery also was employed to apprehend spies and deserters. In the public eye the manhunts for deserters and for registrants were similar enterprises; the draft was further stigmatized. The Federal Government held whip-hand control of the draft; it did not take the local governments into partnership either in action or in responsibility. The law fell most heavily on the poor and allowed the wealthy to escape because, after he was drafted, a man could hire a substitute or purchase outright exemption for $300. Wealthy districts filled their quotas from the poor districts, offered lavish bounties for volunteers. It was the "rich man's money and the poor man's blood." Corruption on a large scale was encouraged by the very nature of the system. Substitute brokers traded in the sale of substitutes. Some professional substitutes, after getting their money, deserted and sold themselves in other districts. Bounty jumpers lived well by repeated enlistments and desertions.

Conscription in the Confederacy followed a similar pattern, early volunteer enlistments later giving way to a system of conscription under which substitutes could be hired. There were too many

types of exemptions, and fraud and corruption were encouraged.

MAXIMILIAN AFFAIR

The Civil War left its scars on North and South alike, and had it not been for the turmoil of reconstruction, the fiery political battles that raged on a complexity of issues, coupled with the fact that the country's attention was also centered on a spectacular expansion westward, as well as an unprecedented industrial expansion in the east, the Nation might have attached to one momentous event—or series of events—the significance actually deserved.

I refer to the exploits of Maximilian in Mexico. Maximilian, it will be recalled, established an "empire" in Mexico with the blessing of Napoleon III, and with the force of French troops in the same year that our North and South became deadlocked. The coup plainly was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but our Government obviously was powerless to make anything but a token protest, for its arms were engaged. With the Civil War concluded, it did not take Napoleon III long to withdraw his French troops. I have often wondered whether the withdrawal would have been so speedily accomplished had it not been for the fact that the United States had a large army of trained troops at the close of the Civil War.

An excellent case can be made—and many times has been made—on the premise that most of our wars would have been avoided had we been prepared with a large reservoir of trained men ready for immediate action. Careful examination of all the facts certainly leads to such a conclusion and there can be no doubt that our lack of a trained reservoir of men resulted in prolongation of every one of our wars. But in a certain sense that is a negative proposition. At least one case in which we actually *did* avoid war because we had a large reservoir of trained men may be found in the Maximilian affair.

CONSCRIPTION IN WORLD WAR I

To the lasting credit of our Nation is the fact that when World War I was upon us, we finally took cognizance of most of the major mistakes of our conscriptions in previous wars. After raising our wartime armies by wasteful, unsatisfactory expedients through all the previous years, we adopted in 1917 a sound and economical system that proved acceptable to the people.

We did not place full reliance on state militias nor on recruiting; bounties for recruits were outlawed; and purchasing of substitutes for service was not allowed.

But most important of all was the fact that principles of true democracy were applied. Full control of the draft was not placed in the Federal Government but was made the responsibility of civilians in the local communities, where the necessary men were to be procured by uncompensated local boards. They were to be selected by fellow civilians, by their neighbors, by the people who were in the best position to know local conditions, who were—in short—best qualified to make the selections in conformance with true democratic principles of self-government.

The World War I Selective Service Act, signed by the President on May 18, 1917, was based upon "the liability to military service of all male citizens." It authorized a selective draft for the army from citizens between their twenty-first and thirty-first birthdays; authorized concurrent voluntary recruiting at Presidential discretion, and the period of service was for the duration of the emergency. Outright exemp-

tions were allowed only for ministers, divinity students, and a few groups of high public officials; conscientious objectors were exempted from combat service only. Exemptions at Presidential discretion were authorized for essential occupations and dependency.

Principles governing the system were supervised decentralization and selection of the drafted men by their neighbors and fellow civilians.

The National Headquarters, primarily a center of instruction and guidance, dealt with the Governors who headed Selective Service in the States, and decided general questions. The National Headquarters was operated by the Provost Marshal General.

State Headquarters, which directly controlled the operating machinery, supervised the local boards and other agents and distributed downward instructions of the Provost Marshal General.

The load was carried by the uncompensated local boards, composed of able and respected men, whose duties included every step from removing the man from his home to placing him in camp.

Undoubtedly the principal reasons for the public acceptance of the draft in World War I were the civilian nature of the system, its intimate local or decentralized administration and the realization of the people that the armed forces were raised by the Nation itself. Also, Selective Service was instituted at the beginning of the war, avoiding belated coercion after other methods had failed, and the obligation of service was held to be personal and nontransferable.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE ARMISTICE

After the armistice, the public mind quite naturally turned away from Selective Service and little thought was given generally to the advisability of continuing to make definite plans for manpower mobilization in event this Nation ever would be threatened with another war.

Fortunately, the National Defense Act of 1920 did recognize the need for such planning and made definite provisions for it. Section 5b of the Act provided in part:

> The duties of the War Department General Staff shall be to prepare plans for the national defense and the use of military forces for that purpose, both separately and in conjunction with naval forces, and for the *mobilization of the manhood of the Nation and its material resources in an emergency*.

Complying with this provision, the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee was created in 1926. Its detailed purpose was to plan for selective service so that if an emergency arose, proposed legislation, rules and regulations would be available for procuring military manpower. The Committee began to develop a plan so that this manpower could be obtained in an orderly, democratic, and selective manner that at the same time would make available through deferment sufficient numbers of men for war production and essential civilian activities.

It was recognized that in order to formulate the type of legislation and rules and regulations which would achieve this purpose in a manner to conform with our democratic processes, participation of civilians would be required. Consequently, the Committee was authorized to arrange for reserve commissions in the Army and Navy to a limited number of specially chosen civilians. Beginning in 1935, in addition to correspondence courses, annual two-week conferences were conducted for these Reserve Officers in four different sections of the Nation.

All known methods of raising armies during past wars in this country and elsewhere were studied in detail. The evolution of selective service was traced from the earliest days, when no selection was required other than the physical ability to hold a spear, up through the ages, to and including World War I when much more careful selection was required because of changed methods of warfare and the vast essential production required to carry it on.

This actually was the first time in American history that a systematic research had been conducted by a responsible group on the subject of conscription. That it later was to pay dividends in winning the confidence of the people was shown in November of 1942 when a poll of Dr. George Gallup disclosed that 82 per cent of persons interviewed answered a resounding "yes" to the question: "Do you think the draft is being held fairly in your community?"

World War I was the first conscription ever to meet the general approval of the American people. This was true principally because it was based upon the principles of democracy. It was a completely decentralized procedure—the people back home, the civilians, were its real managers.

SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT

The Selective Training and Service Act, approved September 16, 1940, followed closely the draft drawn up by the Joint Army and Navy Committee, although it was introduced at the request of the Military Training Camps Association. It followed generally the pattern of Selective Service in World War I.

The general provisions of the act are not unfamiliar. The organization set up was composed of a Director of Selective Service appointed by the President and responsible to him; State Directors to be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Governors of the States; at least one local board in each county or similar political subdivision appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Governors; one or more re-employment committeemen attached to each local board to advise and protect veterans in their rights to obtain their old jobs back as provided in the act; a medical examiner to be attached to each board; a government appeal agent to carry appeals in behalf of the registrant or the Government; and one or more boards of appeal for each state, members of which were to be appointed by the President upon recommendation of the Governor.

The act provided that not more than 900,000 men were to be in training at one time, that the inducted men should serve and be trained for a period of twelve months or less unless sooner relieved, or Congress declared the national interest imperiled, that after their service the inductees were to be transferred to a reserve component of the land or naval forces for ten years, or until they reached 45 years of age, or until they were discharged from the reserve component, whichever happened first. Inductees were not to be employed beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere except in our territories and possessions. Group deferments were prohibited except on the basis of the status of the individual and no such deferments should be made of individuals by occupational groups or of groups of individuals in any plant or institution. Bounties were outlawed, substitute buying was prohibited, and it was provided no one could "buy his way out" of serving the training period.

The act recognized one principle entirely ignored by the draft laws of 1917. It was this: If it is the obliga-

tion of every male citizen to bear arms in defense of his country, it logically follows that it is the obligation of his government to protect his interests during the period he is bearing arms and to make provisions which will enable him to return to the civilian job he left to fulfill his obligation, without suffering any penalty in regard to rank, seniority, prestige, or pay. Accordingly, the act contained a provision requiring employers, under certain conditions, to reinstate the discharged veteran to his former position or a comparable one, without loss of any benefit to which he would have been entitled had he not temporarily left his employment. I like to consider this provision of the act as an extension of the obligation-of-every-man-to-bear-arms principle, for it recognizes that military obligation is a two-edged proposition, with the government having obligations to the inductees as well as vice versa.

May 15, 1945, was set as the act's termination date, except for the provisions relating to reserves, re-employment and pay for enlisted men. Later, this date was amended to make it May 15, 1946.

Three weeks after approval of the act, the four classes and their subdivisions into which registrants were to be placed were announced. Generally, they may be defined as follows:

Class I: Men available for military service.

Class II: Men necessary in their civilian activity.

Class III: Men with dependents.

Class IV: Officials deferred by law; those deferred because they were physically, mentally, or morally unfit; ministers and others.

A comparison of these classifications with those which were in effect on May 1, 1945, will disclose no basic changes in the classification system with the possible exception of the classification for dependency, which since has been removed because dependency as such no longer is a ground for deferment.

We come to Pearl Harbor and the events immediately following.

CONSCRIPTION IN WORLD WAR II

In contemplating the manner in which the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 was so speedily "regeared" from a peacetime machine, designed to raise considerably less than a million men for a year's peacetime training, to a wartime machine faced with the grim necessity of raising nearly 12,000,000 men to be trained for participation in the most brutal and highly mechanized war the world has ever known—in contemplating the relative ease with which the adjustment was accomplished, such adjectives as "remarkable" and "amazing" come to mind. Yet sober reflection compels the conclusion that in a broad sense there was nothing remarkable or amazing in the transformation. For the act was founded on certain fundamental principles, enunciated and put into effect after many years of study which involved the most minute culling of experiences of the past, rejecting the bad elements, accepting or modifying the good to meet conditions demanded by a more complicated civilization.

Even that was not as important as this closely allied fact: The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 embraced, and jealously guarded and built upon, one central ideal—the ideal of democracy at work, exemplified by the autonomy granted the local boards in carrying out the purpose of the act and the wide discretionary powers vested in the local boards in determining each registrant's classification and in deciding whether he could better serve his country by assisting the war effort as a civilian, or by donning a military uniform.

Regulations were necessary to administer the act from the very beginning, obviously, and so were national and state headquarters to promulgate the regulations. But in the final analysis the responsibility rested upon the shoulders of the local boards, composed of citizens who were part and parcel of their respective communities, who knew their communities and the particular economic and social complexities which kept them ticking and who had a very good idea of just what each registrant was doing in his civilian capacity—if, indeed, they did not know the registrant personally. Thus, no basic changes were necessary in the act in event of war. It was merely necessary to change the "gears" to make the machinery ready for war. That is exactly what was done.

On December 13, 1941—six days after the attack on Pearl Harbor—Congress went through the process of changing the "gears" of the Selective Training and Service Act and, with the deletion of a few words and the addition of a few more, it transformed the act from an efficient miniature model to a veritable juggernaut, capable of hitherto unheard of performance.

The changes removed the restriction that inducted men must be kept within the Western Hemisphere or our territories. They lifted the restrictions limiting the number of inductees to 900,000 at any one time. They extended the period of military service to the duration of the war, plus six months. Another law extended the age of registration from 18 to 65 years, although liability for service was not extended at that time beyond the 20-to-45-year-old group. The reduction to 18 years of age in liability for service came later.

THE PROBLEM INVOLVED

The task that confronted Selective Service at the outset of the war was a momentous one. It involved raising men for an armed force of nearly 12,000,000 men. Had no other considerations been involved, it can truthfully be stated this task would have been relatively simple. But other considerations—important considerations—were involved, and the actual situation might be summed up as follows:

We have a nation of 130,000,000 persons with one common objective, the defeat of our enemies. Our military leaders tell us we will need nearly 12,000,000 under arms to accomplish this purpose. We know we shall not only have to equip these men with the most effective weapons of modern warfare, but that we shall also have to feed, maintain, and clothe them, which means stepping up production in war plants and shipyards to a degree never dreamed of before, and we also know we shall have to furnish almost unlimited material to our allies. We are told that industrial demands to fill these needs will strain our manpower resources almost to the breaking point. We are told that we must answer these demands, starting from scratch as it were, without disrupting the institutions for which we are fighting, and with due regard for civilian economy and the necessity of throwing every possible safeguard around protection of the family and the local community which go to make up the whole Nation.

We must consider the welfare and the safety and the interest of the Nation above that of the individual, but at the same time we must keep ever foremost in our minds the indelible fact that the individual, in aggregate, constitutes the Nation. And looming up above everything is the actuality that the primary purpose of Selective Service is to raise men for the armed forces.

At the risk of indulging in oversimplification, the history of the administration of the Selective Training and

Service Act may be very roughly divided into these phases:

The pre-Pearl Harbor phase, dating from approval of the law to Pearl Harbor. The phase embracing the period between Pearl Harbor and the time when the armed forces announced they soon would reach their authorized strength and that needs of the immediate future would demand a much greater proportion of younger men, which was in July of 1944. The intermediate phase, when the armed forces' insistence upon a greater and greater proportion of young men necessitated application of even stricter rules for occupational deferment. This phase ended not long after the defeat of Germany when the armed forces indicated their calls would be reduced to approximately 90,000 a month.

The emphasis still was on younger men and deferment policies were greatly liberalized for men over 30 years old. The restriction that men 30 through 33 years of age be required to be "necessary to" and regularly engaged in an occupation or activity in the national health, safety, or interest was removed and it was merely required that he be "regularly engaged in" such an activity to merit consideration for deferment.

Demobilization System

Meantime, the army had announced its point system for demobilization. Among other considerations, an enlisted man was to be credited with 12 points for each child up to a maximum of three children in computing points making him eligible for discharge. The minimum number of points necessary for discharge was set at 85. With the army thus stressing dependency so strongly as a consideration for discharge, and as some nine-tenths of the soldiers over 30 had pre-Pearl Harbor dependents, it became obvious that the same considerations of dependency m govern Selective Service policies, for 30-year-old with three dependents h 36 of the 85 points necessary for d charge the moment he walked into t induction station.

On May 22 of this year, a mem randum was sent to local boards em phasizing that the needs of the arme forces were for men under 30 years o age and local boards were requested t liberalize occupational deferments so a to reduce the total number of men t be inducted in the 30 through 37 age group—particularly those who were fathers—and to review cases of registrants in the age group 18 through 25 who have heretofore been rejected for general military service or found qualified for limited service only, and to forward for re-examination those whom they have reason to believe may now qualify for military service. The memorandum marked the beginning of the present phase.

Importance of Local Draft Boards

I have said that in their general outlines, Selective Service of World War I and World War II are similar, which is true. But in the enormity of the task, great differences appear. In World War I we were fighting on one front, and it was a comparatively short fight. We are now near the end of our fourth year of World War II, and we have been fighting a global war on many fronts. The size of the forces involved is infinitely larger. Our local boards have examined, and re-examined, more than 22,000,000 men in the 18-37-year age brackets.

No discussion of Selective Service in the present war ever would be complete, or fair, were it to ignore the unselfish and patriotic work of these uncompensated local board members and the thousands of other uncompensated per-

sonnel. The local board members are the most important part of the entire system, because the whole system revolves around the local board member, and without the local boards, the National and State Headquarters would be much in the same position as a general staff without armies, without field forces to carry out campaigns, to make strategy effective.

Major General Lewis B. Hershey has been Director of the Selective Service System since July 31, 1941, having served from December 19, 1940 until that date as Deputy Director. He was formerly executive officer of the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee. He is a graduate of the Army War College, Washington, D. C. He saw service with the Indiana National Guard on the Mexican border in 1916, has been a member of the Regular Army since 1920, and served as a captain in France in World War I.

The Plan of the Armed Services for Universal Military Training

By John J. McCloy

TWICE in our generation, our military power, backed by great wealth and industrial capacity, has been the determining factor in a world war, and on each occasion we were afforded the time by our friends and Allies, who held off the enemy while we generated the decisive power to determine the issue. If there is another world conflict, the enemy who hopes to bring us to defeat can be counted on to have read the lessons of World War I and World War II. Outstanding among those lessons will be: Strike the determining factor first, destroy the United States' war-making power, and prevent her from building up a war machine behind a protective screen of other fighting nations. That the United States is the logical No. 1 target in any large next conflict is so clear it must be assumed that our future enemies, whoever they may be, will attack us vigorously at the outset. We would be foolish indeed, with the development of weapons and the diminution of spaces, if we again assumed that we will have a measurable period of time in which to prepare while other nations hold the line.

The evolution of war has been towards multiplicity of means and complexity of methods. A modern fighting machine cannot spring from the earth. It has to be built and men must be trained to run it. Trained men and fighting machines must be ready to take the field at the shortest possible time in a conflict which we should expect will descend upon us with sudden fury. Hence the factor of time must dominate every calculation in our national defense.

It is this time factor that prompts the War and Navy Departments to recommend that the postwar military organization must rest, inter alia, upon a system of universal military training whereby the youth of the nation will constitute a reservoir of trained military manpower from which a balanced force can be speedily mobilized in the event of an emergency to meet any threat to our national security.

This paper is confined to a consideration of the recommended military training program as such and does not purport to discuss in detail the pros and cons of the system.

Types of Military Organization

A brief description of the types of military organization through which the manpower of a nation may be developed will indicate why the proposed reservoir of trained military manpower is best suited to meet the defense needs of the Nation and conforms at the same time with its ideals and traditions.

There are generally speaking two types of military organization through which the manpower of a nation may be developed. One of these is the large professional standing Army and Navy type. In theory, this type of organization can be maintained either on a voluntary or compulsory basis; in practice, and under modern conditions, it is possible only through conscription. This is the kind of army that has become familiar to us in the period between the two World Wars. In some countries, notably Russia, Germany, and Japan, it has produced highly efficient organizations; in others, it has failed. But, in all countries it has had three principal characteristics which make it unaccept-

able to Americans. First, it involves great cost. Second, it tends to concentrate leadership in war and control of military preparations and policy in peace in a professional and bureaucratic-minded military class. Third, it does not adequately provide for developing or giving play to the latent leadership and genius of the people as a whole. In these respects, it conflicts with all our traditions and has no place among the institutions of a modern democratic state based on a conception of government by the people.

The second type of military institution through which the national manpower can be developed is based upon the conception of a professional peacetime establishment no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements, to be re-enforced only in time of emergency by units such as the National Guard and newly organized units drawn from a citizen army reserve; with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to acquire practical experience through temporary active duty and to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can qualify; and with special attention to making full use of civilian skills and initiative.

An organization of this type has a number of advantages: In the first place, while the efficiency of this system depends primarily upon expert professional control, its leadership is not exclusively concentrated in a professional soldier and sailor class. All citizen soldiers and sailors after their initial training are encouraged to develop their capacity for leadership to such an extent as may be consistent with their abilities, their tastes, and civil obligations. Secondly, as a great majority of the leaders of the armed forces are included in the civil population in time of peace, an intelligent and widespread public opinion is provided as the basis for the determination of all public questions relating to military affairs. Thirdly, with a properly organized civilian army and navy reserve, relatively few officers or men need be maintained in the regular establishment to perform duties which can be performed intelligently and in time by reserve officers and reservists. The dimensions and costs of the peace establishment under this system are thus necessarily reduced to a determinable minimum.

Preference of armed services

As between these two types, the Armed Services unhesitatingly prefer the second. They feel that, apart from any other advantages, it is clearly better adapted to our traditions and national characteristics. But if the professional establishment is to be kept at a minimum, the citizen element must be *trained,* unless we are again to run the tremendous risks and incur the enormous costs of improvising an army and navy after the outbreak of war, as we did in 1917 and 1941. A program for training citizens is not a proposal for a large standing military organization; on the contrary, such a program has, as one of its fundamental elements, the keeping of the professional military establishment to a minimum.

The proposed plan for universal military training in the United States, it should be pointed out, differs radically from the conscript systems prevailing in the European and Asiatic countries. Under the military systems followed by such nations as Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and many others, the principle of *service* has prevailed, i.e., conscripts become a part of the standing army and are subject to periodic recalls. In the United States, the proposal is to give *military training* only. The trainees will not become a part of the standing Army or Navy, either during or after training. They will not be liable for further training. They will be re-

turned to civilian life upon the completion of the training period, and will not be subject to call for further training or refresher, except where Congress determines that the needs of the nation so require.

THE ARMY'S PROGRAM

Because of the scope and speed of modern war, it is the considered judgment of the Army and Navy that a reserve of young men trained in military practices can be created only by the adoption of a system of universal military training for all young able-bodied men, say between the ages of 17 and 20. The system must be universal for all in that age group because the American people will not look with favor upon a system which exempts boys who are physically and mentally qualified, nor will they tolerate a plan that bars boys that are prepared to accept the benefits and responsibilities of training, but who are disqualified because of a punctured eardrum or flat feet. In modern war there are many services of a noncombatant nature where men below physical standard can make a worthy and necessary contribution. The training should be truly universal. It should be applied impartially so that no young man capable of contributing to national defense will be exempted.

The program proposed by the War and Navy Departments is put forward solely to provide adequate training for military purposes and makes no provision for training for other purposes. The proposal of the Army and Navy calls for tough technical instruction under military or naval discipline.

Length of training

It is the further considered opinion of the Army and the Navy that the training should be for one continuous year. This is the minimum time required to develop the skills and teamwork demanded of fighting men in modern warfare. Men eligible for training in the armed services should, within quota limitations, receive training in the service of their choice. Otherwise, trainees should be allotted to the Army and the Navy, including the Marine Corps, in proportion to approved strengths of these Services.

Young men trained for a year by the Army will go through a program of training essentially the same as that which has proved so effective in the present war. The subjects to be taught, the time to be devoted to them, and the sequence of training have been battle-tested. The initial program, then, is ready at hand. Changes will be made in it from time to time, however, to keep pace with improvements in training methods and changes in the technique and materiel of warfare.

At the outset, it should be made clear that the Army training program upon which the proposed year of universal military training is modeled is that for developing units. Replacement training is quite different. Replacements in time of war have to be trained in less time. This is possible only because they are individuals who are placed into experienced units and are flanked and guided by veteran comrades-at-arms. Unit training is a far longer process—the task of a full year. And this is the sort of training we must give the young men who make up the new units upon which we must depend, in the crucial first stages of mobilization and national emergency.

Initial period

The Army's program—only the Army's program is here considered[1]—

[1] See also the article by Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs, "The Issue Should Be Decided Now," in this volume wherein is to be found a brief discussion of the Navy's program,

begins with the physical examination, outfitting, and classification of the trainee. On the basis of personal desires, background, and aptitude, the trainee will be assigned to the arm or service into which he best fits, both for his own good and for that of the military establishment. During the remainder of the initial nine-week period, whether the young man is trained by the Air, Ground, or Service Forces, the trainee will learn the fundamentals of life as a soldier. Through instructions in personal hygiene, first aid, and field sanitation, he will be taught how to care for himself and his fellows. He will learn to defend himself against chemical warfare, antipersonnel mines, and booby traps. He will become familiar with individual weapons, such as the rifle, carbine, bayonet, automatic rifle, and hand grenade. He will learn something of such essential military subjects as map reading, camouflage, and how to take cover. He will begin the year-long process of physical hardening. The training of illiterates, to bring them to the point, essential to their usefulness as soldiers, where they can read simple directives and solve elementary problems of arithmetic, will be begun. It is during this period that the trainee will make the transition from the life of the civilian to that of the soldier.

Specialized training

Next, for a period which varies from nine weeks to as many as twenty-six in the Air Forces, the trainee will become qualified in one or more of the hundreds of specialties required by a complex modern army. The length of time he devotes to training as a specialist will depend upon the field into which his desires and aptitudes, as well as the needs of a balanced military force, take him. He may, for instance, become a machine gunner, a bulldozer operator, a clerk, a radar mechanic, a truck driver, a supply technician, or an expert in aerial photography.

Having received both basic and specialized training as an individual, the trainee will next apply his individual knowledge to an assignment in small units, such as the squadron, platoon, and company. It is at this time that he will learn the meaning of teamwork. If he is in an infantry unit, he will practice day and night patrolling and will undertake special operations such as the defense or reduction of strong points. In an engineer unit he will participate in the performance of the tasks of construction and repair to which his unit is assigned. Some specialists, particularly in the Air and Service Forces, will continue advanced technical training in this period and even beyond. Particularly during training in units will trainees have the opportunity to exercise initiative and display qualities of leadership.

Simulated battle training

Then, for a period of approximately thirteen weeks, the trainee will learn the workings of a team within a team when his company is built with other companies into battalions, regiments, and finally divisions, or when his air squadron takes its place as a functioning part of a group. Infantry units will co-ordinate their efforts with artillery units. Engineer units will construct and repair airfields, bridges, and roads. Squadrons and groups will carry out attacks on designated targets.

Finally, for eight weeks the trainee will play his part, with his unit, in large-scale combined maneuvers. Here, in conditions as near to combat as can be achieved in training, Air, Ground, and Service elements will come together in simulated battle waged by two sides.

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which is very similar in outline to what is described here.

Air and Ground elements will co-operate to win their objectives. Supply of food and ammunition will be practiced, as will also the evacuation of casualties and prisoners—all under "combat" conditions. The trainee will see and share in the big picture and, throughout, every effort will be made by concurrent lectures and explanations to let him know the character of and the reasons for the training plans and problems.

Result of year's training

Throughout the fifty-two weeks, emphasis will be placed on improving the physical condition of trainees. This will be done by a graduated program of calisthenics, obstacle courses, marches, and competitive sports. By the very nature of his work, the trainee will spend most of his days out of doors.

While the program is compressed, shorn of nonessentials and dedicated to its objective of producing a reservoir of militarily trained manpower, the need for relaxation and entertainment is recognized. Periods of free time should be afforded for trainees to do with as they desire. For those who wish to advance themselves in their civilian pursuits or to explore new fields, correspondence courses and other materials for study will be available during off-duty hours. Orientation courses and discussion groups will keep the young men informed regarding current events.

On the completion of the fifty-two-week program, the trainee will return to his civilian pursuit with a knowledge of the discipline, organization, and way of life of the Army. He will have learned how to live as a soldier and with soldiers in the field. He will have become a specialist in some branch of the Air, Ground, or Service Forces and will have applied his skill to military tasks under simulated combat conditions. He will have learned the teamwork of the company or the squadron and have come to know the functioning of his immediate unit in larger units up to the division or the Air Force group. He will have participated in realistic maneuvers in which Air, Ground, and Service elements were joined in complex operations. He will have learned those *principles* of action as a soldier, a specialist, and a member of a co-ordinated team that will stay with him for many years and will change little despite frequent changes in tactics and matériel. He will become a part of a reserve of militarily trained men upon whom the nation can call to form, quickly and effectively, the fighting units it will need should Congress declare a state of emergency.

Number of trainers needed

The ratio of trainers and administrative overhead to trainees in the present war has varied depending on the degree of supervision of individual instruction required. On the basis of present experience, approximately 120,000 trainers would be required for an estimated 620,000 trainees for the Army. This is what it has taken in wartime. Requirements of universal military training under peacetime conditions would probably be less because of the absence of wartime pressure.

The allocation of trainers among the Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Army Service Forces would be in approximately the same proportion as the allocation of trainees. However, a command such as the Army Air Forces, which gives more advanced technical training of the sort requiring individual supervision and instruction, will probably need more than its proportionate share of trainers.

The great majority of trainers will be Reserve Officers and noncommissioned officers on tours of active duty. This will qualify them for their wartime du-

ties. In the case of officers, it is anticipated that up to 90 per cent will be from the Officers' Reserve Corps and the National Guard. A recent survey indicates that among those sampled 61 per cent of the officers will accept reserve commissions and 24 per cent will accept immediate active duty from a few months to several years to assist in universal military training. Others state that they may possibly do so. About 30 per cent of the enlisted men say definitely that they will or may possibly enlist in the Organized Reserve Units. This will provide the War Department with a large source of potential trainers. Ultimately as universal military training produces voluntary enlistments in Reserve components of the Army and as the Reserve Officers' Training Corps is expanded, the number coming on to temporary active duty from the Reserve pool should become ample for the purpose.

Selection of trainees

The organization for registration, examination, and selection of trainees for universal military training should be administered by a civilian agency similar to the present Selective Service System. The civilian agency will be much smaller than the present Selective Service organization for two main reasons: The number of potential inductees will amount to approximately 1,133,000 a year. There will be fewer grounds for exemption and these grounds will be more clearly defined.

Several induction dates spread throughout the year appear to be the most satisfactory. With several induction dates during the year there will be a minimum loss of time for trainees in resuming or embarking upon a business career. Likewise the disruption to the education of those desiring further education would be held to a minimum. The United States Office of Education figures indicate that about one-third of the young men of the country will be high school graduates. Figures further indicate that 10 per cent of the high school population graduates in February and about 90 per cent in June. Induction dates may be so arranged as to permit the graduates to enter the program soon after graduation.

Trainees should be paid at a lower monthly rate than men in the regular service. It is reasonable that their pay be lower since they are entering for the purpose of training only and are not subject to serve as an integral part of the armed forces. Congress should set the pay allowance for the period of training. In the age group subject to universal military training, there will be relatively few men who are married and have dependents. Moreover, the earning capacity of this age group is, by virtue of their youth, small. It is believed that the dependents' allowance should be generally similar (although not necessarily in amount) to the system used in this war.

Use of present reserve corps

The postwar military and naval establishments will require for their successful implementation not only the program of universal military training, but an expanded and strengthened Reserve Officers' Training Corps and Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps. College students who enroll in the R.O.T.C. or N.R.O.T.C. programs, having already had elementary military instruction as trainees, would be in a position to absorb an intensified reserve training program on a true university level. Officer candidate schools, similar to those tested successfully in this war, will be provided for capable graduate trainees who for financial or other reasons will be unable to attend college. The men who have completed a year's training under a program of universal

military training may apply for further and advanced training. It is hoped that by this method opportunity will be afforded graduate trainees to advance to noncommissioned and commissioned grades and to fill positions in the reserve which require more training than it is possible to give in one year.

The graduates of the year of training will be placed in the Enlisted Reserve Corps for a period of five years. At no time after the completion of the year's training will the trainees be required to undertake further military training or service except in the event of a national emergency expressly declared by the Congress and then only under such conditions as the Congress may prescribe.

In lieu of the five years in a special reserve previously mentioned, a trainee may voluntarily enroll in the National Guard, Organized Reserves, Officers' Reserve Corps, Reserve Officers' Training Corps, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps, the Regular Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or be appointed to the United States Military or Naval Academy.[2] Obviously such graduate trainees would accept responsibilities for service by the act of enrollment.

The status of the National Guard, Officers' Reserve Corps, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (which are provided for by the National Defense Act of 1920), the Naval Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, and the Naval Reserve Officers' Training Corps will not be affected other than favorably by the system of universal military training. These reserve components will be composed of men who will have been given a year of training initially under universal military training. The advantages of this training will accrue to the reserve components through the flow of graduate trainees into them, thereby enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations from a military standpoint. These will be advantages which the reserve components have never before enjoyed.

[2] It is proposed that one year of universal military training be required for candidates to West Point and Annapolis or any other national military or naval academies to be founded.

Large reservoir available

When universal military training has been in operation for a few years, the nation will have built up a reservoir of well-trained soldiers, sailors, and marines adequate to meet the initial requirements for defense in the event of war. It is expected that those trainees who have received military training within five years will be ready for service after a refresher course of from two weeks (in the case of the most recent trainees) to six weeks (in the case of those who have been out for five years). These figures are, of course, only estimates based on the best available information, but they indicate a substantial saving over the year's training required for new units in the present war. In addition to the ever available pool of trained men, an adequate program for the training of reserve and noncommissioned officers will have been provided. Thus the nation will be assured that the units of the armed forces will be ready for combat within weeks, rather than months or years, after mobilization.

With universal military training, it will be practicable to continue adherence to the Nation's traditional policy of a standing army and navy no larger than necessary for normal peacetime requirements.

ADVANTAGE OF THE SYSTEM

The military establishment in a period between wars inevitably tends to fall below the peak of professional effi-

ciency. This is true in every profession where the opportunity to exercise its calling becomes limited. Under a system of universal military training the constant flow of trainees to the system will provide a continuing challenge and stimulus, hitherto unknown in our peacetime military history, to the regular establishment which will guide and supervise the program. The problems which the mobilization for a national emergency present cannot be solved, as a practical matter, in the time required unless the professional technicians have had the experience of training, supplying, and transporting the masses of men and equipment necessary in modern and future wars. The problems will not even be flushed if they are dealt with on the basis of a paper solution. In addition the program will be under constant scrutiny by youngsters who will be critical to the quick, and who, together with their families, will assure the watchful and critical interest of the public in the performance of the system. This combination of challenge and stimulus will provide the incentives and competition which are the life of any efficient organization or group.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF WAR DEPARTMENT

It should be made clear that universal military training in the postwar military establishment is but one of the keystones around which the postwar military establishment will rest. The other keystones around which the War Department is projecting its postwar plans for a sound and balanced military establishment include the following:

1. The postwar military establishment, in being, is to be composed of the Regular Army, the National Guard, and the Organized Army Reserves. These three components should furnish divisions, air groups, and other military units necessary to form an organizational basis for the national mobilization and for a national defense in the event of a national emergency declared by Congress;

2. An adequate and sensitive military intelligence;

3. An efficient and practical scheme for industrial mobilization; and

4. An adequate program of military research and development.

Basically, the National Defense Act of 1920 calls for a relatively small Regular Army, and a National Guard useful both to states individually and to the Nation as a whole. It provides, in addition, for an Organized Reserve of citizen soldiers who are normally engaged in civilian pursuits, but are available in time of need at their country's call. The plans which the War Department is recommending for future military security do not change the basic pattern of the National Defense Act of 1920. These plans, particularly with respect to universal military training, are designed, however, to fill in gaps that have been found to exist in the national defense pattern.

The War Department firmly believes that the missions outlined for the Reserve components of our Army are obtainable only if we have universal military training.

CONCLUSION

The historic American policy of military weakness between wars and military improvisation to fight them have been dangerous and costly in American lives and wealth. In the past, it has been our habit to prepare for war after war began. A reversion to that policy would in the future not only risk disaster, which we have risked twice within twenty-five years, but make it certain.

The tendency of human beings, whose way of life has been disturbed in time of war, is to return to the habits of life

they have known. The interval between World War I and World War II provides a clear moral lesson to us. It is that a people must inherit its sense of security from the generation that has seen that security jeopardized.

The present military establishment is a temporary expedient devised for the conduct of this war. The time to lay the foundation for a peacetime establishment is now, when the experience of the generation which has borne the dangers and the heavy cost of unpreparedness is still fresh. The security of the United States is not a matter which can wait. Upon the conclusion of this war, and for some time to come, the United States will be living in an uneasy and uncertain world, full of tension and revolution born of conflict. It will be a period in which this country must consider seriously what Washington called "a respectable posture of defense."

Aside from this purely national defense aspect, which would dictate the necessity of assuring an adequate armed force, this country is now in the process of negotiating with the other nations of the world for the establishment of a general international organization in which the major powers have agreed to take all steps, including the use of *force*, necessary for the prevention of another world conflict. At least for the present, force has been recognized as an instrument which may be required to carry out the principles of co-operation among the nations of the world laid down in the organization's charter.

The proposed program of universal military training will not only assure the strength necessary to permit the country to carry out its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security, but will also, by giving our citizens a more thorough awareness of military problems, enable them to think more intelligently about what our international responsibilities should be and how they can be discharged.

It is not suggested that the security of the United States should be treated as a purely military problem. Political and economic considerations and techniques beyond the purview of the War Department's responsibility also play prominent roles. The system of universal military training here proposed is put forward as an indispensable minimum in an effective postwar military organization which will provide for the security of the United States, and enable it to contribute to the maintenance of world peace.

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Universal Military Training and Military Preparedness

By Oswald Garrison Villard

THE introduction of what is termed universal military training but can never be that, and is now proposed for only 850,000 out of a possible 1,133,000 or more boys reaching the age of 18 annually, will split our military establishment into two parts. The first will be the regular, professional Army, with distinct and separate duties at home and abroad. The second will be the organization to train the annual levy of 620,000 youths for a period of twelve months of intensive drill precisely like that given in this war to the drafted recruits. Since one of these two branches of the Army will be solely for instruction—and indoctrination—and the other will perform the domestic and overseas duties of a permanent standing Army, it needs no demonstration that there can rightly be little or no co-ordination of effort between the two forces except in maneuvers during the latter part of the training of the drafted men.

Army Proposals

What is to be the status of the trained drafted men is not wholly clear at this writing—the Army seems to have changed its program several times. Originally the proposal was to give these men "refresher courses" of one or more periods. The plan currently provides that the graduates of the year of training will be placed in the Enlisted Reserve Corps for a period of five years but will not be required to train again except in the event of a national emergency expressly declared by the Congress. This leaves much in doubt. Will the trained men be compelled to enter the Reserve by the law after their annual draft? Or will they be free to return to civil life without any connection with the military whatsoever?

Whether this dropping of the proposed refresher courses does not seriously weaken the plan from the military point of view is certainly open to discussion, for there is a widespread belief that if the trained men should be called out after four or five years they will have gone back so far in their military efficiency that much more than three or six weeks will be required to make them technically fit for immediate military service. If they are returned wholly to civil life how will the Army be able to keep in touch with them?

One thing is certain and that is that it will not be possible to combine the service functions of the Regulars and the training duties in connection with the conscripts. Writing in *Harper's Magazine* for March 1945, Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin of the *New York Times*, unquestionably foremost among our military critics, thus put the inevitable conflict in aims:

> It would be impossible in one year to train men, ship them overseas, use them for garrison or police duties, and ship them back again for discharge. It would be highly undesirable, even if possible; well trained, disciplined troops—not green, hastily trained youngsters—will be needed for the onerous business of preserving peace in a hostile, seething country like Germany. And any attempt to combine military *service* with military *training* in the short span of one year would be likely to be fatal to both concepts; the boys would be hastily and inadequately trained and their service would be brief and inefficient . . . the peace time one-year draft laws, now under discussion, cannot be applied to the occupation of Germany or of Japan or indeed to military *service* of any description. [Italics Mr. Baldwin's.]

How Shall the Conscript Be Trained?

The War Department now envisages a force of no less than 120,000 trainers to lick the annual levies into shape—a task which will be the more difficult since it now leans toward several induction dates in every year. That goes contrary to European experience and custom and it will undoubtedly greatly complicate the task of the trainers if the 620,000 recruits are split up into two or more groups always in different stages of training. According to the plan of the military a great majority of the trainers will be Reserve Officers and noncommissioned officers on tours of active duty. But if these trainers are kept permanently on the job they will be regular, permanent officers except in name. If, as is suggested, they are to be rotated from civil life and back to it after a year or two, it can be laid down now that the instruction will be gravely uneven, at times inefficient, since as everyone knows and this war has shown, the quality of our Reserve company and battalion officers has varied greatly and many have proved unsatisfactory. The military allows that 10 per cent of the officers assigned to the training will have to be regulars detached from the standing Army—presumably all the higher staff and the regimental officers and of course all the generals. That will weaken the regular Army, historically always a great sufferer from officer absenteeism on detached duty, by just that much; it would be safe to wager that a complete, permanent officer training personnel would soon be established.

While it is undoubtedly true that the use of Reserve or National Guard officers would make *them* more efficient and keep *them* abreast of military developments, this educational process would in itself conflict with the giving of completely efficient training to the annual levies—here again the induction of recruits several times in a year would greatly handicap the proposed trainers. As outlined by the War Department, the extent of the technical training to be given to the annual levies is so far-reaching that it is difficult to see how it can all be accomplished within a year. It seems impossible to believe with the military that so many technical duties and skills can be inculcated in raw recruits within a twelve months' period even if the plan of Franklin Roosevelt to devote a considerable portion of the recruit's military year to vocational education, such as bookkeeping and other civilian pursuits, is abandoned. Indeed, the late President's attitude as to that plan outraged the advocates of peacetime draft, many of whom feel, like Major George Fielding Eliot, that twenty-four months' drilling is essential for the turning out of a competent, modern, mechanized soldier. If Russia continues to be for years, if not generations, our only possible enemy—France and England can certainly be counted out with Germany and Japan ruined and disarmed—it is altogether probable that, just as soon as the one-year system is introduced here, its doubling will be demanded of Congress if Russia continues to train its cannon fodder for two years of consecutive military service.

Diversification of the Modern Army

Let us look a little more closely at the modern army. Important as infantry men are, the actual combatant foot forces at the front are today but a minority of the men in uniform, because of the character of modern war. Yet many advocates of universal military training proceed as if on the theory that Civil War, or earlier, conditions

still prevail in warfare. Thus they quote George Washington's belief that all citizens should have some military training as if we were in the infancy of the Republic. But everyone knows that to win a modern war we must have a huge air force, schooled to the minute in its skill and in the newness of its lethal weapons, and steeled to destroy civilian urban populations, men, women, and children. We must have hundreds of thousands of paratroopers ready to leap from gliders and transport planes and to face destruction as they parachute to earth. Then we must have ski troops and desert-fighting specialists, and many thousands of amphibian soldiers ready to land under fire on foreign shores. The number of artificers of every description runs into the tens of thousands. The tank corps has become so clearly the spearhead of any advance into enemy territory, and such a chief factor in warding off attacks, that it is not necessary to stress how large a part it plays as an absolutely essential military arm—let the controversy as to the relative value of the latest German and American tanks speak for itself, to say nothing of the role played by the German armor in the December 1944 offensive which came within two and one-half miles of becoming a major German victory.

As for the motor corps, the drivers of trucks, half-tracks, tractors, bulldozers, and the like, they are today as indispensable to the life and forward movement of an army as were the teamsters and mules of Grant's forces before Richmond. The huge ground forces of the air service do not comprise men prepared by just a year of military life and drill. They either bring into the service great mechanical skill and experience in dealing with engines, or have it taught to them. Pilots, technicians of all sorts, artificers and other expert personnel, cannot be improvised during boot training and physical toughening.

As for the purely scientific branches of the Army of 1945, such as the infinite number of ordnance activities, the chemical warfare service, the radio, radar, the mine-laying and mine-removing specialists, the antiaircraft gunners, the tank-gun operators so necessary for the protection of our infantry and our tanks, the photographic experts, the sound propagandists, the intelligence corps comprising both officers and enlisted men—all experts as diversified as they are vital—they plainly cannot be prepared for their tasks by a year in the ranks. Their schooling during the conscript year will forbid ventures into any side activities during the fundamental training for army service. And the same is true of the vital engineering forces which frequently alone make possible the progress of an invading army and must be ready to straddle any river, replace railroads, repair roads, docks, harbors, fortifications, and so forth, and foresee what may be required at any given point.

When we turn to the supply services, they make the old Quartermaster Corps of the regular Army seem like child's play. The magnitude of their achievement in the present war is so great that few people will ever be able to visualize it or evaluate it. To supply, equip, reequip, maintain, replace, and to feed some eleven million men scattered all over the world, and to be ready to give subsistence to hundreds of thousands of prisoners, refugees, and so forth, are not duties to be carried on with untrained underlings, no matter how skilled the men at the head. Unless qualified by previous training in civil life, the graduates of one year of conscription will here be of little value, save as unskilled laborers. Yet without skill in these vital activities no army can exist today and win wars. The

same is true of the Medical Corps whose marvelous achievements in the present struggle also need no rehearsing. Surely in the training of these many specialist branches and functions, the regular Army will have enough to do without being compelled to detach officers and trained personnel to lick 620,000 recruits into shape every twelve months.

Even this recital in nowise covers the responsibilities and duties of modern professional soldiers. The art of war never stands still—at least when war comes—and in 1945 it is evolving on land and sea at a terrific rate. As a distinguished French general correctly remarked after the First World War, no army ends a modern war with the weapons with which it began the struggle. The proof of that is the extraordinary development of alligator tanks and amphibian landing vessels of every type and description which the Army and the Navy have invented since Pearl Harbor. More than that, behind the men in uniform there are now thousands of scientists in civilian garb, hourly improving existing navigational and detection instruments, devising new ones, like radar, and increasing the means of communication and for human destruction. The latest proof of this is the creation of the atomic bomb which may either end war or threaten the very existence of humanity, and raises at once the question whether universal conscription is not now a relic of a bygone age. A conscript army will have no relation whatever to this brain-work now so absolutely necessary that arrangements are already under way for permanent civilian research laboratories to work on military problems and advances.

PEACE DUTIES OF THE REGULAR ARMY

Besides these fields of activity and preparation our postwar regular Army must concern itself with the actual testing and development of new inventions, new weapons and new apparatus. Only in recent years has the War Department been adequately interested in maneuvers. Yet their value may be illustrated by the fact that while they demonstrated not long ago the inefficiency of various regimental and general officers they also led to the discovery of strategic leadership ability in others. According to reports, the most striking case in the latter category was a lieutenant colonel, by name Dwight D. Eisenhower, who, within three or four years thereafter, found himself at the head of the greatest army of modern times, with the second highest rank bestowed upon an American soldier. Our postwar Army will have endless problems to work out which will be abridged or thwarted if there is to be unloaded upon it the task of training 620,000 civilians annually. Modern professional military training requires a *full-time effort,* even by those who have been schooled in it and have been in the service for decades.

Our military history has proved the need of that full-time effort—by default—again and again. The qualities of leadership rapidly degenerate if they are not constantly exercised in dealing with and solving military problems, and in simulation of wartime conditions. In the past our army life has been entirely too easygoing and relatively luxurious to keep the intellectual life of the bulk of its officers at anything like high-water mark. If many of our best officers are to be withdrawn from the active regular forces for routine drilling of drafted men the results will not be helpful. The preceding summary of the two differing functions the army will have if universal training is introduced has surely demonstrated this.

It must be plain, moreover, that conscription for one year will, if it is entirely successful, contribute to only

one part of our preparation for war—the foot soldiery. From the point of view of the military, it will be hurtful to its general needs if the impression prevails throughout the country that we shall be completely defended and protected if we just give our eighteen-year-old adolescents a year of relatively elementary training. That is the idea now being spread abroad.

GENERAL MARSHALL'S PROPOSALS

Actually the War Department's plans, as stated, remain misty so far as public knowledge is concerned, whatever may be the ideas of the insiders. From the beginning there has been little enlightenment afforded to the press. Thus, when General Marshall appeared before the House Military Affairs Committee in 1944, and made his effective statement that the only choice was between a large standing army and universal service coupled with a small regular force, he did not define what he meant by the adjectives "large" and "small." He left everyone in doubt as to the number of men who would be drafted, how large the "small" regular Army would be, and how great the "large" one if conscription were not granted by Congress.

Finally, on May 8, 1945, the War Department for the first time issued a press statement which afforded light. It then notified the public that the "small standing army" was to comprise no less than half a million men—from 175,000 to 200,000 more than previously provided in our history—plus the additional conscript force of 620,000 men, with the "active reserve"—if it is to be a reserve—totaling 4,000,000 men. It thus appeared that the total fixed military establishment would be 1,220,000. General Marshall would object if anybody said that this figure represents his "small standing army." But that is what it will be because it will be the existent military establishment, however often its enlisted men may change. It will be composed of the 500,000 regulars, the 620,000 drafted men and the 100,000 trainers (deducting the number of regular officers and others drawn from the regular Army). Yet in his 1944 memorandum the Chief of Staff declared that a "large standing army" has "no place among the institutions of a modern democracy." The largest previous figure for the regular Army was 325,000 in 1940; and since, in giving out that figure, the War Department itself said that it was but an "estimated" 325,000, it can be assumed that that high-water mark was never actually reached.

As for the Navy and the Coast Guard, they are to receive 230,000 recruits from the annual levy. These must be added to the proposed fleet force of 500,000 men unless the Navy should be content with having 230,000 new men to be broken in every year included in its proposed 500,000. It is also not yet clear whether or not the Navy proposes to call back its drafted men for refresher courses. At a minimum, therefore, there will be 500,000 men in naval uniform, but it will probably be a larger figure since the Navy has for years been calling in Reserve officers and enlisted men for annual drills. Taking the lower figure, for the sake of argument, our standing military and naval establishment comes to 1,720,000 men. This does not, of course, give the whole picture because the War Department announces that it will maintain a Reserve Officer's Corps of no less than 400,000 officers, many of whom will certainly be trained annually if they are not drafted to drill the annual forced levies. And this omits still another important military body—the National Guard of the states and the territories.

According to a statement by Secre-

tary Stimson and the War Department's press memorandum published in the New York dailies of May 8, the National Guard is to be built up to a force of at least 400,000, to be more efficient than ever before; it will seek to recruit many of the trained levies if universal service is adopted. The National Guard has drilled for some weeks every summer and been paid by the Federal Government. If we assume that it will have 400,000 men hereafter and that some 25,000 of the 400,000 Reserve officers will be drawn in for refresher courses in addition to those serving with the annual levies, then the total number of troops and naval men in service every summer will rise to 2,145,000 men. These will be withdrawn from industry for a short or long period each year to protect us from an attack by Russia—a very considerable blow to our economic development unless we are facing a long period of heavy unemployment. This figure could be added to if we included the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps Reserves, but as it stands 2,145,000 men in the military and naval establishments would seem to commit us to a pretty thoroughgoing militarism. Even omitting the Navy's 500,000, the remaining figure would seem to make very questionable General Marshall's statement that universal military training will save us from the burdens of a large military force.

THE VETERANS AND THE RESERVES

There is another very important matter not yet illumined by Mr. Stimson or by the War Department, and that relates to the millions of men now being mustered out, and those to be mustered out after our victory over Japan. It is an extraordinary fact that the existing selective service law, which expired on May 15, 1945, and has been renewed by the Congress for another year, specifies that all men drafted into the Army under it shall be discharged into the Reserve forces on their leaving active service. If this were lived up to we should thus have another army of millions of war-trained men available for some years to come until, because of age and for other causes, they are no longer eligible. It was never quite clear why the Army was so insistent that peacetime conscription should be voted before the conclusion of the war except on the frankly stated ground that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to obtain the necessary legislation after the conclusion of the war when the country's mind was again turned wholly to peaceful living.

In all of the Army's propaganda that this writer has seen, no reference has been made to the immediate availability for active service for at least five years of fully 4,000,000 men under the age of thirty who will have had combatant service in Europe or Asia. It has been as if the War Department wished to suppress all thought of these men being utilized again if war should come, in order to prevent their existence from being used as a reason against the proposed new conscription law. Although the law specifically states that these veterans will still be liable to another call to the colors if needed, the men now being discharged from the service are not being placed in the active Reserve. Yet they exist and will be far more valuable than any group of peacetime conscripts.

VOLUNTARY RECRUITING

If at this point it is asked how the future regular Army will be recruited it is obvious that it must come from voluntary enlistment, either of boys not yet drafted or who have served their year as conscripts. That conscription will interfere with such voluntary recruiting is altogether likely, and it is not to be denied that raising a regular

army of 500,000 will call for greater inducements and better opportunities than have yet been offered to American boys.

Let us here quote from a veteran British soldier, General J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O., known for the role that he played in the evolution of mechanized warfare which has led to his being called "the father of the tank." Writing in *Human Events* of May 2, 1945, in an article called "A Military Case Against Conscription," General Fuller says that "voluntary service, therefore, is the only possible basis upon which a professional long-service army can be recruited. Its rates of pay should, at the very least, be equivalent to the highest offered in the skilled labor market." This conclusion follows his statement that because of the tendency of modern armies to seek perfection in the quality of technical weapons, rather than in the quantity or weight of weapon power,

> a return—at least in peacetime—to the professional long-service army will in time become imperative. A medium-service army, such as the old regular British army, cannot possibly meet the requirements, because it will never attract men of high intelligence; nor will a conscript army, because its two to three years' service is insufficient to produce the technical and tactical quality demanded.

Incidentally, this is another testimony to the inadequacy of conscription for one year.

General Fuller lays the greatest weight upon the ever increasing mechanization on land, at sea, and in the air, and the extension of compulsory service to all forms of war labor, as well as to the various civil defense services, such as air-raid protection, the home guard, and so forth. Thus, he says, "has the simple nation in arms, as visualized by Clausewitz, evolved into the highly complex, total-war State —a one-eyed Cyclops." Of special value in connection with our proposed conscription are his conclusions that

> more and more, fighting organizations are becoming integrated factories of lethal power rather than aggregations of individual fighting men. This means that, as weapons become more technical so must the men who work them become more skilled. Therefore, intelligence far more than muscular strength, is required, and the consequence is that war as a whole is increasingly becoming a matter of the "special" instead of the "average" man.

Here must be added an observation by Hanson Baldwin, in the article already cited, which warns the regular Army that:

> We must also face the possibility that the existence of a mass reserve, if this reserve were trained in the concepts of the past war, not the future war, might stultify all military progress in this country; even the military might confuse peacetime conscription with military strength. There is something to be said for a compulsory training program which starts not in the piping days of peace twenty years before a war, but at the eve of international crisis, when the will and incentive to learn are whipped by events. . . . We are being asked to conscript, not for an army and navy of determined size, not to round out a military system of determined shape, not to support a foreign policy of determined pattern, but in advance of decisions on these interrelated matters.

OUR CHANGING WARFARE

More than that, we are being asked to conscript for a warfare that has undergone a most sensational and revolutionary development in the robot bomb already referred to in this article. Here we also have expert testimony. Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, Commander in Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, whose tragic death occurred some months later, declared in August 1944 that he regarded the invention of V-1 and V-2

by the Germans "as a great new weapon of war, by no means to be confused with the airplane or artillery." The quotation is from a cable in the *New York Herald-Tribune* of August 9, 1944. He admitted to the correspondents that the robot may make the airplane "more of a defensive weapon and change military science radically."

In November 1944, James Byrnes, chief assistant to President Roosevelt and now Secretary of State, informed a South Carolina audience that if we had not invaded Normandy just when we did London would probably have been completely destroyed by robot bombs.

One of the American scientists who had been co-operating with British experts in London for a period of two years was quoted on June 28, 1944, in the *New York Times* in a cable dispatch as saying: "In the postwar world, development of rocket and jet-propulsion must be placed in the hands of some international body to administer. No nation in the world could feel safe with another nation developing such weapons." Even in its present development, he declared, there is the possibility for a nation like Germany to prepare quickly and secretly during peacetime and then release thousands of tons of explosives on an unsuspecting foreign capital. He put the cost of these robot bombs at only $500 apiece if manufactured in large numbers.

That in the next war these bombs may be developed to a point where they can cross the Atlantic is admitted by all military men.[1] On May 17, 1945, Colonel E. R. Page revealed to the United Press in Cleveland that important experiments are being conducted in the aircraft engine research laboratory at the Cleveland airport with new aerial weapons "in the nature of the German V-1 and buzz-bombs." He declared that the immediate objective was to achieve the highest possible mechanization in the war against the Japanese so that instead of "engaging the suicidal Japs in man to man combat with needless loss to our troops, we are striving to engage the Japanese soldier at long range with mechanical means." It is needless to point out in the face of this vista of long distance pilotless air bombing, how impossible it is to be certain that a conscript army of one year's service will bear the slightest relation to the warfare of the future, or safeguard the country. No one can even guess how far the development of the new jet-propelled planes and rocket bombs alone will carry us.

Industry and science

We do know, as John Fischer has correctly pointed out in the January 1945 issue of *Harper's Magazine*, that the tremendous industrial capacity of America "makes it possible for the United States to buy a greater degree of security with a smaller investment of manpower than ever before." There is bound to be, however, a more and more serious clash over manpower between any conscription system and the war industries, of which the regular Army is bound to take notice. Thus, if war comes during any period after conscription is introduced, it is plain that the more militarily trained men are called back to the colors the more the war industries and agriculture will suffer. There will be an immediate demand that the millions engaged in, or forthwith needed for, the making of ships, airplanes, tanks, trucks, munitions of every kind and description, and

[1] For an amazing statement of how far German science had gone towards creating incredible new war machines, see the sensational statements of Lt. Col. J. A. Keck, Chief of the technical intelligence bureau of the Ordnance Corps, printed in the *New York Times* and the *New York Herald Tribune* of June 29, 1945.

the raising of food, be allowed to remain at their industrial and agricultural tasks, or be allotted to some such creative duties.

That this will affect the active Reserve heavily is hardly to be questioned. Indeed, the greater the role that industry and science play in the next Armageddon—and it is bound to be as much greater as the change between the First and Second World Wars—the less will be the Army's need of great forces, and the greater will be the necessity for the development of military specialties and new lines of combat. Industrial facilities, research laboratories, with scientists steadily at work, a reasonable regular army—not one to invade Siberia or China, but competent to protect our own country, with well-trained reserve and professional officers—this will surely be the program upon which a wise army leadership will concentrate, instead of upon the present efforts to draw as many millions of men as possible into the Army's orbit.

This is particularly demonstrable if we look at the air force. It is in the air that the United States has achieved many of its greatest successes in this struggle. Our high prestige and technical skill can the more easily be maintained because of the certainty that the progress of civilian aviation after the war will be enormous and unceasing. Already inventors and builders talk of airplanes that will fly around the world carrying huge loads, and of further developments of military transport airships that will not only carry large tanks but a considerable number of troops on each trip. It is certainly far more important for the Army that it should keep abreast of the tremendous air advances already in sight, and forward the instruction of competent ground force mechanics and experts, than that it should devote a great part of its means, time and strength to the handling of conscript forces. The Army will not have the unlimited sums of money to spend after the war which have been at its disposal during the war. There is bound to be a limit that Congress will set for peacetime military expenditure, which means that a competent military management will apply the funds that it receives where they will accomplish the best results.

WHAT WILL CONSCRIPTION COST?

No one knows as yet what the proposed conscription will cost since the War Department has given out no figures, but that it may go as high as $1,500 a year for each recruit is widely believed. That would mean $930,000,000 just for the conscripts in the Army alone; some guesses run as high as five billion dollars for the whole military program as here set forth. Mr. Baldwin is of those who believe that the pay of both forces alone might run to a billion dollars a year. He agrees that conscription is much more expensive than other military systems and that if Congress has to vote such vast sums for upkeep and maintenance it might readily be tempted to cut down funds for research and development, for equipment and officer training. It is quite probable that if Congress appropriates any such amounts immediately after the war when the war fever is still on and the hates engendered by the conflict are still bitter, it will soon find itself compelled to return to a more reasonable budget, especially if the incredible debt of not less than $300,000,000,000 is to be serviced and gradually paid off.

One of the arguments for conscription advanced by its advocates is that it will render the Army better understood and more popular in this country than it has ever been. The theory is that after a year's service those who have profited by the training will have a full realiza-

tion of how beneficial life in the Army's uniform is, and will appreciate its problems and difficulties.

If this should prove to be the case it will be the first recorded instance in which conscription has proved popular in peacetime. Millions of future citizens have come to this country during our history for the express purpose of escaping military service of from one to three years abroad. Peoples everywhere have resented their governments' reaching into their lives and taking the required time out of their youth when they were endeavoring to start their life's work or to complete their education. To this the usual reply is that American army service cannot be likened to the severe barrack existence in European armies. Undoubtedly service in the United States is far easier and far more comfortable and with better food than is the case under other flags. The point is, however, that it is *compulsory* and therefore unwelcome. So, it is replied, is public school education compulsory. But the parallel does not hold because the Government not only takes a whole year or more from a conscript's life, but reserves the right to order him to his death at any time during that period if an emergency develops, or during such time as he may subsequently serve in the active reserve —if any.

As for making the regular Army popular, it has never been that in our history. For generations, service in it was resorted to only by men without ties, by unsettled characters, or youths in search of adventure. This was particularly true during the long years when the Army was on the plains and in the mountains of the West, before and after the Civil War. Of recent years the Army has offered some definite advantages to those who enlisted who were ready to learn one of the trades to which recruits could be assigned. These men learned telegraphy, plumbing, electrical skills, and so forth. Still it cannot be held that the service has made a wide appeal or been what can properly be called popular. As has been said, it is not a broad educational institution; its pupils are taught not so much for what they may acquire from it, as for how they can best perform the services the Army needs. If conscription for one year should result in unpopularity for the military, it would be a high price for our professional soldiers to pay for universal military training.

DANGERS OF CONSCRIPTION

The charge has been made that one reason for the proposed huge active and reserve forces is the desire of the Army leaders to keep in their present ranks the bulk of the temporary generals created during the war, to have a large officer corps available for the more than three million men listed above, so that the skeleton force can be immediately rounded out if war comes. That every army the world over never has enough soldiers or enough officers and is ever reaching out and grasping for more power is indisputable—it was Lord Salisbury, the British Prime Minister, who declared that if the British Army had its way it would fortify Mars against the Moon. There has been growing alarm in Washington over our Army's efforts to dominate the whole war-making machinery, civilian as well as military, and its rejected demand that Congress draft all the manpower of the country. The Army has fought a marvelously successful war, not without many blunders, but on the whole with an efficiency and skill never equalled in our military history. Is it not wisdom for it to be content with what it has achieved and not to call up fear as to the danger of a large mili-

tary force, which was especially strong with the founders of the Republic?

When the Army says that conscription is necessary for the security of the United States it should be compelled by Congress to define exactly what it considers security to be, and how it can tell what will be the world situation even three or four years from now. This is certainly not the time to be legislating for the future as if that future were clear, as if the whole world were not in a state of violent evolution. But it is the time for Americans to make sure that the result of our victories in this struggle is not to fasten upon us a tremendous military establishment such as contributed so largely to the downfall of Germany and has led Japan to the destruction of millions of innocent people in its desire to extend its imperialistic sway over all of Asia. We Americans are very sure of our own virtue and our immunity to any militaristic germs, but we shall be naïve, indeed, if we fail to see that a military and naval force totaling 2,145,000, without counting any active reserves at all, will create the greatest and perhaps the most dangerous pressure group in the United States, containing no less than fully 700,000 active and Reserve officers—our "small army," according to General Marshall.

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The Value of Universal Military Training in Maintaining Peace

By Mary Earhart

THE Atlantic Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks Charter embraced the fundamental assumption that peace can be obtained in the present age only by respect for law supported by economic and military force. Both documents envisioned resort to military power as well as economic and financial sanctions for the maintenance of peace. The recourse to arms by England and France in 1939 in order to crush the Nazi and Fascist menace was a repudiation of pacifism and an approval of physical force. The passage of the Lend-Lease Act by the American Congress in 1941, placing the United States in the position of the "arsenal of democracy," was a similar negation of pacifism and an affirmation of law enforced by military superiority.

Military Commitment

It was thus logical that the fundamental assumption of the Atlantic Charter and the Dumbarton Oaks Charter should rest on the doctrine that law in our day must be supported by force, and that the same principle has been retained in the United Nations Charter, with the result that the negation of the pacifist doctrine and reliance upon force are continued as the underlying basis of the newly created international organization. The retention of this assumption is not only implied in the provisions of the United Nations Charter but also in the existence and continuance of the military understanding between the Big Five (the United States, Great Britain, Soviet Russia, China, and France) as the dominating force of the Security Council.[1]

Force, however, is not the only prop of the new international structure. Article VIII of the Atlantic Charter promised a day when spiritual means even more than force would support international law. But that day is still in the distant future. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has a definite responsibility to restrain the aggressor by force. This is not, however, the entire story. Simultaneously, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council have the function of removing by international agreements the causes of war and aggression. If the latter organs have failed in their task before the military understanding of the Big Three or the Big Five finally disintegrates, the world will be confronted with another global conflict.

In other words, the assumption of the United Nations Charter may be expressed as follows: if peace is to be maintained, every nation, great or small, must make its material contribution not only to universal security but also to the defense of its own borders against aggression by authoritarian states. A weakness of the League of Nations was the lack of a positive obligation resting upon all members to contribute a military force under the direction of the Council of the League. Under the United Nations Charter, each

[1] This view is definitely expressed in the literature that reflects the background of the military alliance of the Big Five. Compare Walter Lippmann, *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston, 1943) and his *U. S. War Aims* (Boston, 1944); James T. Shotwell, *The Great Decision* (New York, 1945); Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York, 1944); George Fielding Eliot, *Hour of Triumph* (New York, 1944).

member state is committed to maintain an armed contingent to be available upon call of the Security Council. To advise and assist the Security Council on its military requirements, a Military Staff Committee is to be established.[2] Hence the United States, as a member of the world organization, is committed, as are all other members of the United Nations, to a military program in which every one of the fifty member states is expected to participate in proportion to its physical resources.

CITIZEN ARMY PREFERABLE

It is because of this military program that the American people are now confronted with the question: Is compulsory military service a necessary requirement for the United States in order to fulfill its obligation under the United Nations Charter? General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, has already given a vigorous reply in the affirmative. He has asked for one year of compulsory postwar military training of boys attaining the age of eighteen.[3] In his military directive of August 25, 1944, he declared that a citizen army is far more desirable than a large standing army. The latter type is the totalitarian way—the kind of military organization used by Germany and Japan. Although this system produces highly efficient armies, it is open to serious political objections. The second type of military institution through which the national manpower can be developed is more nearly in accord with the democratic way of life. According to the Chief of Staff, the latter program is based upon

> the conception of a professional peace establishment (no larger than necessary to meet normal peacetime requirements) to be re-enforced in time of emergency by organized units drawn from a citizen army reserve, effectively organized for this purpose in time of peace; with full opportunity for competent citizen soldiers to acquire practical experience through temporary active service and to rise by successive steps to any rank for which they can definitely qualify; and with specific facilities for such practical experience, qualification, and advancement definitely organized as essential and predominating characteristics of the peace establishment.

This citizen army rather than a standing army is the type of military establishment which President George Washington proposed to the First Congress as one of the essential foundations of the new American Republic. This is the type of army which, in the absence of effective peacetime organization, had to be extemporized to meet American needs in World War I and World War II.

To sum up: (1) The United States is committed to a policy of force under the United Nations Charter in order to maintain international peace and government; and (2) the Chief of Staff reports that a citizen army based on

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[2] The military clauses in the Dumbarton Oaks Charter are found in Chapter VIII, Section B. The official text of this Charter was published in *Dumbarton Oaks Documents on International Organization* (Department of State Publication No. 2192, Washington, 1944). The corresponding clauses in the United Nations Charter are found in Chapter VII. The official text of this Charter is published as *Charter of the United Nations* (Department of State Publication No. 2353, Conference Series 74, Washington, 1945).

[3] See the *War Department Circular,* No. 347 (Aug. 25, 1944), pp. 4–6. Compare the account in the *New York Times,* Sept. 2, 1944. See also the statements of General Marshall and Admiral King, on June 16, 1945, before the Committee on Post-War Military Policy of the U. S. House of Representatives as reported in the *New York Times,* June 17, 1945. For the official text of these hearings, see *Universal Military Training: Hearings before the Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session, pursuant to H. Res. 465* (Washington, 1945), Pt. i, pp. 561–78.

universal military training is a necessary requirement of this policy. Thus, it follows that military training is fundamental as a strategic American weapon in maintaining an international policy of peace. Inasmuch as the directive of General Marshall represents the well-considered and official opinion of the highest military authorities in the United States, it is apparent that the burden of proof rests upon those who would contend that the military commitments of the United States can be maintained by anything less than a universal military system.

It is not the purpose of this essay to evaluate the military conclusions of the Chief of Staff. Complete information on this subject is not available outside of the War Department. It is possible, however, to assess the commitments of the United States, and to appraise the political, economic, and social implications of a national defense policy. Approaching the subject from this point of view, it may be argued that a universal selective system is required for the following reasons: (1) American world leadership and responsibility; (2) American obligations under the terms of the United Nations Charter; (3) regional commitments; (4) requirements of American national defense; and (5) the place of conscription in national defense.

WORLD LEADERSHIP AND RESPONSIBILITY

Power can be used as much as an instrument of international order and peace as it is used for aggression. The danger is not in power itself but rather in its misuse. In time of peace both power and responsibility are required to maintain the peace. Whenever the powerful have proved irresponsible, world order and peace have failed. In the incomparable words of Pascal, "Justice without force is impotence. Force without justice is tyranny. We must therefore combine justice with force."[4] A nation unwilling to accept the responsibility of its position of power and leadership is not worthy of that place. The great and still unanswered question at the San Francisco Conference—a question which hovered like a ghost in the background of every decision made from day to day—was whether or not the United States would accept and fulfill, following the Second World War, the responsibility which devolved upon her as a great world power.[5]

Today, the United States is the most powerful nation in the world. This top-ranking position in the family of nations has been achieved without any conscious effort. The place of power has been secured through (a) military might, (b) extraordinary progress in industry, trade, and finance, due partly to unusual natural resources and partly to unusual native ability for invention and new techniques, and (c) democratic idealism as proclaimed in Wilson's Fourteen Points and in the Atlantic Charter which has won the confidence of many peoples in many lands.

Military might

The United States is in the unique position of having been the decisive force in winning two world wars within the short space of a single generation. Just as Athens achieved leadership in the ancient world by the necessity of turning back the Persian hordes at Marathon, so the United States won international pre-eminence by breaking the military power of Prussia. In each instance, democratic civilization was preserved for posterity.

[4] *Pensées de Blaise Pascal* (Paris: Ant. Aug. Renouard, 1812), Vol. I, p. 241.

[5] Compare editorial in the *New York Times*, June 16, 1945.

Technology

The second reason for the position of power of the United States is her phenomenal conquest of technology. The production of aircraft at the miraculous rate of 95,000 planes a year and the production of about 1,500 ships a year astonished the Allies as much as it staggered the Axis powers. The United Nations, therefore, looked to this industrial wizard for large supplies of mechanized equipment with which to pursue the war. During the period from March 1941 to April 1945, and while equipping an army of ten millions, the United States sent abroad $38,972,000,000 worth of lend-lease war supplies.[6]

Of this amount Russia alone received 28 per cent, or $8,409,695,000. The magnitude of the shipments to this one ally seems incredible. Some 13,300 airplanes, 6,800 tanks, and 312,000 tons of explosives were shipped to Russia. In addition, 406,000 motor vehicles, 1,500 locomotives, 9,800 flat cars, 1,000 dump cars, and other large consignments of equipment were sent. To help replace the foodstuffs cut off from the Russians through occupation and destruction, the United States sent $1,312,000,000 worth of grains, cereals, sugar, meats, fats, and oils. This supply was a large amount of that used by the Russians. In the period of March 1944 to March 1945, lend-lease fats and oils constituted one-half of such commodities consumed by the armies and urban population.

Not only did the United States send to her fighting allies a treasure in equipment and supplies, but she also took the initiative in the organization of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, again because of her great industrial strength. UNRRA was an organization of forty-four nations created in November 1943 with the purpose of sending aid, especially food and clothing, to the destitute peoples of Europe. However, the United States contributed $1,350,000,000 of the $2,000,000,000 appropriated for this purpose by the United Nations.[7]

American genius has been successfully applied to the problem of marshaling international economic forces for the national defense and prosecution of war. In 1941 under the leadership of President Roosevelt, Congress created the Board of Economic Warfare. One of the important functions of this Board was preclusive buying, or the purchase from neutral countries of the important food and raw materials needed by the enemy nations. For example, Germany was in sore need of tungsten and chrome. Her supply came from Turkey, Spain, and Portugal. By 1943 the Board of Economic Warfare had secured nearly all available stocks. The work of the Board was to draw ever tighter the noose of economic strangulation around the Nazi war machine.[8]

Democratic idealism

Lastly, the leadership of the United States has been achieved by an idealism almost unprecedented in history. The moral support of this Nation to international law goes back to the Constitution itself. It was emphasized by the decisions of John Marshall and the adherence of the United States to the principle of arbitration. Law, justice, international morality have been the abiding faith and policy of this nation.[9]

[6] *Nineteenth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations for the Period ended March 31, 1945* (Washington, 1945).

[7] *Second Report to Congress on United States Participation in Operation of UNRRA, December 31, 1944.*

[8] *Report to Congress on Operations of the Foreign Economic Administration, September 25, 1945.*

[9] Manley O. Hudson, "Address before the American Bar Association at its Sixty-seventh

But even more than this, the principles of international policies set forth in Wilson's Fourteen Points and in the Atlantic Charter won the confidence of the world.

World leadership entails world responsibility. The smaller and weaker nations look to this great leviathan for help and protection. The countries of South America, the Philippine Islands, China, and Australia can make some contribution to their own defense; but for the guns, the ships, and the airplanes, as well as for leadership and strategy, they depend upon the United States. Inasmuch as this responsibility must be an abiding precept ever present in the public mind, it follows that relaxation of the principle that every citizen must be prepared to defend his country and the peace system must not be permitted to occur in the postwar era. A continuance of universal military service, requiring every young man to obtain a basic training in military affairs and the technique of co-operation with other citizens in national defense, appears to be a necessary factor in meeting the military responsibility of the United States. Alertness against a potential but unknown aggressor is the *sine qua non* of modern defense.

COMMITMENTS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

The United Nations Charter marks a new type of internationalism for the United States. In the lost years of 1920 to 1940, the majority of the people of this country felt smugly secure. They considered themselves protected by two ocean walls. They had the supposed advantage of a friendly and weak neighbor to the north. They had the protection of the British fleet which stood between them and any Fascist or Nazi aggressor in Europe. They abandoned responsibility of maintaining peace to the League of Nations which this country had sponsored but refused to support. This arrogant complacency was heightened by the spread of pacifism. Military training in the schools was held to be undemocratic, and the maintenance of a competent army and navy as provocative of war. Consequently, the great military force built up in World War I was dispersed, and in a burst of idealism, capital ships were destroyed so that this country might conform to the naval ratio of 5–5–3 adopted at the Washington Conference of 1921–1922 on the Limitation of Armaments and Far Eastern Questions. During these two decades, millions of Americans thought of democracy as a form of government that would guarantee them their liberties without requiring much in the way of personal sacrifice for the national good.

In the meanwhile, dictators arose in Europe and Asia. They saw the weakness of this great and rich land living in a utopia of unreality. Hitler and Mussolini branded the American system as "decadent democracy." The weak policy pursued by this Nation during those years constituted an encouragement to aggressor nations to destroy the peace of the world. The lesson learned by the bitter experience of America's pacifist program, which contributed much to the outbreak of World War II, has greatly influenced the adoption of the fundamental assumption of the United Nations Charter.

The commitments of the United States under the United Nations Charter may be summed up as follows. First, the United States has assumed all the responsibilities of permanent membership in the Security Council which has the task of stopping aggression by military force whenever necessary. Second, as a member of the Gen-

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Annual Meeting, Chicago, September 11, 1944," *International Conciliation*, No. 406 (Dec. 1944), pp. 757–73.

eral Assembly in which all states are equally represented, the United States is committed to participation in the negotiation of multipartite treaties designed to remove the causes of war and aggression. Third, as a member of the International Court of Justice, the United States is committed to have recourse to that tribunal for the pacific settlement of international disputes. At the same time, as a member of the United Nations, this country is pledged to support the Court by force of arms in case the Security Council so directs. Fourth, as an administrator of nonself-governing territories and as a member of the Trusteeship Council, the United States is committed to support the international trusteeship system.[10]

In addition to the commitments to participate in the new international organization for maintenance of peace, the United States has accepted with the other forty-nine members of the United Nations all the obligations contained in the military clauses of the United Nations Charter.

Under Article 43 of the Charter, every member of the United Nations is committed to contribute "armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security." These forces are to be made available to the Security Council, while the numbers and types of forces and the nature of the assistance and facilities are to be defined in special agreements negotiated between the governments of the member states and the Security Council. Article 45 requires each member state to hold immediately available various national air-force contingents for combined international action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents, and plans for their combined action, will be determined by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee, within the limits laid down in the special agreements. Plans for the application of armed forces will be made by the Security Council, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee appointed by this Council (Article 46).

The armed forces of member states, outside of the contingents promised in the special agreements, will be used for the purpose of national defense on the part of each of the member states. While the Charter lays down no program for disarmament or even limitation of armaments, in conformity with Article VIII of the Atlantic Charter, the Security Council has received power to initiate plans looking toward disarmament. It is obvious, however, that no immediate plans for disarmament are to be expected.

REGIONAL COMMITMENTS

Quite apart from any commitment arising out of World War II and the United Nations Charter, the United States has certain obligations of long standing which are as real today as ever.[11] These prewar commitments may be described as the Monroe Doctrine and the Pacific policy. The Monroe Doctrine obligated the Nation to the defense of territory from Greenland to Brazil and from Canada to the Argentine. The Pacific policy made even greater commitments. Here the area under our protection extended from Alaska to Luzon and even to the continent of Asia, as this country has long opposed the dismemberment of China. The abandonment of these long-time commitments has not been proposed.

[10] See Chapters XI–XIII of the Charter of the United Nations.

[11] Compare Major General Walter L. Weible, "The War Department and the Program for Universal Military Training," *American Association of University Professors Bulletin* (Vol. 30, No. 4, Winter 1944), pp. 491–508.

Act of Chapultepec

Commitments made within the last several years by the United States have only further implemented this responsibility. In this category are the Act of Chapultepec (March 3, 1945) and control over certain Pacific Islands as strategic bases. The Charter of the United Nations states under Article 52:

> Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence or regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangement or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

It is expected that such regional agencies will make every effort to achieve peaceful settlement of local disptues.

Thus does the United Nations Charter provide for regionalism and thus does it impose definite obligation to the maintenance of peace and security under such an agency. The Act of Chapultepec cemented the relations of the United States and the Latin American nations into a regional unit. Under this pact, the United States largely assumes the responsibility for preserving peace in this hemisphere. Section 3 of Part 1 states:

> Every attack of a State against the integrity or the inviolability of territory, or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered as an act of aggression against the other States which sign this declaration. In any case, invasion by armed forces of one State into the territory of another trespassing boundaries established by treaty and demarcated in accordance therewith shall constitute an act of aggression.[12]

[12] *Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, February–March, 1945* (Washington, 1945), pp. 40–44.

Trusteeship agreement

When one recalls that from 1919 to 1938 there were continual disturbances of the peace in the Latin American countries, the magnitude of the obligation assumed under the Act of Chapultepec becomes more apparent. The more important of these disturbances concerned relations between Panama and Costa Rica, Chile and Bolivia, Peru and Chile, Paraguay and Bolivia, and Colombia and Peru. While the other subscribers to the Chapultepec Pact will contribute to the general defense and maintenance of peace, the responsibility rests largely with the United States because of her great power and vast resources. Also, the United States has a pre-eminent influence in hemispheric action because she is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council, and hence could greatly influence the decision of the Council as to whether a disturbance might be considered a regional affair or one to come under review of the Security Council.

The newly acquired Pacific bases constitute another obligation requiring the armed protection of the United States. Chapter XII, Article 82 of the Charter of the United Nations states that "there may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies. . . ." Furthermore, under Article 84 of Chapter XII it is stated that it is the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall help in the maintenance of international peace and security, and that the administering authority shall be responsible for the local defense and the maintenance of law and order. These Pacific islands, won at such great sacrifice in 1942–45, form the outer defense

belt for continental United States. The United States will fortify these Pacific islands, together with the Philippine Islands and the Aleutians. From the Coral Sea to the Bering Sea is a distance of about five thousand miles. That area will constitute the American patrol zone in the postwar period.

Only strength and force are capable of co-operation. Weakness is not an element respected in any nation by any nation. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, despite its lofty motives, proved ineffective because neither this Nation nor any other signatory to the pact could make use of force. Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who tried unsuccessfully to implement the foregoing pact by his nonrecognition policy in Manchuria, said recently that a military training program would "show we were in earnest about backing up a security organization and it would show that while forming this new organization at San Francisco we were prepared to defend it."[13] Hence, any future Asiatic aggressor nation would be confronted not by a weak Kellogg-Briand Pact or a pacifistic nonrecognition policy, but by a line of fortified Pacific bases.

American military commitments, wholly outside of the armed contingent allocated to the Security Council under the United Nations Charter, embrace a vast and widely separated area. Such broad commitments make imperative a large navy and a large military force.

REQUIREMENTS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE

The experience of the past has shown that the weakness of certain states has invited international aggression. At the opening of the twentieth century, lack of a strong central government in China tempted unlawful interventions by Japan, Russia, Germany, and other powers. The prevalence of pacifist principles as well as unpreparedness in Britain and the United States in the thirties of the same century led Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo to gamble with the destinies of the world. The basic obligation of the United Nations Charter is nothing less than a prohibition upon military weakness and a positive requirement that every member nation must be prepared to make a contribution to the defense of its own borders as well as to the general defense of all states. Every member of the United Nations, both great and small, is under obligation to make a physical contribution to the general defense, which, on occasion, will be nothing other than its own defense against an aggressor that seeks to invade its territory. This obligation of self-defense rests equally upon powerful Britain and bucolic Denmark, upon unorganized Poland and victorious Soviet Russia.

A common fallacy holds that the defense of such countries as Denmark, Poland, and Norway is a difficult problem, while the successful defense of the United States is a foregone conclusion. It is true that continental United States was not invaded in World War II. American cities escaped the bombing that British, Netherland, French, Russian, and Chinese cities suffered. But this good fortune does not mean that American cities would be exempt from attack in a third world war. A wealth of evidence indicates that the authoritarian dictators who may precipitate a third world war will strike at the outset not little Denmark or Norway, but rather the United States, the "arsenal of democracy."

Air defense necessary

In the last days of the European campaign, the American and British air forces actually operated fifteen thousand planes in one day over Germany. It is not unlikely that with the rapid progress of aerial warfare a powerful

[13] *New York Times,* June 16, 1945.

aggressor state in 1964 (only a quarter-century after Hitler's attack on Poland) could raid the United States with fleets of ten thousand planes.[14] Again, in the summer of 1944 the Germans came very close to destroying London with the flying bomb, the *Vergeltungswaffe-1,* operated at a hundred miles distance on the Normandy coast.[15] The V-2, a thousand-ton flying bomb that traversed the stratosphere and had a radius of several hundred miles, attacked England in the last months of war. Finally, jet-propelled airplanes, with a speed approaching six hundred miles an hour, came into operation in the last hours of the German defense of *Festung Europa.* Had these new inventions reached mass production three months earlier, they would have proved an overwhelming menace to the pacifist-minded democracies.

Finally, the atomic bomb, developed in a two-billion dollar experiment by the United States and launched against Japan in the final stage of the war, has given military tactics a weapon of terrifying potentiality.

All of these weapons, infinitely developed in the laboratories of the aggressor states, will constitute a startling threat to the United States on the part of potential enemies who may seek to attack the "arsenal of democracy" through the air before attempting a land invasion of the Western Hemisphere. Preparation for the instant repulsion of such attacks is not only a duty which the American Government owes its own people but also an obligation assumed by the United States as a member of the United Nations.

[14] Regarding the future of aerial warfare, see Air Marshal William A. Bishop, *Winged Peace* (New York, 1944).

[15] For official reports on the V-1, see *Report on the Flying Bomb* (British Information Services, Sept. 1944), and *Flying Bombs* (British Information Services, Dec. 1944).

Preparedness is essential

If the American people had assurance that in a third world war this country would have adequate time for preparation for combat before the enemy struck us with decisive force, the United States might risk delay in adopting a modern program of national and international defense. Relying upon our pacifist and neutral attitude, the aggressors in the First and Second World Wars refrained from attacking the United States until the contest in each case was well under way. The ensuing period after the opening of hostilities was employed by the United States in preparation for the approaching conflict. Even so, this preparation in the Second World War was laggardly. An entire year elapsed after Germany attacked Poland in September 1939 before Congress passed the Selective Training and Service Act. It was not until March 1941 that Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act. In August 1941, almost on the eve of the sneak attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor, a proposal by the isolationists and pacifists in Congress to disband the trainees of one year's experience under the Selective Training and Service Act was defeated by a narrow vote in both houses of Congress. In the House of Representatives the vote on the extension of the Selective Service System was as close as 203 to 202.[16] If England had crumbled as promptly as France in 1940, the trend of American history might have been far different. For almost two years, only the British fleet and the Royal Air Force stood between the United States and the Nazi *Luftwaffe.* A successful invasion of Britain would have brought the Nazi *Grossraumordnung* to the shores of the Western Hemisphere.

[16] *Congressional Record* (Aug. 7 and 12, 1941), 77th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 87, pt. 6, p. 6881, and pt. 7, p. 7072.

Warlike dictators will have learned nothing from the strategy of the Second World War if they have not foreseen that success in world conquest requires an instant attack upon the "arsenal of democracy." In the next war, the aggressor must attack the United States at the outset in order to cut off the sending of food, munitions, and implements of war to the victims of the attack. American self-defense is thus world defense.

THE AMERICAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

Discussion of the size of American armed forces in the postwar period lacks reality prior to the publication of definite recommendations from the Army and Navy. This question has already been discussed between the President and the Chiefs of Staff. In due time the recommendations of the President, as Commander in Chief, will be laid before Congress in order to serve as the basis for the adoption of legislation providing for the permanent military establishment of the United States.

It is obvious that the permanent establishment must include: (1) armed forces available to the Security Council of the United Nations; (2) forces employed in occupied Germany and Japan; (3) forces established in American outposts and naval bases in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans; (4) home defense forces; (5) reserves; and (6) personnel of the Navy. The six categories offer some duplication of numbers, inasmuch as some of the armed forces available to the Security Council may be employed in American outposts and naval bases or elsewhere.

The size of the American army required to guard occupied Germany and Japan in the next five years or so has not yet been disclosed. How much air power is to be maintained in American air and sea bases in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans is still undetermined. The size of the ground forces required to support the fleets of bombers and fighters is not announced. Even the size of the forces devoted to the defense of continental America remains to be seen.

As to round figures, it is probable that over a half-million men will be required for the Navy and the Marines. Naval experts and popular opinion seem to agree that seapower, including naval aviation and amphibious operations, must be maintained at a strength that equals if not surpasses that of any other member of the Big Five. Our postwar Army has been variously estimated at about one million men. Compulsory selective service would, of course, supply personnel for both the postwar Army and the reserves.

The size of postwar armies and reserves is still a matter of speculation. The Kremlin has not disclosed its plans; in the meanwhile, estimates of six to eight million men for the Red Army and reserves have been made by various sources. The Chungking government may have six million men under arms, and France over one and a half million. The struggle to free the world of the Nazi *Grossraumordnung* and of the Japanese New Order in East Asia has been so grim that relaxation of military power by the victorious is going to be a slow process.

In any event, a drastic reduction of American armed forces to the 1940 basis would entail an enormous loss in the prestige required for American leadership in the new international organization. It would also awaken suspicion regarding the sincerity of the American commitments and thereby contribute to the weakening of international confidence and security.

Finally, it is apparent that the main-

tenance of an American army and reserve force as large as above indicated would require a system of compulsory military service. In the modern world, universal conscription is the only democratic method of raising large armies, navies, and air fleets. In other words, all young men owe an equal obligation to serve their country in a manner to be determined by the constituted authorities of the democracy. Any other method is a denial of the democratic way of life.

CONSCRIPTION IN NATIONAL DEFENSE

The American people have almost consistently ignored the advice of their military leaders in times of peace, only to turn to them in hysterical anxiety when the country became engulfed in war. They have been beguiled by the false claim that military preparation is un-American and undemocratic. The unfounded fear of the rise of a Prussian military caste system has prevented an adequate preparedness program for this country for one hundred and fifty years. We have been fortunate in the past because of a favorable geographical situation which no longer exists, and by reason of faithful allies who did the fighting while this country made preparation.

The advice of military experts upon whom this country depends for defense in time of need is as valid in time of peace as in time of war. It is an unfair responsibility to place upon them the security of the Nation and deny to them adequate preparation. The views of these experts are well known. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, testifying before the House Committee on Post-War Military Policy, said:

> The Problem of the maintenance of the future peace of the world directly involves the problem of the postwar military policy of the United States. To support our determination to maintain the peace, the world must recognize our military power as a realistic and not as a remote potential. You will have to frankly face two things, either universal military training or the hope—and that's all—that you will have a year to get ready, if another war comes.[17]

To the same Committee, Admiral Ernest J. King testified:

> This might be the last war in which our own homeland is not hit directly, and first, by the ravages of battle. We expect now that Germany and Japan will be disposed of for some time to come as aggressors in the military sense. However, the underlying warmaking motives ingrained in the minds of the people of Germany and Japan and of those of possible future aggressors, will have to be dealt with in our plans for the future. In looking back over the history of the world, one finds that aggressors are succeeded by others. No one can predict with certainty who the future aggressor will be. To have testified before Congress in the Nineteen Twenties that we would be at war with Germany and Japan in the early Nineteen Forties would have resulted in being discredited. As a citizen and a taxpayer, as well as a Naval officer of over forty years service, I emphasize the democratic nature of universal military service. I believe that every man and woman is obligated to assist in the maintenance of our national security.

In further testimony before the Committee, Secretary Henry L. Stimson, Admiral W. F. Halsey, Admiral Chester Nimitz, and General Dwight D. Eisenhower presented arguments as to the need for military training as the best means for maintaining home security

[17] A report on the public hearings before the Committee on Post-War Military Policy of the U. S. House of Representatives on June 16, 1945, appeared in the *New York Times*, June 17, 1945. For the official text of the hearings, see *Universal Military Training: Hearings before the Select Committee on Post-war Military Policy, House of Representatives, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session, pursuant to H. Res. 465* (Washington, 1945).

and national defense.[18] The proposed military training includes far more than "basic training." It also comprises technical education, co-operative techniques, travel, and psychological indoctrination. Such training requires a longer period than does a basic training designed merely to create soldiers who will obey orders. The end to be achieved is the creation of a citizen reserve composed of young men who are socially minded and willing to make personal sacrifices for the welfare of the country.[19] It envisions an organization of citizens who, having once learned the art of teamwork and collective action, will be ever ready for instant co-operation in the defense of democracy.

[18] See the *New York Times,* June 5, 16, and 17, 1945.

[19] On this point, see a remarkable statement by a young soldier, E. J. Kahn, Jr., "A Soldier's Slant on Compulsory Training," *Saturday Evening Post,* May 19, 1945, pp. 27, 94.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it may be said that the case for the use of universal selective service in the postwar era in the United States rests on the following premises: (1) the fundamental assumption of the United Nations Charter is that law in our day can be made to prevail only by force; (2) America's role of leadership and responsibility in international affairs demands an adequate military force; (3) the commitments under the United Nations Charter require forces that must depend upon universal military service; (4) regional commitments also require adequate military forces; (5) the necessities of national defense call for this system as the only democratic method of raising a large national military establishment; and finally (6) as shown in other essays in this series, this system has the support of the American people.

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Universal Military Training and American Foreign Policy

By Halford L. Hoskins

ISOLATION having disappeared, this Nation no longer can count on living its own life undisturbed by troubles elsewhere in the world. Consequently, the question has arisen—a fundamental question of policy, undoubtedly—as to how the United States can best safeguard its continued existence in a world in which war very likely will remain the ultimate expedient of the aggressor and the final court of arbitrament of the peace-loving.

A great deal of discussion has centered about this problem in recent months. Taken by and large, the significance of the views and opinions expressed lies not in their diversity or even in the failure of most of them to outline any clear line of policy but rather in the too-abundant evidence that such thinking is brand new. Certainly there has been little indication that among those concerned with public policy there is much appreciation of the unique features of American life and institutions, on the one hand, and the probable bearing on the American way of life of direct and continued participation in world problems, on the other. Generally speaking, the recommendations which have been made with reference to the necessity of meeting the problems created by the relatively sudden change in the world environment have been based on the most elementary considerations, such as the exposed position of the United States at the opening of the current war and experience in it thus far. Little progress has been made in attempting to apply this experience intelligently to probable conditions in the postwar era.[1] The one safe conclusion to be drawn from such discussions is that much hard thinking ought to be done before the United States is committed to any long-range program intended to provide maximum security in the future involving any sacrifice of cherished customs and ideals.

All Factors Should Be Considered

The purpose of this essay is to examine briefly some of the problems involved in such a change in traditional policy as is represented by recently proposed universal peacetime military training schemes, illustrated by the bill laid before Congress in January 1944,[2] and to consider some of their probable effects on the criteria and outlook of the American people and consequently on our external relations.

There is no intention here of insisting that, taking everything into consideration, the introduction of a system of compulsory military training at this period necessarily would be poor national policy. That question can be answered satisfactorily only after an expert appraisal of all of the factors involved, many of which are dealt with elsewhere in this symposium.

Probably it will be considered necessary for the United States to adopt some such manpower program as that projected, if, on mature study, it should appear that: (1) there are foreseeable dangers remaining in the world which might bring about an attack on this

[1] A notable exception to this statement is the excellent article by Hanson W. Baldwin, the *New York Times* military expert, who, in the issue of *Harper's Magazine* for March 1945 (pp. 289–30), considers many aspects of the question under the title, "Conscription for Peacetime?"

[2] H. R. 3947: 78th Cong., 2d sess.

country without warning and which would call for the hasty mobilization of huge trained army forces; (2) such a military program as proposed actually can be made to apply to the circumstances under which any such conflict would be visited upon the United States; (3) the international position of this Nation will be seriously weakened and its diplomacy rendered ineffective unless supported by the potential of force represented by a universal military training program, presumably with the concomitant of the manufacture of quantities of all of the paraphernalia of war. If beyond peradventure of doubt the strength and welfare of the United States in time of peace as in time of war require such a military training program, there is no occasion for argument: the program must be undertaken with whatever sacrifices and disadvantages it entails. The present point of reference is, however, that as yet there is no unanimity of thought among those best qualified to be heard on the subject. As long as there seems to be reasonable doubt as to the necessity for such a compulsory military training program as has been proposed, it may be worth while to examine its cost.

From every point of view the cost will be high. If the price to be paid could be measured merely in terms of money, or even time and money—and for this expenditure there could be assurance of safeguarding not only life and property but also ideals and institutions—no price would be too high. The question is by no means so simple, however. The military program proposed is intended to become a permanent feature of American life. In one way or another, it will affect every group in American society, every kind of activity, every individual life. It will cost not merely time and money, but it will also call for considerable sacrifices in the American way of life. Particularly for this reason the decision which is to be made is one of fundamental character and the issue is one of the most important and far-reaching ever to come before the American public.

National Strength

Perhaps the crux of the problem lies in the question as to what constitutes strength. There is no longer doubt in the mind of anyone that the United States henceforth must remain one of the strongest of nations. The Commander in Chief of Allied Armies, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, returned from the battle zone to advocate universal military training in peacetime as a source of national strength. He believes that only military strength is understood and respected in this world. While this may be entirely true, it should be noted that this Nation has not been without a considerable amount of influence in the world at times when its military power was negligible. Its peculiar contributions to this age, in fact, have been those derived from moral strength, which, in turn, has stemmed from free institutions.

If henceforth American lives must be lived with direct reference to the lives of other races and peoples, who, being unable to appreciate or to emulate the freedoms of the West, only covet the material advantages enjoyed in this country, the American people will have lost the great privilege of shaping their institutions in their own way. Assuming for a moment that because of developments in the way of radar, atomic forces, jet planes, rocket bombs, projectiles, and mass production of all instruments of war, they will have no option but to keep large numbers of men and vast military equipment in readiness for sudden and grand scale attack, they will have to be strong not only in conscious-

ness of the right but in consciousness of power. As Secretary of the Navy Forrestal said to the latest graduating class at the United States Naval Academy:

> the most dangerous thing for the United States to do, next to a decision to abstain from . . . a world organization, would be to assume that simply because a document has been written or a plan drawn for international organization the evolution of the plan into a living and viable instrument will be automatic. . . . One of the bricks in the international structure will be the realization by this country . . . that availability of armed force to prevent aggression is fundamental in any plan for peace.

THE PEOPLE SHOULD BE MORE ALERT

The logic of this doctrine is that the American people must never permit a belief in the brotherhood of man to obscure the fact that man is a competitive animal and, by and large, always will be likely to fight for what he wants, if not also for what he believes in. They must never cease to be diligent in seeking out improved—that is, more destructive—methods of warfare, or in building up supplies of war essentials, or in searching out the secrets of other nations. It will no longer suffice to leave the problems of war entirely to professionals.

To make assurance doubly sure, the public must be prepared for eventualities. Public education will have to begin—subtly, perhaps, but surely—to indoctrinate the youth and to instill into the minds of boys and girls such militant elements as will bring the one group not too unwillingly to their period of compulsory military training and even, if required, to military service; and the other to relevant tasks in the auxiliary services. That is to say, the American sense of values will have to be overhauled. Education and upbringing can no longer have in view only preparation for decent, peacetime pursuits. All peacetime planning will have to be predicated on the idea that war is no longer merely a remote possibility in the lives of the American people but that at some time it may be inevitable and that very probably it will be a life and death struggle when it does come.

This brings us to the likelihood that one of the more significant influences inherent in the universal military training scheme will be found in the course of time in an altered social outlook on the part of the American public generally. No program of training in the use of physical force could be devised which did not involve the acceptance of ideas in keeping with it.

An essential part of the military training process is to instill into the future soldier the belief that, in the last analysis, only the use of force counts. He must learn that in modern war any chivalrous impulse is dangerous; that the enemy must be denied all advantage; that he must be circumvented and at last eliminated, whether by starvation, flame-throwing apparatus, bombing, shelling, mines, grenades, or simple rifle and machine gun fire. He must think nothing of the suffering of his opponent except how to add to it. He must learn to regard human life as of no great value under conditions of war. He must know that all individual initiative must be kept carefully attuned to orders from above. He will learn these things at the most strategic time in his life, at the age when individual codes of conduct are being formed.

The military training program, in fact, would be largely useless were the trainees not adaptable. The criteria for living which are bound to evolve from this year of more or less intensive training will not be those which we have come to regard as characteristically American. They will hardly emphasize the idea of fair play; they will be more

concerned with the form than the substance of courtesy; they will need to substitute the extrinsic for the intrinsic. Individual thought and freedom of expression will be restricted to routine expressions, to clichés, to dogma: in a word, young men who have been regimented for an appreciable length of time at an impressionable age will not entirely escape from the experience. They will not be particularly unwilling to have their lives controlled from above; they will have sacrificed some of their heritage as citizens of a free country.

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MILITARY TRAINING

These effects, of course, will not immediately become visible. The results of one year's training will not greatly affect the body politic and even after five or ten years no striking changes in public outlook may be apparent. Nevertheless, in the course of a generation the effects will have become cumulative even if they have grown imperceptibly. It is not necessary here to dwell on the many ways in which the influences of a permanent universal military training program in all probability would be manifested. In some measure, however, they will result in the Europeanization of American life, in consequence of the admission of a certain amount of military control, or at least influence, over normal civilian activities, and military considerations may be expected to enter more and more into party politics, governmental policy, and economic and social life. There is the possibility that the tendencies toward state socialism which have become prominent during the past decade or so, coupled with the authoritarian influences of a universal military training scheme, might conspire to bring about changes in governmental processes at which the present generation would look askance.

Those inclined to view such potentialities with alarm, however, should recall that nothing in the life of nations is as certain as change, and that, in view of our relationship to the world environment, no precautions that could be taken at this juncture could forestall the many changes in the life and outlook of this country which necessarily will take place during the coming decades, in any event, in the process of adjustment to this environment. Change, though unavoidable, need not necessarily be regarded as unfortunate and it ought to be assumed that any changes involved in the measures proposed for insuring the safety of the country will be taken in stride. That some kind of neo-fascist state will evolve from these measures, as some apprehend, would not seem to be very likely, especially if a lengthy interval of peace and international stability should ensue after the present war. Presumably there will be no slowing down of the American tempo, no lessening of national enterprise. American life may even become more purposeful, in fact, but it will almost certainly depart from the familiar and characteristic pattern.

AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Any fundamental change in policy and attitude on the part of the American people could not fail of carrying over into their foreign relations. Throughout most of American history the relations of this Nation with others have been mild and unaggressive. The symbolic figure of the American people has been an "Uncle" Sam. The contributions of this country to a better world order for the most part have been acts of consideration and generosity—acts illustrated at random by the good offices of the United States Government in the Tacna-Arica contro-

versy; the arrangement of the Treaty of Portsmouth; official sponsoring of the Belgian Relief Commission; even by Lend-Lease. Not infrequently such acts have paid dividends. The return to China of the major portion of the American share of the Boxer Indemnity created an American legend in China. The participation of China in the First World War as an American Ally can be traced largely to that circumstance and American influence in China even now is not unrelated to it. The willingness of the United States to effect an arrangement leading toward the political independence of the Philippine Islands made the Filipinos almost universally loyal American Allies during the period of Japanese occupation.

It seems unlikely that similar manifestations of good will can be expected of a militarized United States in the future. They would hardly be in keeping with the spirit implicit in a policy of strength through military readiness. Already there are some who believe that for the sake of American military outposts and naval bases, as well as for the sake of better control of that essential raw material, sugar, the Philippines should be kept attached to this country. Certainly it is likely that many of the captured island groups in the Pacific will be retained as outposts and bases—protective positions against future unknowns in Asia.

Early in World War II the American Government obtained from Great Britain the use of several island bases in the Atlantic. The European war has ended, but the work of strengthening these stations goes on. At the same time efforts are being made to secure the long-range use, at least for civil air transport, of various fortified air bases constructed during the late military operations in Africa and for the sake of an oil supply with which to operate "the greatest and finest Navy in the world" to be retained after the war, according to the Secretary of the Navy, the United States has entered into treaty relations with Saudia Arabia for special oil concessions.

TREND TOWARD IMPERIALISM

These and numerous other developments along similar lines are significant. They tie in with plans to carry on into the postwar era many types of research in military science; with plans being pursued, notably through the work of the Army Industrial College, for maintaining a relationship between the General Staff of the War Department and the appropriate sections of American industry to make certain of an adequate stockpile of war matériel at all times and to provide for the prompt conversion of industry to war production in time of emergency. They are essential parts of the setting for a legislative bill to provide universal military or naval training for all male citizens in the United States upon attainment of the age of seventeen years, which, as Secretary of War Stimson has said, is "a necessary foundation on which to build the security of the United States."

These steps suggest unmistakably that the leaders of the United States Government now see no alternative to assuming all of the burdens and the risks—and presumably the prerogatives—ordinarily assumed by a world power. They suggest that this country may actually have reached the early stages of forms of national enterprise sometimes described as imperialistic. If this is true, and some of the trends point in that direction, it should not occasion great surprise, for it is difficult to think of any instance in the past in which a state once converted to a strong policy of military or naval development has found it possible to abstain from territorial expansion in one guise or another. Very generally such moves have been

made initially with the object of providing for the protection of the home country, or secondarily with the aim of safeguarding the interests of the home country, through the acquisition of islands, strategic continental bases, leases, spheres of influence, or whatever term might best apply to an area for which the power finds it expedient to assume some measure of responsibility. Any intimation that the United States ever will resort to a policy of territorial expansion would draw indignant denials from all quarters, no doubt: the intent here is merely to say that it will be hard for this country to achieve a position of perfect security in the world without a further extension of influence over land as well as sea. Did not the United States recently construct a military highway across the entire width of Canada?

DANGERS OF MILITARY STRENGTH

At all events, there can be little doubt that in the future this Nation will take a leading part in the old and treacherous international game of power politics. "The experiences of the present [war]," reads the peacetime conscription bill cited above, "conclusively establish that the lack of such a system results in unnecessary wars . . . and causes international discord and interracial misunderstandings." The obvious intent of the measure is to employ the potential strength to be built up by universal military training to reinforce any points of view advanced by this Government. This is explicit in the evidence presented to the House Post-War Military Policy Committee by the Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, who, in advocating the passage of the bill, said, "Without adequate preparedness our diplomacy becomes weak and ineffective." This point of view gives cold comfort to any student of history. There is no evidence to support the theory that wars are prevented and diplomacy made more effective by programs of conscription or by armament plans in general.

On the contrary, it might perhaps better be contended that emphasis on military preparation would seem now and again actually to have conspired with other factors to hasten war. The possession of weapons too often has been accompanied by a temptation to use them. It is difficult to suppose that the naval contest between Germany and Great Britain did not have a considerable bearing on the character and timing of the First World War, or that Russia's development of heavy industry with its potential for the manufacture of guns, tanks and planes, did not very greatly influence Nazi strategy in the Second. Former Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, insists that universal compulsory conscription is "a discredited, broken stick." On what ground, then, can peacetime conscription (plus an armaments program) find support in this country? Apparently in the fact that the absence of great military strength failed to obviate the necessity for American participation in either of the recent world conflicts and in each instance it is conceivable that a large and efficient military force in the United States would have given the aggressors pause. Probably, also, in the fact that no cure for war, not even a moral equivalent of war, yet has been found. It is a deep distrust of the future, no doubt, rather than any danger definable at present, which gives impulse to proposals for peacetime military preparedness. In a dark forest known to harbor armed men of unknown purpose, does not even the brave man esteem weapons?

A revolutionary change of military policy in this country is bound immediately to affect the relations of the United States with lesser nations. Con-

sider, for example, its effect on relations with the Latin American republics when, with no dangers visible elsewhere in the world, they come to realize that the "Colossus of the North" is no longer merely an invention of their own demagogues and designing politicians. The implication contained in the change of attitude on the part of the United States toward military preparedness is, of course, that while this country may hope that preparedness alone will tend to keep the international peace, at least as far as the Western Hemisphere is concerned, its development as a national policy is prima facie evidence of a willingness to resort to armed force whenever occasion warrants.

Consequently, the voice of the United States in inter-American councils henceforth will not be merely that of reason, but, however softly spoken, it will surely be that of might. No nations are better aware than are those of Latin America that even a well-intentioned people always will be inclined to dilute the wine of justice with the vinegar of self-interest when it lies easily within their power to fix the standard of judgment. Unless the future military potential of this country is accompanied by an unprecedented consistency in policy with respect to the Latin American states, it would not be surprising presently to find these Latin neighbors building up their own armaments to the limit with the advice and encouragement of European military missions and entering into secret pacts with each other, if not also with nations overseas, in an effort to preserve a balance of power to their liking in this hemisphere.

CO-OPERATION AMONG POWERS

No less delicate will be the relations of the United States with the major powers. With no specific opponents in sight (as of now) following the conclusion of the war, a peacetime program of military training on a broad base could mean but one thing: serious lack of confidence in, if not suspicion of, the powers which were erstwhile allies. Since it is difficult to distinguish between a military establishment intended solely for defensive purposes and one capable of being employed in offensive action, the adoption of any far-reaching military policy on the part of a state which traditionally has maintained in peacetime hardly more than a token military force could not be regarded without some concern by any other state against which military force could be applied. Consequently, it will behoove every state economically and industrially capable of doing so to look to its own defenses and to develop, if possible, a certain margin of safety, that is, superiority. It requires no imagination to see in this situation another armaments race, and the most zealous advocate of military preparedness would hesitate to assert that this would augur well for the maintenance of international stability and world peace.

At the close of the First World War the United States took the position that the existence of large armed forces in time of peace by their very existence constituted a hazard to peaceful international relations and this Government played a leading role in the general reduction of armaments. Whether or not this action materially affected the success of the then international organization, the League of Nations, is difficult to say, since the League was handicapped from the start by the defection of the United States. At all events, the League could not or did not prevent the rearming of Germany or the military preparations of Japan and Italy and a second great war ensued. The moral now being drawn from this circumstance is that those who make the peace must remain strong in order to keep it. The new United Nations Or-

ganization therefore will have to begin its labors in a milieu decidedly more militaristic than that in which the League began its work. It can hardly be supposed that this new organization, having no armed power of its own, will be able to create a much healthier international atmosphere under these conditions than did its predecessor.

The principal advantage in favor of the new Organization appears to lie in its probable support by the United States, which now proposes to follow a "strong" military policy. While this may indicate a growing realism on the part of the American people, it must also be taken as a measure of their lack of confidence in the efficacy of the new world order, or indeed in any scheme based on the co-operation of the powers. It may be submitted that any prospect of success for the new world organization must lie in the mutual regard and good will of the powers that brought it into being, and moves on the part of American Government officials to place the United States on a quasi-war footing at all times, continuing as they did while delegates of the United Nations were laboring at San Francisco to construct a charter based on world co-operation, hardly inspire optimism for the future.

MILITARY STRENGTH AS PEACE STRATEGY

Meanwhile, it is true that the United Nations Charter itself is based on the idea of the use of force in preventing aggression. At least in theory, provision is being made for a mechanism through which the armed power of the nations—substantially that of the great powers—can be brought to bear upon offenders. Therefore it can be and is being argued that this country has an obligation to maintain a powerful military force which would be available for dealing with aggressive outbreaks in any part of the world. Such an argument is specious and unworthy of serious consideration. The fact is, as has been pointed out, that, except for those maintained by the great powers which are surviving the war as victors, no noteworthy armed forces now exist in the world. Any aggressive outbreaks in other quarters could easily be dealt with by the peacetime forces of any one of the major powers, were it maintained on the basis of voluntary enlistment only.

The real question is whether or not the United States is obliged to resort to universal military training in peacetime in order to insure its own safety; in order to make its voice heard in international councils; in order to maintain international peace on the American plan. If so, all of these desiderata amounting to the same thing, the proposed universal service legislation becomes a question of high peace strategy. It is the fee for membership in the exclusive great powers society. Should those charged with the administration of the American Government always be men of great wisdom and sound judgment, the fee might not be exorbitant. Power can be applied for good quite as well as for evil. Should it not be too greatly esteemed for its own sake, or used to promote purely American interests, or employed as a substitute for calm reason and discussion in international affairs, it might become an important factor in the establishment of an effective international organization and hence be a real factor for peace.

CALIBER OF AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES

It has been blithely assumed by most of the protagonists of military preparedness that the military potential to be created by universal peacetime conscription measures would accomplish

just this end. However, the odds are long against it. Unless American relations abroad are handled with extreme tact and skill, a military potential invariably would be interpreted as a military threat and the danger of involvement in war, instead of being reduced, actually would be augmented. Properly to use this potential will call for a high order of statesmanship on the part of government heads—statesmanship not narrowly American but broadly international. Moreover, representatives sent abroad will have to possess not only unusual strength of character but also a degree of astuteness in diplomacy to which American diplomatists have not often attained. In order to ensure this plane of military stability, it will be essential very promptly to overhaul the methods of selecting public servants for international tasks and modify existing ideas of democratic procedures in order to: (1) provide long, comprehensive, and expert training for the men and women destined for public service having to do with international affairs and (2) maintain a rigid policy of selecting only men and women of high intellectual and moral caliber and adequate training for all strategic posts. Until very substantial progress is made along these lines the American people ought not to be permitted to play with loaded guns on the international playground.

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Arming Against Russia

By Norman Thomas

DURING months of active discussion of peacetime military conscription, public and private, I have become convinced of three things: (1) If conscription is passed, suspicion and fear of Russia will be the dominant reason. (2) Conscription will inevitably increase that suspicion and fear, be the signal for an armament race, and make war more likely. (3) To the degree that peacetime conscription and mass armies are an aid to the war of the future, the U.S.S.R. will be the gainer rather than the United States because of its greater population and birth rate, its geographic and strategic position, and its totalitarian government to which conscription is a more appropriate weapon than to our democracy. That democracy may indeed be corrupted by accepting a pattern which did so much to condition European peoples for dictatorship.

Our Fear of Russia

Here is the record of my experience. While in public, those against whom I have debated have denied that they wanted to arm against Russia or, more often, have ignored my question, some of them privately have admitted that Russia was the potential enemy. The man in the street nearly always admits that Russia is in his mind if he advocates conscription.

This came out with startling clearness in the hearings on peacetime conscription before the Woodrum Committee. Very early in these hearings a witness bluntly stated his opinion that we must have conscription to face Russia, and one of the Committee members (Congressman Allen) even asserted that he had come to the same opinion. His fellow committeemen did not rebuke him. Former Congressman Maury Maverick felt it necessary in his testimony to protest reference on either side to Russia, thereby emphasizing what others tried to ignore. Meanwhile, Washington buzzed with gossip that war with Russia was a paramount subject of discussion in the armed services, with some officers, especially in the Navy, believing that since war is so likely we had better have it soon while we, rather than the Russians, are at the top of our strength. All this, mind you, while our two countries are still Allies, engaged at San Francisco in making a charter for permanent security, with the European settlement still to make, and the war with Japan (in which most Americans would like Russian help) unfinished!

To be sure, the more prominent advocates of conscription do not mention Russia but give other reasons for it which, in most cases, are probably subjectively sincere. It is easy for officers to rationalize in generalities their professional interest in the great military establishment which would be created by the addition of millions of conscript trainees and reserves to the necessary standing army of experts and the large navy which the government will in any case feel compelled to maintain unless we can achieve general disarmament. Quite honestly, many officers believe in the social values of military training "for psychological indoctrination." General Eisenhower used the phrase in his support of conscription. The United States Chamber of Commerce is motivated far more than its members will admit even to themselves by the time-honored resort to militarism and imperialism, as forms

of boondoggling against unemployment, and a great source of profit in the production of supplies. It is very significant that while the support of the Chamber of Commerce for peacetime conscription was easily won, the tremendous propaganda campaign of the War Department won no labor or farm support at the hearings, and favorable testimony only from an admitted minority of educators and churchmen.

That peacetime conscription is directed against Russia would be fairly obvious even if it were not so generally admitted, because it is about the only argument for it that logically makes any sense.

The notion advanced by Under Secretary of State Grew and Secretary of War Stimson that we must have peacetime conscription to fulfill our obligations under the United Nations Charter, is either completely disingenuous or an amazing revelation of their cynical attitude toward the effectiveness of the peace organization that they support.

Look at the facts. Our present enemies will be completely disarmed. Only our Allies, the "peace-loving" nations, will retain any military strength. The policing of a disarmed Germany and Japan will neither require nor employ conscript trainees. Neither country can rearm unless the Big Three fall out and one of them encourages rearmament. Twelve American generals declare that "Germany has lost her power to make war for the next hundred years." Actually, in terms of comparable military power, there are only the Big Two. Even Great Britain cannot hold her empire without the support of America or Russia, or both, and a tacit, if at times restless, Anglo-American alliance is a virtual certainty.

DANGER OF IMPERIALISM

There can, in short, be no new world war unless the United States and the U.S.S.R. are on opposite sides. An American mass army with millions of reserves can have meaning only against Russia. No, that statement must be qualified. An American mass army might be useful for aggressive imperialism in this hemisphere, and such imperialism has been the inevitable accompaniment of militarism in the history of the great powers of Europe. Certain Latin American liberals who remember our war against Mexico and our dollar diplomacy greatly fear some such development, especially if we go in for conscription.

I cannot imagine what Latin American leaders for what tortuous reasons led Secretary Stimson to think (as he declared in one statement) that they hoped for our adoption of conscription as a sign that we would not abandon the world! On the contrary, I can imagine no greater potential threat to real good neighborliness in this hemisphere, especially since the same State and War Departments which want conscription are recklessly sending military missions to help our little neighbors arm. The most recent agreements are with Chile and Guatemala and have no conceivable relation to protection against Germany or Japan.

However potentially dangerous is this development of an American imperialism, it is certain that neither Congress nor the American people would openly admit it as a reason for reversing our historic policy and adopting the peacetime conscription which so many of our best citizens left Europe to avoid. Imperialism with armies of occupation cannot be disguised as police work. No genuine police task under the United Nations Charter, against one or more small nations who may conceivably want to run amok, will require a mass conscript American army. The Char-

ter (whose ratification I favor) is very unsatisfactory, but it is not as bad as its supporters make out when they present it as an excuse for the race in arms and conscription that our compulsory peacetime military training adoption will invite. No sheriff, desiring to substitute an effective posse for private wars in his county, would urge every man without a gun to buy one or every woman to become a pistol-packing mama. It cannot be otherwise in the family of nations. Any effective plan of international security will require at least international control of arms production and a rapidly progressive national disarmament. That was not even discussed at San Francisco, but, at worst, the arrangements there proposed do not require that the Big Five shall maintain conscript armies to make the little nations behave. American conscription, I repeat, if useful at all, will be useful only against Russia.

There are military experts who doubt the usefulness of any peacetime conscription for forming potential mass armies to conduct a war which will be begun by highly trained experts using rocket bombs and other weapons of which we scarcely dream. Hanson Baldwin, Lt. Col. Conkling, from experience with Selective Service in two wars, and the British General Fuller, "father of the tank," have developed various aspects of this problem. When General MacArthur was Chief of Staff, he praised the volunteer system and it is noteworthy that this highly articulate hero has not joined the present army chorus in demanding peacetime conscription. Military support is by no means unanimously behind the drive of a War Department which encourages officers and soldiers who are proponents of peacetime conscription to advocate what it forbids its opponents in uniform publicly to oppose.

RUSSIA'S ADVANTAGE

But, assuming that peacetime conscription might help prepare mass armies for what would necessarily be a secondary stage of the war, it is obvious from history and logic that Russia with her population, birth rate, and strategic position will profit by it far more than the United States. We are preparing for a contest with a weapon in which we are bound to be inferior. One might go farther and say that if a third world war with the United States and the U.S.S.R. as the principal adversaries reaches the stage in which decision is by mass armies rather than technological devices, the U.S.S.R. and its probable populous allies will win. At all events, it will be a war of such horror that it is the first duty of statesmanship to avoid it.

Peacetime conscription will make it very much harder to avoid war with Russia. To support it and the competitive armament and research that must go with it if our military establishment is to be effective will be very expensive. Even though many of them will get some jobs out of it, the taxpayers will resent the expense. Hence it will be necessary to play up rivalry, fear, and suspicion of our only possible adversary. It now appears that there will be plenty of differences between Russia and our country. They cannot safely be ignored or dealt with by a policy of appeasement which invites an ultimate explosion, but certainly they must not be monstrously magnified by men with a vested interest in the sale of arms or the opportunities for promotion that great armies will afford. No nation in history has ever armed against the planet Mars, or the moon. Our Nation will be no exception. As in Europe during the last century, the whole training of peacetime armies will

be with an eye on a specific rival—in our case Russia. The same process will take place in the U.S.S.R. with us as the ultimate foe.

This is so axiomatic that one marvels to find communists and ardent pro-Stalinists among our editors and commentators who advocate or do not oppose peacetime conscription. In the case of the communists, they may see in it good conditioning for their totalitarianism, or they may believe that, if our conflict will be with such weapons their holy Russia will win. But this is speculative now that the communist line is changing again and the "Spirit of Teheran" no longer broods over the communist bureaucracy. American communists may turn to a different tune on conscription.

As for the degree to which *PM* and other advocates of complete appeasement of Stalin as the price of peace have either supported and have not actively opposed conscription, that is more puzzling. It is to be explained in terms of war madness and an emotional orientation which make them think and feel in terms of fear of a Germany which never again can be a primary threat to world peace save as we or the Russians permit it.

THE ALTERNATIVE

Here, then, is a tragically dangerous situation. Sensible men know the horror of new war. They are working for an international organization, however imperfect; they particularly desire to avoid war with Russia; yet some of them advocate an American adoption of conscription which makes faith in the new United Nations a farcical pretense and inevitably magnifies the danger of war with the only other power in the world which might be willing and able some day successfully to fight us. And, worst of all, no one, or almost no one, who has the public ear has cried out for what is the obvious alternative to this madness, and the greatest possible single guaranty of peace.[1]

That alternative is, of course, agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., which Britain would certainly back, to initiate universal abolition of peacetime military conscription and progressive disarmament. Such disarmament could hardly stand alone in a world which insists on continuing power politics. But we still have time to make the sort of peace in Europe and Asia that will abate that danger. We do not need to continue a war of annihilation against Japan, without specific peace aims, which will invite the U.S.S.R. and the Communist Party to profit by Japan's destruction while it capitalizes on Asiatic resentment against Anglo-American imperialism. At all events, the effort to reach an agreement on military conscription will help solve other problems.

When I argue this, I am frequently told "but Stalin won't agree." How does any one know until we try? When the prize is nothing less than future peace, ought we not to try if the chance were one in a hundred before we submit to the fate which conscription will bring upon us? And the chances are far greater than one in a hundred. Stalin is a realist. He was, at least for many years, an antimilitarist. Less than twenty years ago he, through Litvinoff, proposed to a world in which he was not then so strong the thing I am now urging. There was no answer. If Stalin was bluffing, no one called the bluff. Today, great as is Russia's power, she has suffered enormously. She has a gigantic task of rebuilding

[1] This was in type before Congressman Martin introduced his admirable resolution for abolition by international agreements of peacetime military conscription.

and expanding her industries and cities. There is work for more men than she has so that she asks for German slave labor by way of reparation. The Russians are weary of war. Who dares to say that no agreement against military conscription is possible?

There is this further fact to remember. Our present strength gives us a few years of grace; it makes possible a holiday from conscription and competitive armament which we can use for working out this co-operative disarmament in perfect confidence that we are safe. We do not have to get Stalin's consent tomorrow morning. We can work patiently and firm patience is a value he respects.

Our business, then, in shaping an American military policy is not merely to avoid peacetime conscription now. It is actively to press for its abolition throughout the world. There are better things for our eighteen-year-old boys in tomorrow's world than to train them in the acceptance of war, the military psychology, and skill in the art of wholesale murder.

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The Issue Should Be Decided Now

By Randall Jacobs

EVERY thoughtful citizen has wondered soberly how the United States will come through the titanic storms that now sweep this warring world, and what adjustments we will make when our own survival at last is assured. The prophetic visibility is admittedly low; few of us would pretend we can see very far into the fog of uncertainty that is even the immediate future. We badly need some intellectual counterpart of radar. Even so, certain concrete facts can be made out, not all of them pleasant. One is that our old security, the security that came in part from our two broad oceans, has been repealed by science. Whereas we have been used to thinking of ourselves as out of range and almost impossible to reach, we now realize that our old ally, geography, has taken some bad blows. We accept the sobering truth that this country can be the target of a surprise attack, and is not impossible of invasion. Whatever else may be true of the postwar world, we know that much is so.

Our thinking for the future must therefore take cognizance of such circumstances as long-range bombing, supersonic speeds, and the kind of amphibious warfare we ourselves have pioneered. We will need security plans [1] suitable to the new dangers.

Those plans must encompass many things—alert scientific research is one requirement.

Those of us who advocate universal military training believe our plans also should include the creation of a reservoir of trained citizens who can in time of emergency expand the regular standing Army and Navy. I have been invited to say what merit there is in taking this step now, rather than later.

Plans Should Be Made Now

If we know what should be done, then the prudent course is to do what is required as soon as possible. If it is said that perhaps, for a period after this war, we might be relatively safe under a do-nothing policy, then the answer is that "perhaps" and "might" are not good enough when so much is at stake. The national safety is a positive good we cannot achieve too early.

Events can tell us with great clarity that we *should* have done this, on such and such a date. Unfortunately, we cannot expect perfect understanding or proof positive, until it is too late. Those who would have us postpone action, who want us to "wait and see" how things are after the war, are asking us to take a chance. As President Seymour of Yale has said, "To wait until obvious conditions demand a sudden decision is to gamble with national safety in the meantime." [2] Those are high stakes for any gambler. As a Naval officer, I would add that the long-armed weapons now at hand make that gamble far more hazardous than ever in our past.

These are troubled times, beset by great problems. We live in a day that

[1] The term more commonly used in this connection is "defense plans." This hardly seems to cover the modern situation, in which nations may wage wars thousands of miles from their own borders, not to repel an attack, as the word "defense" suggests, but to prevent it. "National security" appears more appropriate, except that a nation's security is the sum of many elements, among which are natural and industrial resources, and we are here discussing only the purely military elements that may contribute to this goal.

[2] "Should We Have Compulsory Military Training?" *Liberty*, Apr. 28, 1945.

seems sometimes to have outstripped itself, technologically. We live in a world that possesses machines holding tremendous possibilities for good and equally tremendous possibilities for destruction. We could wish that our times had chosen something else to excel in, rather than devastation, but there is no blinking our tremendous strides in that field.

We have been through two world-shaking wars, and no one knows how long it will take to heal the wounds. The distinguished Cornell historian, Professor Carl Becker, has written that postwar Europe may present a picture of "political and economic chaos, of hunger and desolation, unknown since the Thirty Years War." [3]

NEW POSSIBILITIES AND DANGERS

Perhaps the one fact that is clear is that history is taking us into unexplored territory. New nations are in the ascendant, old nations are losing their relative standing. We are by no means the largest of the nations, and new giant states may be in the womb of history. When heavily populated backward areas, technologically backward, acquire mathematics and high explosives (again to paraphrase Professor Becker) our own position in the world will not be the same, nor will we enjoy the same peace of mind. And it seems inevitable that western technology will spread, in spite of Mr. Lin Yutang's gentle insistence that soap flakes and the assembly line are not synonymous with civilization.

What ideas will seize this world of tomorrow, what words and beliefs will capture men's souls, what leaders will arise, what clashes in national aspirations will develop, no man can say. It is devoutly to be hoped that we will develop techniques in the art of peace as we have developed techniques in the art of war. Certainly our own intentions are amiable enough: it is known in every quarter of the globe that this nation wants peace. But our wishes in this regard are not always respected, as we learned on December 7, 1941. Neither do we so overawe our brother nations that they hesitate to attack us. It seemed preposterous to many thoughtful Americans that Japan would invite war with us. Many a citizen said that day: "Japan has committed national suicide." It did not seem preposterous to the Japanese, who have been convinced as deeply as we hold any convictions of our own that they are intrinsically superior, and must inevitably defeat and dominate us. We cannot always hope to understand the thought processes of other nations by applying our own. Japan studied us well, and was not impressed. Indeed, we know now that the Japanese have held us in the deepest contempt. To the Japanese this is a race war and perhaps a religious war. They are learning that they misjudged American spirit and American determination, it is true. But teaching them that lesson has cost us bitterly.

This country inspires real friendship by its ideals, which are those of men of good will everywhere. But we also engender envy and hatred, and it is tempting to foreign politicians to make us the scapegoat for their own shortcomings. It would be pleasant if we were the darling of the nations, if all nations looked upon us with deep affection. But the course of prudence is to inspire respect, rather than to hope for popularity.

As I say, the world has been through a titanic upheaval, and no man knows what winds of dissent will blow over the ruins. Our own will is for peace, for law and order. Samples of public opinion suggest that this yearning for

[3] *How New Will the Better World Be?* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944), p. 132.

peace is very strong indeed—amounting almost to a determination. Yet inquiries of the same sort discover that 60 per cent of our people believe there will be another large-scale war within fifty years.

DEFENSE PLANS SHOULD BE RECAST

Drawing plans for the defense of a nation is a task comparable to designing armor plate. Armor must be fashioned to resist existing projectiles, irrespective of any question of who might open fire. Even if the times were less unsettled, defense plans could not be based on intangible hopes and wishes. We must work in such cases with what we know, rather than what we suppose.

We know what weapons can be used against us, we know that it is possible now to raze an industrial city like Würzburg in a morning—in 20 minutes, according to some reports. We know what animosity can be whipped up, we have seen how helpless millions of conquered peoples can be set to work against us, contrary to their wishes. We know that even defeat does not always persuade our enemies that their attempt was hopeless. Knowing what devastation is possible—and possible now, not later—it is not too soon to put our house in order. A prudent man does not wait for a thunderstorm before he puts a lightning rod on his home. Neither does he assume from the fact that the sky is clear today that it will not storm tomorrow.

Opponents of preparedness plans inevitably ask: "But whom are we going to fight?" It is a question that cannot be answered. Anyone who had predicted in 1920 that 1941 would find us fighting a coalition of Germany, Italy, and Japan, with Russia as our ally, would have invited ridicule and abuse. This is a field where long-range forecasting is impossible. We did not know what 1917 would bring—but it came. We did not know what 1941 would bring—but we know now. The fact that we cannot foresee the future is an argument in favor of preparedness, not against.

We can adopt either of two systems of defense. We can maintain a large standing Army and Navy, or we can revert to George Washington's idea of a trained citizenry. In this latter case we will have a relatively small standing establishment which will be expanded in time of need by civilians previously trained.

To install a system of universal military training will require camps and schools for approximately 850,000 young men a year.[4] We have these facilities now. The Navy's trainees would report to some of the same naval training stations and the same naval air stations which trained so many of their older brothers for the present war. They would, after their "boot" training, move on to Class A Schools where we teach the technical know-how so vital to operating a modern navy. These facilities are in operating condition now, but when the war ends we will dispose of them. It does not seem provident to tear down camps and sell training equipment only to build and acquire the same thing later on. A large part of the initial cost of universal military instruction can be avoided if we use the facilities which are at hand.

RESERVOIR OF YOUNG MEN

Furthermore, our goal is to give the country a potential military strength that will command respect—to maintain, as Washington said, "a respectable posture of defense." What we are after is a body of trained men—pursuing civilian careers, but trained if they are

[4] Of 1,133,000 young men reaching the age of 18 each year, it is estimated that 850,000 will meet the physical, educational, and moral standards.

needed. Each year we delay, we lose an estimated 850,000 potential trainees, and fall that much short of attaining our full possible stature.

It is true that immediately after we demobilize a reservoir of trained men will exist—the veterans of the present war. Each year, however, brings its attrition. With each passing year the number of those men capable of an effective role in an emergency decreases sizably. By putting universal training into effect at once we can keep this reservoir full. The protection afforded by the trained veterans is considerable. It diminishes very rapidly, however. The boy who went into this war at 18 and fought for three years is a good military prospect when he comes out at age 21. He will not be quite as good when he is 25, and when he is 30 his experience and training will not substitute for the stamina and resilience of youth. We keep our blade sharp only if we replace each year those who pass the prime of military condition. The best possible reserve is a reserve of young men. To rely on the fact that we have veterans trained in this war is to stake our safety on a diminishing quantity which every passing year reduces in effectiveness.

The time to decide an issue is when the facts are fresh in mind. Right now, the importance of training, in modern warfare, is clear to everyone, civilian as well as soldier. The character of modern warfare is well understood, and we see plainly that today's weapons will grow more terrible. Our attention is perforce on the subject of war; those who hate war most sincerely have had to learn what war is and can become. It has been said that to delay a decision would let us apply a cooler judgment. I contend on the contrary that our vision will never again be as clear, our attention as undistracted, our determination to prevent national disaster so firm. Peace will pose intricate problems. There will be a hundred urgent claims on our attention. The reaction to years of the gravest responsibility may be irresponsibility. Preserving our country from the hazards of war is in the very forefront of our minds at this moment. There can be no better time to decide a question of national safety than a moment when so many citizens are so well informed from firsthand experience.

Some of those who suggest delay—and urge it sincerely, not merely to torpedo the idea—say we should wait until the servicemen are home again. A great many of our servicemen already have come home. They will have as great a voice in the discussion as they elect. As to those still in the field, samples of opinion have been taken by both the Army and Navy. These expressions indicate that a substantial majority of the servicemen approve compulsory peacetime training. No one knows better than they that training wins battles and saves lives. No one knows better than they that untrained men, confronted with the intricate weapons of today, are helpless. Our Navy radio technicians go to school for 11 months before they attempt to maintain the remarkable electronic gear used in this war. Men like that know that under the conditions of today you cannot extemporize a modern army or navy. The day of the minute man is past.

CONGRESS SHOULD ACT

I think in this connection it is useful to consider how a system of peacetime training would be adopted. Universal military training would come into being by an act of Congress. That act of Congress could be wiped off the books at any time. We are not taking an irrevocable step. The members of Congress who vote universal military training in can vote it out the next day

if they so choose. It can be abolished the day we feel safe without it—if we do. Whether such training is continued or abandoned will be a matter for the free choice of free citizens.

It is also clarifying, I think, to see clearly that what is proposed is not conscription, under which all young men would become a part of the regular Army or Navy for a stated period of unlimited service. The regular Army or Navy would of course continue to be composed of volunteers. Naval trainees will go to camp, attend service schools, receive operational training and spend a period at sea or with air squadrons—but for training and training alone. Our Naval trainees will get their sea experience aboard two reserve fleets set aside for these purposes, not aboard ships of the active or combat Navy. When these men have received their training they will return to civilian life, and only an act of Congress, declaring a national emergency to exist, could give the Army or Navy any further claim to their time or attention.

PEACE WILL BE STRENGTHENED

The allied nations are now attempting to form a world organization devoted to solving disputes by methods short of war. The prestige of the United States in the postwar world will inevitably be great. What strengthens this country will strengthen any world organization of which it is a part, and will reinforce the peace. Peace-loving nations certainly will not complain if we put our own house in order and take sensible precautions for our own survival. Done now, when we have no dispute with any nation except the remnants of the Axis, such steps could not possibly be given an ominous meaning. Those who are afraid of a paradox say it is cynical to think of defense while working for peace. That kind of word-ridden logic would conclude that it is erratic for a healthy man to take out life insurance, that it is cynical to carry life rafts on a seaworthy ship. I do not believe we need worry much about the reception this line of argument will receive from practical men of this or any other nation.

If it is agreed that we must recast our defense plans to meet new possibilities and new dangers, if it is agreed that a reservoir of pretrained citizens is an essential of those defense plans, then the sooner we get to it, the better. We could conceivably act too late. We could not possibly act too early.

Vice Admiral Randall Jacobs, U. S. N., is Chief of Naval Personnel. He has been actively engaged in the Navy since his graduation from the U. S. Naval Academy in 1906. He relieved Rear Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in December 1941.

The Issue Should Be Decided Later

By Francis J. Brown

THE discussion in this paper is limited to the matter of timing: Should America adopt compulsory military training *now?* It is not a consideration of whether compulsory military training should or should not be a national policy.[1] Those who argue for immediate action do so, primarily, on three fundamental assumptions: (1) that unless action is taken now, such legislation will never be enacted; (2) that if the present military establishments, including personnel, are permitted to disintegrate they can be rebuilt only at tremendous cost; and (3) that it is necessary now to declare a *policy of might* in order that we may demonstrate a philosophy of force in international councils.

Argument for Immediate Action

In presenting the first argument reference is frequently made to the fact that following the cessation of hostilities in World War I, America quickly reverted to a nonmilitarist policy. The American people sought, as speedily as possible, to forget war. A very considerable number of soldiers destroyed their uniforms and the few military souvenirs were soon relegated to the attic. Proponents of immediate action point to the fact that the armed forces, and especially the Army, dropped lower and lower in public esteem after November 1918. This, in turn, was reflected in decreasing congressional appropriations, until we came to the brink of another war with a weakened Navy and a standing Army of only 160,000 men. The military asserts this must not be permitted to happen again, and frankly says that unless, now in the heat of war, they capitalize upon the present emotionalism, history will repeat itself.

A high ranking Army officer recently said to the author that he was not impressed with the result of the Army survey showing that 67 per cent of those now in the armed forces favor compulsory military service, except that it argued for immediate action. He continued by saying that even these men who now favor military training, when discharged, will follow the same pattern of those discharged after the last war and become opponents rather than proponents of conscription. No stronger statement can be given of the lack of confidence with which the military views the judgment of the civilian or even of those whom it has trained. It is a declaration, too, of a lack of faith in the reasoned and deliberative processes of democracy.

In a sense, the military is taking an unfair advantage by insisting that a decision be made now that is of such far-reaching importance for the whole future of democracy, and perhaps of the world. It knows that, at this time, there can be no honest airing of the total effect of military training upon the individual. No one can now wisely criticize the armed forces in their administrative policies, in their utilization of manpower in relation to individual ability, or their development of the all-important aspect of personal attitude. At this time, they can hide behind the cloak of military secrecy in not presenting a complete analysis of the relative need of manpower and material necessary for effective war. Discretion now forbids pointing to errors of judgment in the handling of masses of men or to the times that the autocratic or-

[1] For the author's attitude on the whole issue see "Is Conscription the Way to Peace?" *California Journal of Secondary Education,* March 1945, pp. 130–135.

ganization of the military has authorized breaking faith with individuals. Likewise, their own military personnel are expressing a judgment at a time when freedom of expression, if contrary to the official position, is suspect unless prefaced with "do not quote me" or, "this is off the record." The questionnaire on which the published percentage of soldier opinion was based did not include the opportunity for the individual to check whether the decision should be made now or after all hostilities had ceased.

Whether deliberately or not, the military, by pressing the issue of conscription now, is forcing the American people to express a vote of confidence. Since this issue is being forced, the civilian must speak! During war the critic is silenced, and rightly, by just two short sentences: "The exigencies of war demand this action," and "The exigencies of war are a military secret." But in looking to the establishment of a permanent policy during peace, there should be no military secrecy. The American people are entitled to a candor impossible during war. The issues must be focused sharply and debated frankly. There should be no element of a "vote of confidence." If compulsory military training cannot stand the test of reasoned judgment, free from the emotionalism and limitation of the war period, then it would be a mistake to adopt it even if the military is successful in its strategy.

RELATIVE VALUES OF MILITARY MAINTENANCE

The second argument implies a matter of relative values. It is true that, if military training is not enacted while military camps and personnel are available, it will be necessary to build again on whatever basis the threat of World War III may demand. But what of the alternative cost of keeping 800,000 men a year in continuous training for a decade or a quarter of a century during which their services will not be needed in the defense of the Nation? Certainly the productive capacity alone of the millions of man-years that will be lost makes the momentary loss of rebuilding shrink into insignificance.

It would be interesting to know, too, the human cost of military training. The American people have a right to know the incidence of accidental injury and death due to training as compared with the normal rate for men in the same age group not in military training.

The argument of proponents of action now is important only if it is assumed first, that the entire military machine will be scrapped; and second, that World War III will come literally overnight, and without warning. Few, if any, of the opponents of immediate action assume that we shall again permit our military preparedness to shrink to the low level of 1940, unless disarmament be a sincere and universal world policy. America will retain such military establishments as the international organization and collective security shall make desirable and necessary.

The second assumption is totally false. They tell us that the next world war will open with an attack on America; that twice we have had an opportunity to prepare, but that such an opportunity will not be provided a third time. How completely the proponents fail to read the history of the last fifteen years, during which the clouds of an impending war rose first on the horizon with the militarization of Japan, the rise of the imperialism of Fascism and the militarization of the Reich. As early as Armistice Day, 1935, in a Chicago address, the late President Roosevelt warned America that we must participate in "quarantining the ag-

gressor." Our diplomats and Secret Service representatives gave us ample time to have rebuilt our armed forces and to have been adequately prepared years before the malicious attack on Pearl Harbor. If such warnings were possible for this war they will be even more inevitable in the future. There will be time then to rearm!

There is a further factor in relative values. This war, even more than World War I, shows the dependence of armed forces upon the development of new instruments of death and destruction. The implements of warfare left by the British and French at Dunkirk were completely outmoded when compared with those used on D-Day. While it is true that land must still be taken by foot soldiers, the unparalleled sweep across France and Germany indicates that mechanized units of air, sea, and land are the vital instruments of war. The irrefutable argument of experience is that a gap of only a few years between training and utilization will require retraining—actually more difficult than original training.

EFFECT UPON THE PEACE

The third argument—the effect of the acceptance of the policy of universal military training upon negotiation at the peace table—is wholly a matter of judgment. The proponents assert that only as America joins her allies with mailed fist and an assurance of continuing military might can she play her rightful role in the determination of international policy. They are forced to admit that, whatever the decision regarding conscription, America will have demonstrated her potential strength as well as her actual strength now! She will have a reserve force of 15,000,000 men, half of whom will have seen overseas duty and will be under 27 years of age. At the time of cessation of hostilities she will have a standing Army of 7,000,000, more than half of whom will be under 25 years of age. She will have a Navy unequaled by any nation of the world. The issue is in terms of whether or not she will have already demonstrated that she has accepted the fundamental policy that only might makes right. It is whether or not we will have already declared a policy of military isolation—that we will be prepared to meet all comers, friend or foe. Proponents believe that only by a precommitment of a permanent military policy will our voice have authority.

There is no parallel in history against which we can fairly appraise this position. Of the "Big Three" at the end of World War I, France, alone, had conscription as a peacetime policy. Yet, it was she who sought the hegemony of Europe and prevented the co-operation of nations that could have maintained the peace. The only basis of judgment is recourse to common sense. The policy of military isolation is a policy of suspicion of those whom we now term our Allies. It is an attitude of fear that one or another of them are our potential enemies. It is impossible to conceive that a permanent peace can be built in such an atmosphere. The structure of a peace must be based upon mutual confidence and a willingness to compromise, not on military might and the threat of force! Peace can be constructed only in an atmosphere of frankness and understanding and with no precommitments.

A recent press release stated that Russia planned to establish universal training for 15- and 16-year-old boys. But this is not military training nor is it under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Army and Navy. It includes, according to the release, vocational and health training and only the last few weeks will be "in bivouac." It cannot

be asserted that such an experience and at that age has military effectiveness as its objective. In fact, it appears to differ very little from the youth Pioneer movement of prewar years.

It is pertinent to ask, "Who are our potential enemies?" Certainly they cannot be our present enemies for those of Europe are already disarmed and those in the Pacific, pray God, soon will be! Unless we, or one of our Allies, break faith no one of our present foes can ever again rearm. Our enemy must then be one of our present Allies—else there would be no haste in making this decision, nor would there be a loss in permitting a partial disintegration of our present military establishment. To assert that this question is unimportant is to deny the military's own argument that national security is the only justification for conscription. This question cannot be cast aside as unimportant, for armaments are of value only when directed against an enemy—unless, of course, we are to declare the whole world is our potential enemy and frankly adopt a policy of unilateral action. Even such a policy will not assure peace. History reveals more illustrations of nations prepared for war who have engaged in intermittent conflict, than of those who have refused to adopt the policy of conscription and have been attacked.

CONFIDENCE IN PEACE TERMS

There is another and even more fundamental question than the relative influence of suspicion or confidence, and that is, that by taking action now we shall publicly be declaring that we have no faith in the international framework which started at Dumbarton Oaks and was carried forward in San Francisco. Conscription legislation must rest exclusively on the assumption that World War III is inevitable—that it is so imminent, in fact, that we cannot permit even a temporary interruption of the endless stream of new blood entering the armed forces. Can we keep faith with the living and the dead of this war —as we did not with those of World War I—by declaring, even while plans are being drawn for collective security and for permanent peace, that we have no faith in them? Can we prepare the mind of the youth of our Nation for collective action and peace at the same time that we declare that their bodies must be trained for an inevitable World War III? Even those who framed the bills now before the Congress recognize that the two are inconsistent. They admit in the preamble: "The details of future military organization cannot be determined with precision until after the terms of a permanent peace can be envisaged." If it is now impossible to know the future of military organization, how can the military, or the Nation, know that one year of compulsory military training of all able-bodied men is necessary?

Confidence in peace cannot be established by legislating for war. International peace must be the outgrowth of conferences, treaties, world organization, trade, and good will. We must not tie the hands of those who seek to build the framework of collective security by declaring in advance that America will go its own way in the maintenance of total military preparedness!

SURVEY OF EDUCATORS

The position of urging that action be delayed is one held by more than 75 per cent of college and university presidents and faculty members as indicated by a survey recently conducted by the American Council on Education. This has been the consistent point of view of educators. In March 1944 the following resolution was adopted by the con-

stituent members of the American Council on Education. These members included fifty-one national education associations, representing in their total membership the great majority of those in the entire field of education. They declared: It is unwise to commit the nation, at this time, to a year of compulsory military training because:

1. *Present Military Necessity:* Under the Selective Service Act, the present personnel needs of the armed forces are being met so far as the Nation's resources of manpower permit. It therefore follows that the proposed year of compulsory military training is to be conceived in terms of a postwar, not a current, undertaking. No basic change in the present Selective Service System is necessary to provide required military personnel, not only for the period of the war but also for the period immediately following the defeat of our enemies.

2. *Long-Time Military Necessity:* Since the proposed year of compulsory military service is not a question of immediate military necessity it must be appraised in long-range terms. In these terms it is clearly impossible at this time to debate fairly and intelligently the question of whether compulsory military service is a national military necessity. No one can foresee the international situation which will exist when Germany and Japan are defeated. Neither the international political nor the international military situation can be calculated while the war is still in progress. Prophecies on this subject and debate thereon at this time may prove detrimental to sound national policy and to the unity of the United Nations.

3. *Policing the Peace:* When the war is over, it may be necessary to maintain a large standing army to police the peace, and this may force us to adopt compulsory military training. No one is in a position now, however, to forecast fully the international responsibilities of the Nation after the war, and certainly not the responsibilities that relate to the occupation of foreign territories. Until the postwar national situation is clarified, it seems to us extremely unwise and even dangerous to commit the Nation to such a revolutionary change in fundamental national policy as would be the establishment of compulsory military service.

4. *The American Military Tradition:* Our American democratic tradition is strongly set against a large standing army. We, along with the great body of Americans, will support a year of compulsory military service when we are convinced that the safety of the Nation requires it. We are unreservedly for adequate preparedness, but we see great dangers in any unnecessary break with our tested democratic tradition respecting compulsory military service in times of peace.

5. *The Opinion of the Young Men Now Fighting the War:* The year of proposed military service, if adopted, will directly affect the children of the men now fighting in our armed forces. These men should have a voice in determining the desirability and soundness of compulsory military service. Their opinions cannot, however, be determined until the war is over. This constitutes another strong reason for delaying decision until peace has come.

6. *The Nature of the Peace:* The American people are fighting this war with the high hope that it will eventuate in an enduring peace. We all look for measures of international co-operation which will reduce the necessity for large-scale postwar military establishments. If, against the background of these great expectations, the President of the United States should urge a year of compulsory military training, many Americans will interpret such action as a signal for the return of the cynicism of the 1920's, or as an admission on the part of the President that we shall all continue to live in an armed camp and that the hopes of a more peaceful world are not to be realized.

CHURCH AND LABOR GROUPS

Almost without exception the church groups have declared themselves in favor of delay. The following resolution by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America is typical of that of

almost all church organizations of all denominations in America:

> The Congress of the people of the United States is now considering the possible adoption of legislation providing for postwar military conscription. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America recommends that congressional action on this matter be deferred until after the war. The churches believe that the peace should establish procedures for controlling military establishments everywhere. To this end the Christians of many nations are now directing their energies. They are doing this not only in obedience to conscience, but also because the war aims of the United Nations as defined in the Atlantic Charter anticipate the establishment of a permanent system of general security and encourage "all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments."

Labor groups join in the same plea! The following report of the American Federation of Labor Permanent Committee on Education was adopted unanimously by the Convention, November 30, 1944:

> The form and substance of such a program [of peacetime universal military training] constitute too technical and complex a problem to be dealt with hastily and without adequate study and investigation.
>
> We, therefore, urge (1) that this convention go on record against any hasty ill-considered plan for universal military conscription for youth; (2) that we request the President of the United States to appoint a national committee representing the armed forces, organized labor, management, farm organizations, and educational organizations to make a thorough study of this problem and to recommend a program of action; (3) that the Permanent Committee on Education continue to study this problem in terms of national and international developments; (4) that adequate funds be granted to the United States Office of Education to establish a research department which will be able to assist in the study.

COMMITTEE ON YOUTH PROBLEMS

In January 1945 the Committee on Youth Problems of the American Council on Education presented the following petition to the President of the United States:

> Within recent months, the high command of both the Army and Navy have recommended, to the Congress and to the people, immediate action providing for one year of compulsory military training for the male youth of the land in time of peace. In their proposals, the leaders of the armed forces state that one year of compulsory military training is required for the national security. Obviously, when and if this point is demonstrated, we and all other citizens shall join in asking for enactment of such a measure.
>
> We submit, however, that the people of this Nation have not yet seriously considered the total implications for peacetime life of the proposals for compulsory military training. Only fragmentary evidence regarding the need and operation of the program is now available. During the war, individuals and groups have, without questioning, patriotically surrendered to the Government many of their cherished rights and liberties. But the present proposals are in no sense an emergency war measure. They are concerned with the future and, we trust, peaceful life of the Nation. A law making such sweeping changes in our national policy should not be passed until the country has thought through and accepted its effect on American life.
>
> Since the present conscription law, which has successfully met our manpower needs for armed service, can be extended until the end of the war, we submit that hasty action is not required. If a question of such magnitude is enacted under the emotional pressure of war, it may well suffer the fate of the prohibition amendment and soon fall by the wayside. If compulsory military training is to become a permanent functioning part of our system of govern-

ment, it must be because the Nation is thoroughly convinced by the logic of facts that it is necessary for national security.

The American people are fighting this war with high hopes that it will eventuate in an enduring peace. At Dumbarton Oaks, the United States and her allies made substantial progress toward this important goal. Against this background of great expectation, our people should not be swept into unconsidered action.

As one of the best means to secure broad discussion of this important issue, we petition you, as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the armed forces, to appoint a broadly representative National Commission composed of leaders of such groups as Industry, Labor, Agriculture, Education, and the Church, and with representatives from the Senate and House, to consider all evidence and viewpoints regarding the defense of the Nation in peacetime and to report to the Nation at the earliest possible moment. We assume, of course, that such a Commission will call upon the leaders of our Army and Navy for testimony and advice regarding the Nation's needs. We believe that the appointment of such a Commission will elicit broad discussion of the issues involved. From the report of the Commission we should expect sound guidance in the development of a national policy which will assure the national defense and which will have the understanding support of all our people.

VIEWS OF OTHER COMMITTEES

In May, 1944, the Board of Trustees of the Child Labor Committee adopted the following resolution:

The National Child Labor Committee believes that the adoption of compulsory military training for young men under the age of 19 would affect profoundly the lives of our young people, and should not be entered into hastily. It believes that it is impossible to determine now, while we are in the midst of war, whether universal military training will be necessary to maintain peace and security after the war, and that until the postwar international situation is clarified, this country should not depart from its tradition which has always opposed conscription of youth in times of peace.

It therefore opposes action by Congress at the present time on bills providing for postwar compulsory military training.

On November 22, 1944 the National Farmers Union joined its voice with the growing number of those who seek delay in action: "We oppose any attempt to establish permanent peacetime conscription while plans are being formulated for a decent peace that will make nationalistic materialism unnecessary."

Even the American Legion (Warren Post No. 23, Bowling Green, Kentucky) on April 17, 1945 included the following statement in its resolution:

We propose that the enactment providing military conscription following the war be held in abeyance until it is determined whether this country is to become a part of a co-operative world movement or whether these co-operative measures are to fail. If they are to succeed, it is impossible for us or anyone else to determine what our national course is to be. If they are to fail, then we favor the early adoption of the program set forth above. The program which the American Legion proposes is not a patchwork program. It recognizes first, the new hazards for America in modern scientific warfare, and, secondly, that so-called universal military training, when and if passed by Congress, will probably be so modified that it would be nothing more than a delusion to look upon it as adequate national defense.

The Willard Straight Post (No. 842) of the American Legion joins its voice in protest to action now. The following release was issued on June 4, 1945:

Taking issue with the traditional stand of the American Legion on compulsory military training, the Willard Straight Post No. 842, New York City, today is sending a communication on national defense to President Truman and all

members of Congress. The Post opposes adopting compulsory training at this time and urges the appointment of a Presidential Commission, with a civilian majority and an army, navy and air force minority, to develop a comprehensive plan for postwar national defense.

Members of the Willard Straight Post, which includes writers, educators, attorneys, business, and professional leaders, say that adoption of compulsory training now "actually would hinder, rather than help, an adequate program of national defense."

The Post recommends that a commission be created by joint resolution of Congress and directed to bring in a report within one year; that it formulate our postwar defense needs and means of attaining them and that meanwhile the Nation should give its fullest support to current moves to set up a world security organization.

The full text of the Post's statement gives its reasons for believing that compulsory military training would give the country a "false sense of security" while hampering what the Post lists as our vital defense needs.

On May 5, 1945 Congressman Celler of New York included the following statement in a national broadcast which was printed on May 7 in the *Congressional Record:*

It is stated that the military security of the Nation must be placed first and not last, and that all conjectural fears should not be permitted to obscure the issue. I object to the phrase, "conjectural fears." If we as the most powerful country in the world desire to start a race among the nations of the world for bigger and better armies, for feverish expansion in the instruments of war, then by all means let's have universal military peacetime training. But let us also keep in mind the possible outcome if we embark upon such a course. Undoubtedly we will cultivate an atmosphere of distrust among our militarily weaker neighbors to the south of us and inspire them to rivalries and jealousies among themselves. The axiom developed in the past 25 years is that modern technical warfare has made stronger nations stronger and weaker nations weaker. If this is what we want, then by all means let's have peacetime militarism. *And if we desire to make absolutely certain that all proposals for the establishment of an international organization for peace will fail, then let's pass the military training bill now.*

MILITARISM OR COLLECTIVE SECURITY?

Those who insist upon immediate action assert that to delay action is tantamount to failure to declare a policy. It is the exact reverse. It is a declaration of a very definite policy! It is a declaration to the entire world that we are sincere in our efforts to build an international structure for permanent peace, that we believe honestly and wholeheartedly in collective security. To refuse to take action now is to refuse to try again the isolationist road that leads inevitably toward war; it is to resist the development of an attitude of suspicion—the same suspicion that the military is now again reviving—which kept us from being in the international organization after the last war and that prevented our active participation in the League of Nations. It was our policy of isolation during the 1920's and 1930's which prevented the applying of sanctions when Japan entered Manchukuo; it was the lack of international agreement which prevented the French from stopping the little band of 2,000 German soldiers who goose-stepped across the bridge and began the militarization of the Rhineland, now the graves of tens of thousands of American youth; it was the lack of international co-operation which permitted Italian ships, laden with soldiers, to go through the Suez Canal and begin the Italian conquest of empire.

To refuse now to follow the same

road of unilateral action is a fundamental statement of policy. It is the acceptance for peace of a policy which up to now we have accepted only during war. It is a courageous policy for only he who is fearful and suspicious must carry a loaded pistol.

The issue is not one of the end to be achieved. All seek a way to peace. The issue is: shall we seek this way to peace by declaring now that we are returning to the old policy of military isolation, or shall we, by refusing now to accept conscription, declare that we are honestly eager and anxious to cooperate with the other nations of the world and to erect a framework for international co-operation and to find the way to world peace through collective security.

What greater paradox is there than at one and the same time our diplomats are seeking to build a collective world order and our Congress considering legislation which can be justified only on the assumption that World War III is inevitable? Surely, we have now, as we had not in 1918, destroyed enough cities and shed enough of our own blood to renounce military isolation, to accept collective security, and to build now an international order in which all people everywhere believe, hope and pray that it will stand firm!

Francis J. Brown, Ph.D., is professor of education at New York University, and is on leave of absence to serve as consultant to the American Council on Education, Washington, D. C., and as education advisor of the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation. He is also engaged with numerous other educational bodies. He is associate editor of the Journal of Educational Sociology and is editor, author, or co-author of a number of works.

Public Opinion Toward Compulsory Peacetime Military Training

By Hedvig Ylvisaker

WHEN in June 1945 congressional hearings began on a bill for a peacetime draft, opinions on the issue appeared well crystallized. The reactions of the public had been carefully surveyed by various opinion polls. The views of special groups, notably educators, had been registered with equal care.[1] At that time, attitudes of the general public diverged sharply from those of the leaders of the Nation's colleges and schools. Seldom, in fact, in the history of opinion polling has a sharper conflict in views been registered. Differences in the studies preclude exact comparisons, but the American people apparently commended the principle of compulsory peacetime military training with as much vigor as the educators condemned it. Somewhat less enthusiastic than their elders, but tending to agree with them rather than with their teachers, stood the group most immediately concerned—American youth.

Public Attitude

As for the people—that is to say the civilian population of voting age—their attitudes on a peacetime draft were obviously only a part of their thinking on other postwar issues. Clearly their mood was to build a world of international comity, but with "the gun rather loose in the holster." This is the evidence of innumerable public opinion polls. Queried on various postwar issues, people have repeatedly counterbalanced majority approval of participation in an international political organization with equal support for potential force—whether an international police system, a large peacetime United States Army, or compulsory military training for American youth after the war. Admittedly the polls have not (up to the time of writing) required a selection of alternatives. But such evidence as there is indicates that the public would have considered a choice of that kind unrealistic.

Opinions on a peacetime draft were remarkably clear-cut for presumably so controversial an issue. Three major national polling agencies—the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Poll), *Fortune* Survey (Elmo Roper), and Denver University's National Opinion Research Center—have found affirmative attitudes toward the issue. True, none of the three polls explored the relationship between peacetime military training and the well-being of American youth. Possibly opinions would have been different had this been done,[2] but it is to be doubted.

The basis for this assumption is not simply the size of the favorable vote registered by the three polls, though this in itself is convincing. More significant is the fact that each organization went to the people with differently stated propositions, each substantiated its findings with its particular amplifying evidence, and each came out with almost equally large majorities. A review of the findings bears this out.

[1] Though groups other than educators—churchmen, for example—have expressed attitudes on the questions, their views are not included, as this paper is confined to results of opinion polls.

[2] Cf. the *American Magazine* Poll of Experts, discussed later in this article, where the issue was considered solely in terms of the well-being of the young men concerned.

RESULTS OF THE GALLUP POLL

The Gallup Poll, like other national polling agencies, conducts personal interviews among civilian adults in all parts of the country, representing every important socioeconomic, age, educational, regional, and political group. Since the summer of 1943 Gallup has been asking the same question, and thus is able to chart the trend of popular opinion, as follows:

After the war is over, do you think every able-bodied young man should be required to serve one year in the Army or Navy?

	Yes (Per cent)	No (Per cent)	No opinion (Per cent)
July 1943	66	27	7
Nov. 1943	63	29	8
Sept. 1944	63	23	14
Dec. 1944	70	25	5
May 1945	70	24	6

Queried on when the program should be enacted, opinions have divided sharply. Almost half of those voting for the principle said they thought the legislation should not be passed until after the war, but an equally large group wanted immediate enactment.

Though the trend of opinion on a universal draft as recorded by Gallup has fluctuated slightly, the differences have not been great, and the number favorable to compulsory training has always been large. Moreover, at the time of writing, affirmative attitudes appeared to be stabilizing at a high point.

The significance of the "Yes" vote is seen in sharper focus when compared with Gallup's earlier findings which date back to 1938. Then Hitler and Hirohito appeared remote threats to peaceful America, and few people welcomed the idea of a military draft. Even the outbreak of the European war did little to change their minds. By the summer of 1940, however, a remarkable shift in sentiment had occurred. Predominant opinion then was that a military draft was necessary. Excluding the "No opinion" vote, which ran about 7 per cent, the pre-Pearl Harbor trend was as follows:

Do you think every able-bodied young man 20 years old should be made to serve in the Army or Navy for one year?

	Yes (Per cent)	No (Per cent)
Dec. 1938	37	63
Oct. 1939	39	61
June 1940	50	50
July 1940	67	33
Aug. 1940	66	34

A fair assumption from both trends is that opinions on compulsory military training have not been generalized, but have been specifically related in people's thinking to time and circumstance.

NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER

Of equal importance in interpreting Gallup's results is the unequivocal phrasing of the question in terms of service in the Army and Navy.

This probably explains why the National Opinion Research Center found people even more receptive to the idea. The question asked by the Center was, in some respects, more generalized than

Gallup's, thus permitting those who might balk at the idea of a year's stint in either the Army or the Navy, but were receptive to something like the Reserve Officers' Training Corps or its equivalent, to vote affirmatively. While the majority recorded in the most recent survey is not as large as that previously found, it remains impressive. NORC asked:

Would you be in favor, or would you be against a law that would require boys to take a year's military training after the war when they became 18 years old?

	1944	1945
For	79 per cent	72 per cent
Against	17 " "	20 " "
No opinion	4 " "	8 " "

NORC has also substantiated its results in other ways. In the 1944 study, people's views on possible international repercussions of a peacetime draft were explored. The results were illuminating. Seven in every ten Americans thought if the United States were to embark on the program, other nations would follow suit; but they saw no serious consequences, for eight in ten felt that even if this did happen, it would not lead to future wars.

The Center also analyzed the pattern of thinking of the people who approved and who opposed compulsory training. This was done by comparing attitudes of both groups toward other postwar issues. The main fact to emerge from this comparison was the folly of attempting to identify advocates of the principle according to traditional stereotypes. For example, people who wanted peacetime military training were more favorably inclined toward United States participation in a world organization of nations (72 per cent) than those opposed to the program (63 per cent). They were markedly more certain of the correctness of President Roosevelt's pre-Pearl Harbor policies—eight in ten of them, as against six in ten of the opponents of a military draft, holding that the late President tried to keep the Nation out of war prior to the Japanese attack. And they were relatively less pessimistic about the future, though only in degree; 63 per cent of them compared with 75 per cent of the dissenting minority thought the United States would be at war within the next fifty years. On other postwar issues there was little difference between the two groups, though, not unexpectedly, more of the proponents than of the opponents of military training adhered to the view that the program would not lead to future wars.

FORTUNE SURVEY

At the time the congressional hearings on the bill commenced *Fortune* Survey had not published anything bearing directly on the question, of more recent date than July 1944. Then it sounded out attitudes on two aspects of the problem:

After the war, do you think the U. S. should draft all young men for a certain amount of army training during peacetime?

Yes	69.1 per cent
No	21.1 " "
No opinion	9.8 " "

After the war, do you think the U. S. should draft all young men for a certain amount of training during peacetime, or should we go back to the regular army system of taking volunteers only?

Draft	61.4 per cent
Volunteers	29.4 " "
No opinion	9.2 " "

Two points should be emphasized here. The first, of course, is that some people who approved the principle of a universal draft changed their minds

when given the alternative of a volunteer army. However, the shift was not great, and a considerable majority, even then, held to compulsory military training. The second point is that *Fortune* not only phrased the issue in terms of army training (like Gallup and unlike NORC), but also included the word "draft" which might have unpleasant connotations to some. Yet the affirmative vote remained large.

Asked how long the training period should last, almost half (46.9 per cent) said one year; the choice of the next largest group (16.7 per cent) was two years; and the remaining groups selected periods ranging from six months to more than two years. As to the age of the trainees, a plurality (44 per cent) voted for the eighteenth birthday, and almost a third (30 per cent) thought under 18 years was a good time to start. Only 17 per cent felt that the men should be older than 18 years. The remainder (7 per cent) withheld opinions on the issue.

Fortune explored another phase of the problem in the same study: whether or not people thought the United States could have a sufficiently large army by relying on a volunteer system. Results showed an exact split between pro and con opinions with a fairly large minority unable to make a choice.

After the war, do you think the U. S. should have an army large enough for the country's needs by taking volunteers only?

Yes	42.0 per cent
No	42.3 " "
No opinion	15.7 " "

Fortune also has reported evidence of changing attitudes toward military training, presumably brought on by altered world conditions. For example, in March 1939, Roper's interviewers found that three-fourths of the public opposed a suggestion that every adult male should spend at least two years in the Army. A year later, in May 1940, a slim majority (53 per cent) voted for compulsory military training for young men, ages 18 to 20 years. By September 1942, however, 69 per cent agreed to the general principle that every man should have some military training, even in peacetime.

INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE

The strong support for compulsory peacetime military training registered in public opinion polls should not be considered an isolated attitude, but, as previously suggested, rather a part of a larger pattern of thinking on the postwar world. Thus people have also been strongly in favor of an international police force, a large peacetime army for the United States, and other forceful measures.

Votes for an international police force have ranged from approximately 60 to 80 per cent, depending on the question asked. For example, *Fortune* Survey in 1944 found that 54 per cent of the people agreed that a general international organization would need "a permanent military police force of its own, stronger than any single nation's"; in contrast, when the Office of Public Opinion Research of Princeton University stated the proposition in terms of a police force "to keep the peace," 77 per cent agreed.

However, a Gallup Poll taken in February 1945 showed that half of the American people wanted a peacetime United States Army at least a million strong; and according to a *Fortune* Survey published in June 1945, 80 per cent said the United States should have a larger army, navy, and air corps after the war than Great Britain, Russia, China, or France.

More revealing of the pattern of opinions were answers to this question, also

published in the June 1945 issue of *Fortune:*

In the Pacific (Atlantic) area, which of these three possible strengths do you think it will be best for us to have?

	Pacific (Per cent)	Atlantic (Per cent)
Be strong enough ourselves to stop any disturbances there	58.9	47.7
Be strong enough to join with other nations to stop disturbances, but not strong enough to do it alone	32.2	42.1
Keep only a small force and wait to build it up until a disturbance threatens us	4.1	4.8
Don't know	4.8	5.4

Further questioning revealed that people divided their votes between Great Britain, Russia, and China as partners to be counted on to help us keep the peace in the Pacific; whereas in the Atlantic, main reliance was placed on Great Britain, with Russia and France in the background.

One interpretation of this cluster of attitudes, particularly as viewed against majority support for our participation in an international league, would be that confusion and contradiction mark popular American thought. But this interpretation is probably too simple, and, like most simple explanations, true only in part. A sounder interpretation is that precaution characterizes American attitudes at present. The foremost desire of the people is for peace, but, rightly or wrongly, they are not prepared to rely on any one measure to ensure fulfillment of that aim.

STUDENTS' POINT OF VIEW

Persons of an age to be subject to a peacetime military draft were somewhat less enthusiastic about the idea than were their elders. A poll taken by the Institute of Student Opinion among high school students throughout the Nation, reported in the fall of 1944, showed that less than a majority of all students favored compulsory military training for boys from 17 to 23 years of age. However, it is noteworthy that among the boys the favorable vote reached much higher proportions. The girls held back.

Are you in favor of one year's compulsory *military* training for 17- to 23-year-old boys after the war?

	Boys (Per cent)	Girls (Per cent)	Total (Per cent)
Yes	58.5	38.5	48.5
No	30.5	44.5	37.5
No opinion	11.0	17.0	14.0

High school boys welcomed the prospect of a military program more than they did that of a training program only partly military. (In this, as subsequently reported, they differed from their teachers.) The girls, however, reversed that order.

Are you in favor of one year's compulsory service *not necessarily military* for 17- to 23-year-old boys after the war?

	Boys (Per cent)	Girls (Per cent)	Total (Per cent)
Yes	46.5	45.5	46.0
No	41.0	38.5	39.8
No opinion	12.5	16.0	14.2

A suggestion of how college students viewed the issue (but only a suggestion because of the limitations of the sample) was a survey made in March 1945 among students at the University of Denver. There a majority (54 per cent) approved one year's peacetime service in the Army or Navy for all able-bodied young men. As reported in the student newspaper, the *Clarion*, a majority of men were opposed, and a

majority of women approved—thus, apparently, reversing high school opinion. Half of the students were against considering legislation on the proposal before the war's end.

EDUCATORS' POINT OF VIEW

Manifestly, what the American people thought of a peacetime draft departed drastically from the views expressed by those charged with the education of the Nation's young people. Polls of educators' opinions have shown majority disapproval of the proposed program.

An example of this point of view is the study made in January 1945 by the Division of Research of the National Education Association. Questionnaires were mailed to superintendents of schools in communities over 2,500 population, to a random sample of high school principals, and to the president or secretary of each affiliated unit of the National Education Association. Of the 7,700 questionnaires sent out, 3,800 were returned, a high proportion for this method of polling.

Replies showed that opposition was strong to immediate enactment of legislation for a peacetime draft. The question and the vote were:

Assuming that a decision is to be made now, and that your opinion will influence Congress, do you favor a full year of compulsory military training for all able-bodied young men, the training to be given in military camps under the exclusive direction of the regular military agencies: Army, Navy, etc.?

	Yes (Per cent)	No (Per cent)
Superintendents	37	63
Principals	32	68
Teachers	40	60
Total	34	64

Thus educators were almost as much against the program as the public was for it. It must be admitted, however, that the proposition put to the schoolmen was stringent—so stringent, in fact, as to bear the marks of a "loaded" question. Nor was any provision made for "no opinion" answers. In any case, the question was much more specific than any of those used in the national polls, not only in terms of conditions of training, and the implications of personal responsibility, but significantly, in the time element. As will be recalled, a fairly large proportion of the people who wanted military training also wanted legislation postponed until after the war. This may partly account for the striking discrepancy in attitudes between the two groups.

But certainly if educators could have their say, legislation would be delayed until after the war. They voted 68 per cent strong against immediate consideration. Their dislike of current proposals obviously did not stem from a generalized opposition to all military training—pacifism was not its root; for eight out of ten of all educators queried stated that they were not against all forms of compulsory peacetime military training.

Alternatives lacking

It was not too clear, however, just what kind of program leaders of education would substitute for a straight-line military draft. Approximately 50 per cent favored a combined plan—military training plus something else. But their suggestions, when specific, were so varied as to prevent cataloguing. From the evidence on hand, however, it is clear that most of those who were specific were inclined to give schools and colleges a hand in the process. Here are some comments illustrative of typical points of view:

I favor a program of military training,

majority of women approved—thus, apparently, reversing high school opinion. Half of the students were against considering legislation on the proposal before the war's end.

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I favor a program of military training,

integrated with, and geared into, our public schools.

All college men should be able to take the required amount of military training in college.

Require three years' military training in all high schools.

Combination military-institutional direction. An integrated educational and military program, including physical rehabilitation.

Summer camps only, except for boys out of school.

Can best be done in R.O.T.C. units during school vacation.

An earlier study made in May 1944 by the National Education Association explored in greater detail educators' views on the kind of program deemed desirable. In this survey, superintendents only were asked for expressions of opinion. They voted overwhelmingly (85 per cent of the total return) for a more extensive preparedness program than in prewar years. Few, however, envisioned a strictly military plan, and most preferred a nonmilitary, or combined military-camping-national service program. The question and summary of replies follows:

If the United States were to move toward some type of more extensive preparation for possible future emergencies, what type of program would you consider best, or least objectionable?

Compulsory national service (Camp and non-camp service, combining citizenship training with service on national projects)	7 per cent
State and local camping program	15 " "
Compulsory military training	25 " "
Some combination of 2 or more of the above	53 " "

Opinion of College and University Presidents

College and university presidents were even more decidedly against immediate enactment of a compulsory military training program. In a survey by the American Council of Education and the American Association of Junior Colleges among more than a thousand university and college presidents, 77 per cent advised delay in congressional consideration of the measure. Instead, they strongly urged the setting up of a national commission to study the problem and make recommendations to Congress:

Do you favor the creation by the Congress of a national commission representative of many interests—Army, Navy, Education, Business, Labor, Agriculture and Religion—to study all aspects of postwar national defense, including universal military training, and to make recommendations to the Congress?

Yes	80.1 per cent
No	9.5 " "
Uncertain	6.9 " "
No answer	3.5 " "

Judgments of university and college presidents on the principle of a peacetime draft were not, however, as decisive as those found in the National Education Association poll, possibly reflecting in part the difference in the questions asked. Not any more of them than of the schoolmen approved the principle, but less than half (in contrast to almost two-thirds in the NEA study) were definitely against it, and almost one-seventh were unable to make up their minds or did not answer the question.

If the decision concerning universal military training is to be made now, do you favor the establishment as a peacetime policy of some form of military training for physically qualified men?

No	47.0	per	cent
Yes	38.3	"	"
Uncertain	11.9	"	"
No answer	2.8	"	"

The opinions of those who favored the principle diverged sharply regarding details of the program. In general, however, the largest single bloc of votes respectively favored these points:

1. A combination of basic military training, specialist training *and* non-military training (39 per cent).
2. The program to be directed by the armed forces in co-operation with civilian education (40 per cent).
3. No exemptions for any classes of men (44 per cent).
4. A single continuous training period of twelve months (30 per cent).
5. The program to begin at any age chosen by the individual between his seventeenth and twenty-third birthdays (44 per cent).

College and university administrators who opposed a peacetime draft were asked what forms of national defense they favored. Obviously they felt the need for strong measures of national security, as shown in the following results: Overwhelming majorities said they wanted an adequate professional standing army and navy, an international police force and limitation of armaments as an outgrowth of international co-operation, and better health and physical training programs in schools and colleges. Important majorities also spoke for a large-scale research program in the science and technology of war, peacetime planning for speedy industrial conversion to war production, and increased facilities for training officer personnel.

EFFECT OF MILITARY TRAINING

Up to the time of writing, only one survey had explored opinions on the effect of a peacetime military training program on the young men to be trained. This, too, was a study made among educators—the *American Magazine* Poll of Experts, conducted by Dr. Arthur Kornhauser of the Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. The fifty members of the panel are all men and women well known in academic and educational circles: college and university presidents, deans, administrative officers, professors.

Panel members were asked questions like these:

How would a system of peacetime military training affect the boys trained? If adopted, will it lead to graver difficulties? What about the health, discipline, and citizenship qualities of tomorrow's young men? Shall we expect a year of military training to prepare them for a better life?

As reported in the June 1945 *American,* only a small minority of the panel foresaw any benefit to youth from such a program. Only 16 per cent thought the effect would be good, 26 per cent were doubtful, and 58 per cent were convinced that the consequences would be bad.

A peacetime draft was criticized on four grounds: (1) it would take a valuable year out of young men's lives, difficult to make up; (2) military training, by its very nature, tends to have undemocratic influences; (3) military training in peacetime would aggravate personal problems, lead to feelings of resentment and frustration with consequent ill effects; and (4) the combination of the youth of the trainees and the peculiar conditions of military life would have a harmful effect on the morals of young men.

Quite a number of the panel acknowledged some good in the program, particularly its effect on health and physical fitness. But few thought a military draft was the *best* way to achieve this. A minority also saw other possible

benefits, for example: healthy discipline, the chance to learn new skills, opportunity to meet and adjust to new people, and the development of character and personality. But, for the most part, the panel thought that these goals, too, could best be achieved by other means. First place among the alternatives was given to an improved and expanded educational system. Thus on the proposition that a program of compulsory peacetime military training would benefit youth, the panel voted "No."

CONCLUSION

To sum up: At the time Congress began to discuss the measure, the American public for the most part wanted a universal military draft for young men when the war was over. So, in some-what less degree, did the younger people, many of whom were potential trainees. Leaders of the Nation's educational life, on the other hand, were in sharp disagreement with the people's views. Educators felt strongly that the decision should be postponed until the war was over, and many of them were skeptical of the soundness of the principle of compulsory peacetime military training. The people recommended military training as only one of many measures all presumably aimed to ensure security and peace. Educators were at one with the public in a desire to maintain national security—their opposition to the proposed program was not based on a general opposition to military measures. The public and the educators were thus agreed on ends; they differed on the means to attain those ends.

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A Sociologist Looks at Conscription

By Willard Waller

IT IS proposed that the American Nation, as a means of preparedness for war, should establish a system of peacetime conscription requiring a year of military service and training of all young men somewhere around the ages of eighteen to twenty-one. In making up our minds concerning this proposal, we must strive to balance one consideration against another and to select the course of action which, all things considered, seems to offer the best prospect of national survival. The change proposed is drastic, almost revolutionary, in our American tradition. And yet perhaps that tradition needs to be changed.

Precisely because of the revolutionary nature of peacetime conscription, we have little to go on in evaluating its probable effectiveness or its social results. We have no American experience to guide us, and it is by no means easy to discover what European experience teaches. In order to find the answer, we must weigh and balance against each other a number of uncertain possibilities and probabilities, finally deciding on the basis of the best available evidence just what we should do.

If there were a reasonably well-worked-out science of society, it could be tremendously useful to us at this moment of decision. But in fact sociology is far from exact, and sociologists disagree on many of the fundamental tenets of their subject. Nevertheless, a sociological analysis of the entire question may have some value as a contribution to the discussion, and that is the spirit in which this paper is written. The reader is hereby put on notice that the writer speaks for himself alone and that many of his sociological colleagues will disagree.

The method of our discussion will be to cut the question into pieces by logical analysis, dividing the major question into a number of smaller questions, and then to attempt an answer into which sociological principles may enter to some degree. The method is, of course, extremely aprioristic, but so is the entire discussion of this particular proposal. And it may be that sociological analysis will have some value in illuminating aspects of the subjects which might otherwise be disregarded. In preparing this analysis, every effort has been made to expose its logic for discussion without any deceptive overlayer of rhetoric. There are many sides to the question, and while the writer would vote for conscription at the present time, he does not intend to commit himself permanently to that position without hearing further evidence and argument.

Logical Analysis

Logical analysis of the problem indicates that if we had the answers to the following questions we should know better what to do about conscription:

What is the prospect of future wars? If there are more wars, will the United States become involved in them?

Will conscription increase or decrease the probability of war? Will it tend to produce war or to involve this nation in war? Will it prevent war?

How helpful will the proposed scheme be as a measure of preparedness? Has the scheme peculiar hazards as a means of preparedness?

What will be the social costs of the projected program? And what will be its incidental benefits?

What other measures should be taken to assure adequate preparedness?

Is military preparedness enough for security? If not, what else is necessary?

Should we decide now or postpone the decision until another time?

To all of these questions, there are answers of a sort which can be based in part on the lore of the social sciences. Let us try to state some of these answers.

THE PROSPECT OF FUTURE WARS

The probability of future wars is very great. If the causes which have produced wars in the past are not removed, then there will be other wars in times to come. War is deeply rooted in our society, while the present attempts to prevent it are extremely superficial. Nothing which is being seriously considered today goes to the roots of war. After the conferences are over, the white race will still seek to dominate the rest of the world through its system of empires. Inherent in this situation are at least two causes of war: the pigmented peoples may one day rebel against their oppressors whom they so greatly outnumber; and the aggressor nations, or great powers, may clash among themselves. In the postwar period the frightful dynamic of rival class systems will still operate to set nations at one another's throats. Discontented smaller nations will still play their age-old role as pawns of international politics. And we should note well that in all of the current negotiations no great nation is ready to surrender one iota of its sovereignty, and we must suppose that wars will always be possible while sovereign nations continue to exist.

There is another view, attractive to the emotions but logically insupportable, that the world has grown so small that the nations of the world must learn to live together peaceably. It is true that the tempo of social interaction on the international level has been greatly accelerated, that contacts of the nations through culture and trade have greatly increased, but it seems likely that this will mean, for the foreseeable future, increased friction rather than increased brotherly love.

Even if the dynamic of social class, which, more than any other single factor, brought about World War II, were entirely removed by the triumph of socialism in all the countries of the earth, it would be too soon to hope for peace. Quincy Wright has shown convincingly that there is an affinity between socialism and war. Two socialist states might just as well clash as two capitalist states, and we may suppose that they would fight much better wars than capitalist states.

Will the United States join in future wars? Why not? The American people, who love peace so much that they never neglect an opportunity to fight for it, will have many such opportunities now that the world is one. And we are rapidly building up a system of commitments which will assure us a full and indisputed right to participate in the quarrels of all the world.

CONSCRIPTION AND THE PROBABILITY OF WAR

Granting that there is a prospect of future wars in which the United States may become involved, we may ask whether conscription would tend to increase or diminish national security by producing or preventing war. The arguments here are nicely balanced. One group argues that conscription would tend to produce war through promoting international distrust and stimulating rivalry in armaments, through lessening faith in collective security, and perhaps through creating a military caste or a group of economic interests which would profit from war. It might also indoctrinate young men for war and thus

produce a warlike mentality. The other group argues that the world will be better off, and the United States more likely to be free from the threat of war, if the representatives of idealistic America are in a position to negotiate from strength instead of weakness. It adds that the dangers inherent in weakness are infinitely greater than those derived from strength.

There is much historical evidence for the view that preparedness programs stimulate international distrust and thus promote war. However, the proposed conscription program is so mild in nature that it would constitute no threat to other nations; if other nations fear us in the future it will probably be because of our naval and air strength, which has nothing to do with this proposal. Certainly the conscripted army would be of such a nature that it could not quickly be used for aggressive purposes.

Conscription might lessen the faith of the American people in collective security; in fact, it probably would. But one wonders whether such faith is of any great importance at the present moment. It is true that if all the peoples of the world, haves and have-nots, oppressors and oppressed, should suddenly become so imbued with faith in collective security that they would scrap all their armaments and cease all thought of war, then the Kingdom of Heaven would be at hand. But this is hardly likely to occur so long as collective security continues to mean what it seems to mean today, that is, an attempt to guarantee and perpetuate all the existing injustices and oppressions of the world by bringing more force to bear in their support.

It is also possible that conscription would tend to create a military caste and a set of economic interests which would be predisposed toward war. This danger, again, is far greater with regard to the naval and air forces than with regard to the conscription army. There is also the danger of widespread indoctrination for war, the inculcation of a warlike mentality in the masses of young men. This could happen, and it could help to produce war, but it seems improbable in view of the average young American's attitude toward such matters.

On the other hand, there is the view that world peace will be greatly furthered by a strong America. Allowing for the possibility of ethnocentrism, the present writer believes the United States to be, of all the great powers of the earth, the only one which is noticeably idealistic and humane in its foreign policies. Would it not be well for the world if this idealistic power were also a strong power? Would the heavens fall if we were to say: My country! In her intercourse with foreign nations may she always be right, and may she also be immensely strong!?

This view is strengthened by an examination of the peculiarly exposed position of our democracy. Somewhat underpopulated, possessing vast resources, perpetually unready for war but disposed to raise its voice in international affairs, highly inconsistent in its foreign policy, slow in making up its mind, this Nation may some day be attacked by a foreign power. Military strength may discourage attack. The strong may perhaps enjoy peace, but for the weak there is never any peace, especially if they are rich and somewhat meddlesome.

The Effectiveness of Conscription

The effectiveness of conscription as a measure of preparedness will be less than many of its advocates believe, but it seems to be a necessary first step in any program of preparedness. The scheme has many hazards against which

we should take precautions if it is adopted.

Peacetime military training in the United States tends to deteriorate rapidly. During the twenties and thirties the Reserve Officers' Training Corps on the average college campus, with its ragged, unsteady ranks and its absurd questions and answers copied directly from the textbook, was a very sour joke to anyone who had ever seen a real military organization. The conscription army, unless we are very careful, may become the same sort of thing. A young lieutenant recently returned from combat put it this way: "Will they train the boys with live ammunition and maybe kill a few? Will they expose them to shells bursting, say, 300 feet away? Will they have nerve enough to tell the boy, 'Son, we're training you now so that if you ever get in combat you can last two weeks, three weeks or maybe a month instead of getting killed the first day?' I doubt it."

An army, in peacetime, is a prey to the disease known as institutionalism. It stifles criticism and court-martials innovators. It makes poor use of the abilities of its men. It goes in for fancy uniforms and parade-ground maneuvers but neglects the realities of war. It tends to be a gerontocracy, preparing for the last war or still fighting the Battle of Gettysburg, cultivating what Vagts calls the militaristic way rather than the military way. An army, especially in time of peace, always tends to be inefficient—if not somewhat stupid—just because it is an army. All this is peculiarly true of the American Army, which, in peacetime, is wholly in the hands of regular Army officers, able men, for the most part, but hardly of a progressive turn of mind.

There is here a hazard which must somehow be avoided if the plan of conscription is to work. Under conscription we might have the appearance but not the reality of an army, and we might neglect other measures because of a false feeling of security. Precautions against this eventuality are clearly indicated.

It has also been pointed out that under modern conditions a man does not become a trained soldier in a year, since he must learn infinitely more than a soldier ever had to know in previous ages. In addition, changes of technology will make the training of 1950 obsolete in 1955. Advocates of conscription admit this, but insist that their aim is to give the man the social conditioning which would enable him to function in an army system, and that if he had this he could acquire up-to-date skills in a short time. There is merit in this view. A soldier is a soldier, and he can quickly learn to fight with new weapons. Conscription would not, however, give us an army instantly capable of offense or defense; this is one reason why such an army could not easily be used for purposes of aggression.

SOCIAL COSTS AND INCIDENTAL GAINS

Both the social costs and the incidental gains of the proposed program would be considerable. These should be carefully weighed and balanced against each other, and every attempt should be made to minimize the one and conserve the other.

Some alleged costs of conscription may be discounted. It will not, as some say, create a gigantic veteran problem. A veteran problem is created by service in time of war, by combat with its death and wounds and mental strain, and by the risk which all assume when they give themselves over to the military machine. It is also said that military service will corrupt the sex morals of our young men, but there should be little danger of that if

conditions of training are properly supervised.

However, a year of military service would certainly disrupt the relations of the sexes, and would strike a heavy blow at the American family. It would force the young man to postpone marriage for a year or more, and would introduce confusion by giving women an advantage in competition for jobs and education, thus discouraging marriage. Normal association of the sexes, with its informal but often effective education, would be interrupted for one year, and would be replaced, for the men, by institutional living in a one-sex group, and this would certainly complicate the problems of mate selection and marriage adjustment. These things could not fail to affect the birth rate, which is already too low, especially among the educated and intelligent sections of the population. If conscription is adopted, measures to strengthen the family and increase the birth rate are indicated.

Organized labor is opposed to conscription, presumably because its leaders feel the measure would affect the class struggle in a manner adverse to labor interests. The sympathies of Army officers are, of course, with the employing group, which would probably affect the character of Army indoctrination, so that labor's objections may be well founded. If the measure is adopted, labor should insist that there is some form of supervision which will assure the impartiality of Army indoctrination.

From the viewpoint of an educator, one of the greatest costs of conscription is the waste of the abilities of many thousands of capable young men. There seems no way of avoiding this, and no point in deluding ourselves with talk of other kinds of gains. It might be possible to compensate for the cost by devising some way of discovering the really able young men during their period of service and then giving them help with their postservice education.

Many incidental gains are claimed for the conscription program. The experience might have some educational value, but for most boys the value would certainly be less than that of a year of school. It may be that there would be some physical benefit to the conscripts, and that the discovery of educational deficiencies would make possible remedial programs. It may be, but the method is one of burning the house down to get a piece or two of roast pig, since such ends could be accomplished more easily in other ways.

On balance, one would have to say that the social costs of conscription outweigh the incidental gains, and the measure will have to be justified, if at all, on the grounds of overriding necessity.

Other Measures of Preparedness

In the discussion of other measures of preparedness, the opponents of conscription have made some of their soundest points. Without some of these other proposed measures, conscription will not be an adequate means of defense.

Modern war rests upon scientific research. Wars are won by learning and inventiveness as much as by bravery and military organization. As war grows more total, the relative importance of its industrial and scientific aspects increases—and ultimately technology and science are one. Emphasis upon scientific progress is, therefore, essential to national security. If conscription interferes with scientific progress, as it may, it could easily cost more than it is worth. Ideally every billion spent for training or armament should be matched by a certain expenditure (itself estimated on the basis of research) for scientific advancement. In so far as we fall short of this goal

we shall fail to do the utmost for national security. But conscription and scientific research are not really opposed unless the American public comes to believe that mere military training is enough.

Another necessity is to find some means of combating the conservatism inherent in a peacetime army. For one thing, the Army must keep abreast of scientific progress, be constantly on the alert for the possibilities of new discoveries; there must be constant communication and interchange of personnel between the Army and centers of research. Again, we must have higher pay and better social standing for Army officers. The salaries of our officers, who now wield vast power, are ridiculous in comparison with their responsibilities. If the Army is to attract good men, it must reward them adequately in both money and prestige.

But more than that, the Army must learn to utilize the abilities of the men it has. Officers must be permitted to specialize, must be placed where they belong in peace as well as in war. Inventiveness must be encouraged. Criticism must not be stifled. There must be a permanent revolution in the Army. Procedures to attain these ends could easily be devised, but could be imposed upon the Army only with extreme difficulty.

It seems to be taken for granted by both sides of the argument that a standing army, a navy and an air force would be required in addition to the army raised by conscription. There is argument concerning the nature and size of these forces, but that is another matter which need not concern us here. After the war, we shall also have to decide whether or not we want a merchant marine and whether or not we shall seek to retain a certain amount of economic self-sufficiency for purposes of war.

All this is, however, somewhat beside the point. The claim of the conscriptionists is a modest one. They say their proposal is a necessary element in any program of preparedness. They do not deny the importance of these other measures. And we should add that it hardly seems probable that any of these other proposed measures would be adequate without the program of conscription.

IS PREPAREDNESS ENOUGH?

From the standpoint of sociology, it is clear that military preparedness alone is not enough to assure national security. If the United States is to be strong enough to survive, it must have, among other things:

1. An adequate population. For this we need a population policy which will encourage the reproduction of the fit until the optimum population is attained.

2. A just society. If we go into the next war carrying the burden of racial, religious, and class antagonisms which we have carried in this war, we stand a good chance of losing if we oppose a monolithic state. Here the sociologist, who is concerned with such matters, can make a great contribution to national strength.

3. A progressive society. Herein democracy, with its relative freedom of opinion and economic enterprise and its emphasis upon the education and development of the individual, may have a long-run advantage over totalitarianism.

4. A foreign policy. We must answer certain questions which apparently no one in authority has asked as yet.

It is argued that we should not decide the matter now, but should wait until we have sobered up from the excesses of war. We are undoubtedly hysterical at the present moment, but one wonders whether or not we shall be

wiser and more sane in the immediate future. If the war is followed by a schizophrenic pacifism similar to that of the twenties, we shall perhaps be less able to deal intelligently with reality than we are at present. Now at least we know that war is possible and that we can become involved in it, but in a few years many people may be disposed to deny that fact.

Conclusion

On balance, the writer would vote for conscription at the present stage of the argument. The proposed program entails great social costs and many hazards. It must be supplemented by broad social programs before we can hope to be secure. But some form of preparedness is necessitated by the present state of our international relations and conscription is a necessary element in any program of preparedness. We should therefore adopt the measure and attempt to cut its costs and avoid its hazards as best we can.

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The Economic Implications of Universal Military Training

By Rainer Schickele and Glenn Everett [1]

ECONOMICS deals with the creation of wealth; military preparedness with plans for its destruction. Economic analysis cannot yield an answer to the question of whether or not the benefits from a program of military preparedness are worth their cost. Those benefits are not measurable in economic terms. The desirable size and composition of our military resources in peacetime must be evaluated in terms of military security and the prospect for success in building a dependable organization for international peace, law, and order.

Economic analysis can make a significant contribution, however, to the discussion of preparedness policies. Once alternative programs of military preparation are presented to the public for debate and decision, the economic costs of these programs and their impact upon the Nation's economy are important factors which must be considered in making an intelligent choice.

If the same degree of military preparedness can be achieved by different routes, the element of economic cost may, indeed, become the decisive factor. While the final decision as to the degree of preparedness needed in the post-war period rests largely on political grounds, the public should know how much of the Nation's economic resources are to be taken out of the civilian economy and devoted to the military program. Any policy of so broad a scope as the proposal of universal compulsory military training is bound to have a considerable impact upon the Nation's economy. The purpose of this paper is to describe this impact and evaluate the economic costs involved in this projected program.

Three Basic Alternatives

It is helpful to place this specific preparedness program into its broader setting. No armament program is purely national in its consideration. Essentially, the magnitude of America's post-war military program will be strongly influenced by the prospects for the United Nations establishing successful machinery to maintain peace.

With respect to security and defense, the United Nations have a choice among three basic courses of action:

Independent national armament.—Each nation can rely primarily upon its own military prowess. Economically, this would unquestionably be the most costly course for every nation. It would require the largest proportion of their economic resources to be withdrawn from civilian use. Politically, it would be the most explosive policy, entailing an almost inevitable arms race. Militarily, its effect would be paradoxical; the higher the degree of preparedness each nation would try to attain, the smaller would military security become. Indeed, in a world armed to the teeth, no nation would have any security at all.

Mutual military assistance pacts.—The United Nations may group themselves into military alliances in which a certain amount of pooling of military

[1] The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance received from Julius Allen of the Library of Congress, and from the War and Navy Departments, in gathering statistical data on armament expenditures. The views expressed are those of the authors', and do not necessarily reflect those of the agencies with which the authors are affiliated.

resources would become possible. Hence, the individual economic costs to be borne by nations entering such alliances might be somewhat less. But the same danger of armament races and explosive political atmosphere would prevail.

A world police force.—If the United Nations were to pool their military resources into one organization to maintain world peace, it is clear that much lower economic costs would be required than in either of the two alternative courses. Even though the various armies, navies, and air forces might retain their national identities, with their deployment only loosely co-ordinated by an international security council, the individual security of each nation would be considerably strengthened at a relatively low economic cost. The establishment of a true world police force under an organized world government would be the cheapest means of all, and would yield the greatest security.

It is well to keep these alternative courses of world military development in mind when evaluating the economic cost of the specific preparedness program of any nation, including the United States. To the extent that the United Nations succeed in erecting an effective organization for collective military security, the world burden of armament will be light. But to the extent that the United Nations fail in such communal efforts, the world armament burden will grow heavier—virtually without limit.

SOME PRACTICAL QUESTIONS

In addition to the international implications of armament policy, other fundamental questions on universal training have an important economic bearing:

How large an army shall we need? Would it not be better to concentrate on a large navy and an alert air force in view of our geographic position? To what extent should we rely on a standing force of professional soldiers, sailors, and airmen, and to what extent upon reserve personnel who have received some military training? We are coming out of this war with an ample number of trained personnel and a large amount of military equipment. Will it be necessary, then, to embark in the immediate postwar period upon a large national preparedness program, particularly since the enemy countries are being so stripped that they cannot wage war for many years?

The problems encountered in evaluating the economic aspects of an armament program can be illustrated by a brief analysis of the proposed universal military training program, which remains, thus far, the only specific program submitted to the American people for immediate decision.

The proposed program calls for a full-year's training of every physically able young man reaching the age of 18 years. After completion of the year's training, he would become a member of the reserve forces for a period of five years, during which time he may or may not have to participate in one or more refresher courses.[2]

SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Men who would become eligible for conscription in 1946 were born in 1928. During the decade of 1928–37, the number of male births in the United States averaged around 1.1 million per year. About 93 per cent will attain the age of 18 years. If judged under present physical standards, nearly 25 per cent would not be accepted for training because of physical or mental defects, leaving between 750,000 and 800,000 men to go through military training each year during the period of 1946 to 1955. If, after training for one year,

[2] The present May-Gurney Bill does not provide for refresher courses, but some military quarters favor them strongly.

the men would be placed in the Reserve forces for five years, the United States would have, after 1951, a reserve force of four million men, plus 770,000 in training.[3]

It is important to realize that this reserve force of nearly 5 million men would not replace the Regular Army, Navy, or Air Force. We probably would still be asked to maintain a regular professional military personnel of at least 1 million men[4] to be recruited through voluntary enlistment. In order to attract the caliber of men desired for mechanized forces, substantially higher military pay will have to be offered than before the war when the average compensation per soldier and sailor was only $1,000 a year (including officers).[5]

In fact, the permanent postwar size of the regular professional armed forces will probably be determined quite independently of whether or not the Nation adopts a universal training program. Assistant Secretary of War McCloy states emphatically that "the trainees will not become a part of the standing army or navy, either during or after training."[6] By the time the men have been trained, they will return to civilian life. It is, therefore, extremely doubtful that a program of universal military training would reduce the cost of the regular military establishment; it may well tend to have the opposite effect.[7]

The projected armed force would be much larger than before the war. Table 1 shows that in 1939 the United States had about 330,000 men in active service and 210,000 in the trained Reserve (excluding the National Guard), a total of 540,000 men. According to the above estimate, however, the United States would maintain, after full demobilization of World War II forces, a professional armed force of around 1,000,000 men, with an immediate trained reserve of more than 4½ million—a total of over 5 million men, or ten times the trained personnel thought necessary for national defense in 1939.

ESTIMATES OF ARMAMENT COSTS

The measurement of the economic impact of an armament program is a difficult problem. Federal appropriations for the military and naval establishment are only one of the items in the ledger. There are many indirect costs involved in preparing a nation for war. Theoretically, the most appropriate method of determining armament costs is to estimate the volume of civilian goods and services that could be produced by the manpower and capital resources assigned to the military program. This indirect "opportunity cost" of armament is considerably higher than

[3] This is the estimate which appears in Kimmel, *et al., Postwar Fiscal Requirements,* The Brookings Institution, 1945.

[4] Brig. Gen. Edward A. Evans of the Army General Staff Committee for Reserve Policy on May 7, 1945, told the House Military Affairs Committee that the War Department hopes to maintain a peacetime standing Army of 500,000 Regulars, backed by a 4,500,000-man active Reserve built up by compulsory training. (See the *New York Times,* May 9, 1945, and United Press dispatches of the same date.) For the Navy's estimates, of about 500,000 men, see the statement by Vice Admiral Jacobs in his article in this issue of THE ANNALS. These estimates may lean toward the conservative side. Some writers, citing official sources, have predicted an even larger postwar standing force. See, for instance, the 2,300,000 man estimate made by *The United States News,* September 15, 1944.

[5] For instance, the pay of an army private or an apprentice seaman will probably remain at $50 a month instead of reverting to the prewar rate of $21. Dependency allowances may be continued to encourage men to make a career in the armed services.

[6] See his article in this issue of THE ANNALS. It will take about 125,000 regular military personnel to carry out the training program.

[7] See Hanson Baldwin, "Conscription for Peacetime?" *Harper's Magazine,* March 1945.

TABLE 1—SIZE OF THE ARMED FORCES, PREWAR AND PROSPECTIVE POSTWAR
(Thousands)

Fiscal year	All Armed Services			Army		Navy and Marines	
	Total	Active	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Reserve
1935[a]	416	248	168	138	117	110	51
1936	460	286	174	166	119	120	55
1937	482	306	176	178	114	128	62
1938	501	317	184	184	116	133	68
1939	539	328	211	188	139	140	72
1949[b]	1,750	1,750		950		800	
After Demobilization, with Univ. Tr. Program[c]	5,620	1,000	4,620		[d]		[d]

[a] From *Statistical Abstracts of the United States*, 1943, tables 165 and 166, for 1935–39.
[b] From L. H. Kimmel, *et al.*, *Postwar Fiscal Requirements*, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1945. Assuming demobilization not yet completed.
[c] The Reserve is based on estimated 770,000 trainees per year and a 5-year reserve status.
[d] The probable distribution of the armed forces among Army and Navy in the postwar period is difficult to assess at present.

the immediate fiscal expenditures which appear in the Federal budget.

For convenience, we shall use the term "armaments" to cover every activity directly connected with the military establishment. Two methods should be distinguished in evaluating the cost of a given armament program: the *direct costs* in terms of government expenditures, and the *indirect or imputed costs* in terms of the "value of civilian goods and services that could otherwise have been produced by the resources actually used to provide armaments."[8] The latter measurement involves a complicated technique of economic analysis if a high degree of accuracy is to be attained. In the following we shall aim only at rough approximations.

Federal armament expenditures in the United States amounted to approximately 1 billion dollars per year during the late 1930's. No one seriously expects the regular appropriations of the War and Navy Departments to drop below that level after this war. Indeed, even under the most optimistic assumptions regarding the success of the United Nations Organization, armament expenditures are likely to considerably exceed that figure during the 1950's. *Any expenditures authorized for a universal military training program would be largely, if not entirely, in addition to that amount.*

The annual cost of such a program has been estimated at 1,047 million dollars.[9] This estimate presumes a pay of $30 a month, however, whereas the level of compensation might approach the present minimum military pay of $50 a month.[10] The estimate, further, takes no account of instructional costs which may easily amount to 100 million dollars a year or more. Thus the training program may cost as much as

[8] See the cogent treatise by R. W. Goldsmith, "Measuring the Economic Impact of Armament Expenditures," *Studies in Income and Wealth* (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943), Vol. VI, pp. 46–83.

[9] See Kimmel, *et al.*, *op. cit.* This estimate assumes a compensation of $360 a year and an annual cost of food, clothing, lodging, and equipment of $1,000 per trainee, for 770,000 trainees a year.

[10] The trainees would receive $50 a month unless Congress specifically orders otherwise.

TABLE 2—FEDERAL EXPENDITURES FOR THE ARMED FORCES, PREWAR AND PROSPECTIVE POSTWAR

Fiscal year	Total Expenditures (in million dollars)			Exp. per active serviceman		
	Total	War Dept.	Navy Dept.	Total	War Dept.	Navy Dept.
1925–29[a]	721	386	335	$2,920	$2,880	$3,000
1935	924	488	436	3,720	3,540	3,970
1939	1,368	695	673	4,170	3,700	4,800
1949[b]	7,195	3,515	3,680	4,100	3,700	4,600
After Demobilization (rough approximation)						
Regular Forces	4,000			4,000		
Training Program	1,300			1,700		

[a] *Statistical Abstracts of the United States*, 1943, p. 243.
[b] Kimmel *et al.*, *op. cit.* Demobilization not completed.

1,300 million dollars per year or about $1,700 per trainee.[11]

If we assume that the professional personnel of the armed forces would number around 1 million, and that the average rate of total expenditure per man would be $4,000,[12] we arrive at a level of armament costs of 5.3 billion dollars annually for the postwar period, after full demobilization.[13] This is almost twice as large as was the total Federal budget during the 1920's. Table 2 presents some highlights of direct armament costs before the war, and compares them with what may be expected after the war.

This estimate of 5.3 billion dollars for armament expenditures after demobilization (during the 1950's) implies a purchasing power of the dollar which prevailed in 1939–40. At the present 1945 price level, the amount would be about 25 per cent higher, or 6.6 billion dollars. In order to avoid speculation as to the postwar price level, the estimates are here presented in terms of 1939 dollars.[14]

An expenditure rate of 5.3 billion dollars a year for armament would be more than the total expenditure for education in the United States, both public and private—a sum which has never exceeded 3.2 billion dollars.[15] It would be about equal to the total expenditures for relief by all state and local governments during the 1930's,[16] would be twice the amount spent altogether on the Civilian Conservation Corps and the

[11] The Office of War Information's current estimate is $1,750 per year on maintenance of each enlisted man in the Army.

[12] This figure is slightly lower than that for 1939 in Table 2, and hence quite conservative. Mechanization has much increased since 1939, and although the need for large-scale equipment may not increase in direct proportion with the number of personnel as compared to prewar, the actual expenditures per serviceman may easily exceed $4,000 in the postwar period.

[13] Kimmel suggests that in the mid-1950's a level of armament expenditure somewhere between 2.5 and 5.0 billion dollars a year can be expected.

[14] W. L. Crum, in his paper on "Postwar Federal Expenditures," *American Economic Review*, May 1945, p. 334, puts the probable average annual federal expenditures for the decade 1947–56 at 21 billion dollars (excluding debt service), and assigns to armaments a range of 5–9 billion dollars, or about one-third of total federal expenditures (in 1942 dollars).

[15] The record total of $3,199,593,000 was reached in 1940 according to the U. S. Office of Education.

[16] These expenditures between 1932 and 1942 reached the aggregate sum of $6,055,431,000 *for the total decade.*

National Youth Administration,[17] and would be 35 times the total sum spent on the League of Nations, World Court, International Labor Office, and all other international organizations combined from 1919 to 1939.[18]

It is not for the economist to decide whether or not a federal expenditure of 5 to 6 billion dollars a year for armament after the war is justified. If Congress and the people can be persuaded that such is the price of military security, and that it cannot be had cheaper, then that price will be paid—or any other, for that matter. It is, however, the obligation of the economist to ask the questions: whether or not such a price is required for the desired national defense, and if it is, whether a universal military training program is an efficient means of bolstering that defense, or whether the billion or more dollars that it would cost might be better spent on the professional personnel of the armed forces, on better and more up-to-date ordnance and equipment, and on new scientific research and development in the field of military technology.

It is difficult to examine these questions cogently at the present time, nor are reliable answers likely to be found until the postwar situation has crystallized and America's needs and policies can be more clearly defined. Since there is no danger of the United States being attacked by an aggressor for at least ten years after this war, and the Nation's present armed forces offer adequate preparation in the event of any international complication during that period, the weight of the economic issues alone, not to mention the political and social questions, might justify postponement of a decision on a peacetime universal training program until it is possible to scrutinize alternative policies more judiciously.

[17] The total sums appropriated for these agencies *during their lifetime* (not per year) were, respectively, $2,139,008,000 and $508,492,000.

[18] The total expended upon all international agencies during this period reached approximately 155 million dollars (including erection of the buildings at Geneva).

INDIRECT COSTS OF ARMAMENTS

Government expenditures represent only part of the economic resources withheld from the production of civilian goods and services. Without delving into elaborate calculations, the major components of indirect cost can be briefly analyzed.

Manpower

For the *professional personnel,* it can be argued that since they have voluntarily chosen military service as their occupation, their remuneration may not be much out of line with what they personally believe their earning capacity would be in civilian pursuits. The compensation of the regular military personnel would be about 2 billion dollars.[19] Since civilian labor earnings normally constitute around 70 per cent of the national income, the earnings of the professional military personnel *may represent an equivalent of 2.8 billion dollars worth of civilian goods and services withdrawn from the national economy.*

The remuneration of *trainees* would probably be less than what they could earn in civilian life, even considering the fact that they would receive food, clothing, and shelter in addition to a cash salary of $30 to $50 per month.

A fairly adequate way of computing

[19] Computed on the basis of 900,000 enlisted men at an average compensation of $1,750 (counting rations, clothing issue, and so forth, but not counting possible dependency benefits), and 100,000 officers at an average compensation of $4,500. These estimates do not include retirement pay which if prorated against years of service would raise the real level of compensation considerably for career officers and men.

this manpower cost is to estimate the loss to the national economy entailed by the withdrawal of the productive labor of the young men in training. Despite their youth, it can be assumed that their contribution would fall close to the over-all average gross national product per employed worker. That average was $1,900 in 1939 and $3,500 in 1944. Allowing for the effect of overtime (10 per cent) and the increase in the general price level (25 per cent), the latter figure would be reduced to about $2,400[20] worth of goods and services at 1939 prices and 1944 technology.

According to the 1940 census, 68 per cent of the young men 18 to 19 years of age were gainfully employed in the labor force, while 32 per cent were pursuing apprenticeships or higher education. Hence, the 525,000 trainees (68 per cent of 770,000) who would otherwise be in the labor force would, under conditions of moderately good employment, contribute at least 1.3 billion dollars a year to the national product. If the potential contribution of the remaining 32 per cent of the trainees were similarly evaluated (for one year is being irrevocably withdrawn from their period of productive contribution to the economy), the *indirect cost of withdrawing 770,000 young men each year would be about 1.9 billion dollars.*

This figure is by no means arbitrary. When the gross national product is divided by the total labor forces, the denominator includes youth below 18, old people, part-time and underemployed workers, domestic help, and southern farm laborers, whose productivity is well below that of strong 18-year-old men. Moreover, a year's postponement of the education of many trainees means that one year of higher skilled and more productive work is lost. Assigning the average productivity rate to the would-be student simply means an allowance for that loss, by transferring part of his future productivity into the present for accounting purposes.

This figure of nearly 2 billion dollars' manpower cost of the training program may err on the side of conservatism. Trainees may be handicapped in finding employment prior to induction due to the imminence of a year's absence from the community. Upon their return they may find that their readjustment to civilian life and resumption of normal employment requires at least several weeks. Thus, the training program may actually cause a loss of somewhat more than a year's productive labor.[21] This additional loss of productive effort may be partly offset, however, by skills acquired by some of the trainees which would prove useful to them later in civilian occupations.

To round out the picture: the *"opportunity cost" of the total manpower resources* assumed to be employed by the armed forces under the program projected (1,000,000 professional personnel and 770,000 trainees) might well reach a magnitude of *4.7 billion dollars per year,* measured in terms of the goods and services which could otherwise have been produced by the men engaged in the military program.

Industrial resources

Nearly all the arms, munitions and equipment used by the military establishment are produced by civilian workers and business firms, under government contracts which can be presumed to reflect the cost levels (as prevailing throughout the economy) of the various production agents. Their value, there-

[20] This productivity rate of $2,400 worth of goods and services per trainee compares with a rate of $2,800 per regular serviceman which reflects the higher level of skills and maturity on the part of the latter group.

[21] This will especially be true if the training program later includes refresher courses.

fore, represents roughly the amount of goods and services which could otherwise have been produced for civilian use. A few modifications are necessary, however, to prevent duplication. Most of the food served to soldiers and sailors, for instance, would still have been eaten by them were they in civilian occupations. At least part of their clothing falls in the same category, while a number of other items require similar adjustments.

By deducting from the total armaments expenditures the major items of payroll, food, and most of the clothing cost, we arrive at a figure that roughly represents the "opportunity costs" of the industrial resources employed in the military establishment.

With respect to the *universal military training program,* that figure might amount to about $720 per trainee [22]— or about *550 million dollars* in total— representing the cost of all military equipment, arms, ammunition, and so forth, used by the trainees.

Adding this amount to the imputed manpower cost of 1.9 billion dollars, *the training program as a whole would divert a potential amount of goods and services worth 2.5 billion dollars from civilian use.* This "opportunity cost" is nearly twice as high as the direct Federal expenditures required for the program.

For the *regular armed forces,* the average total expenditure per active serviceman was $4,170 in 1939. Deducting the same rate for food and clothing as in the case of the trainee, and an average pay of $1,000,[23] we obtain $2,530 per active serviceman (Army, Navy, or Marine Corps), representing the *annual* cost of the military equipment, tanks, airplanes, vessels, guns, ammunition, and the like, used by the regular force in peacetime.

Total indirect cost

If, after demobilization, a standing force of 1,000,000 is maintained, *the annual cost of industrial resources would amount to about 2.5 billion dollars,* at 1939 prices and a state of military mechanization comparable to that prevailing in 1939. This represents a very conservative estimate. Mechanization of the postwar armed forces will be much greater than in 1939. The cost of a typical capital ship, for instance, has increased from approximately 30 million dollars to 100 million dollars, and the development of armored divisions of which the American Army had none until 1940, has introduced a vast array of expensive equipment. It is doubtful, therefore, that the annual cost of armament and equipment per man in the postwar military establishment will return to the prewar level.[24]

Another factor suggests that this estimate may be low. Assistant Secretary McCloy states that the Army's active reserve should be ready to swing into action in six weeks' time or less.[25] A trained force without adequate weapons is helpless. Obviously, there will not be time to manufacture weapons for 4 million men reservists in 6 weeks' time. Hence, it must be presumed that

[22] Subtracting pay of $360, clothing of $90, and food of $190 from Kimmel's conservative cost estimate of $1,360 per trainee (at 1939 prices).

[23] Since 1939 estimates are being used, the 1939 level of pay (see above) is here used. The validity of this estimate will not be affected, therefore, by the probable postwar increase in regular military pay.

[24] Major General Weible of the Army General Staff has stated that the increase in the mechanization of the armed forces and of their requirements for increasingly complex equipment can be represented by a virtually straight line on a graph. This would suggest that the figure for "industrial resources" cost would continue to increase steadily after the war.

[25] See his article in this issue of THE ANNALS.

TABLE 3—ESTIMATED COSTS OF THE POSTWAR ARMAMENT PROGRAM
(in billion dollars)

	In 1939 Dollars		In 1944 Dollars	
	Federal Expenditures	"Opportunity Cost" to Economy	Federal Expenditures	"Opportunity Cost" to Economy
Universal Training	1.3	2.5	1.6	3.1
Regular Armed Forces	4.0	5.3	5.0	6.6
Total	5.3	7.8	6.6	9.7

the War Department hopes to maintain equipment sufficient to put such a huge land force into the field immediately at any time. The cost which such an arsenal would entail might easily amount to 1 billion dollars per year or more, representing a capital value of equipment of 8 to 12 billion dollars, to be kept in readiness for the trained reserve.[26]

Adding to the estimate of minimum cost of industrial resources (2.5 billion dollars) which would be diverted to the support of the regular establishment, the value of the manpower resources ($2.8 billion), we arrive at a *total indirect cost* (in terms of the value of potential civilian goods and services) of *5.3 billion dollars per year for the regular military establishment*, assumed to be maintained indefinitely after demobilization.

The total peacetime armament program, i.e., the regular armed forces and the military training program combined, would represent an amount of civilian goods and services valued *at nearly 8 billion dollars* at 1939 prices (or 10 billion at present prices). The direct expenditure appearing in the Federal budget meanwhile would total only about 5.3 billion dollars. Table 3 briefly summarizes the various components of the armament cost.

INCIDENTAL BENEFITS

It has been argued that a universal military training program might bring certain benefits to the civilian economy, that it might reduce unemployment, would educate the trainees in discipline and self-reliance, would improve their health and physical stamina, and that the year of training would not be entirely lost to the economy since the trainees might return with certain skills that would be useful in civilian pursuits. Nearly all of these benefits are subject to controversy, however, and might be offset by less favorable aspects of the program. Whatever they may prove to be, they can hardly be used as reasons for the adoption of universal training. They are not the objectives of the program; training for war is its only goal.

There is, of course, great need for better health services, better education, and better character-training. We shall use our economic resources more wisely, however, if we achieve whatever degree of military preparedness we decide is necessary at a minimum cost through an efficient single-purpose military program, and attain these other nonmilitary objectives directly through specific health, education, and vocational programs.

[26] This does not represent a detailed calculation, but is based upon estimates derived from informal discussions with Army officials. It presumes an obsolescence turnover and maintenance cost of 10 per cent per year of the capital value of the arsenal.

Nor is the Army an appropriate agency for unemployment relief. To remove 770,000 productive young workers from the economy is not a way to contribute to the wealth of the Nation, nor is it a solution to the problems of maintaining full employment. Indeed, by placing the burden of the care of these large numbers of men upon the shoulders of the taxpayers, it might actually aggravate the real problem of creating full employment.

WAR POTENTIAL IN PEACETIME

In the weighing of alternatives lies the clue for wise decision. Assuming that a high state of military preparedness is found necessary in the long-run postwar period, is the universal military training program an economically justifiable part of such a defense program?

To justify its considerable direct cost in Federal appropriations and indirect manpower and resources costs, it must be shown that the training program has definite, concrete advantages as an essential part of military defense. The mere possession of a large trained reserve is no guarantee of security (as France found out in 1940) if an aggressor, relying primarily on more modern weapons and surprise strategy, can find a way of setting this defense at naught.

In this proposed program, all men are to be trained for one year whether they are to become radar specialists or truck drivers. A different period of training is required for each special task, and an infantryman can be satisfactorily trained for combat in 15 weeks,[27] but all are called for service for the same duration. It has further been the experience that peacetime training, where it was practiced, tended to settle into a stabilized curriculum that changed slowly, if at all, and offered training for the *last* war rather than the *next* one. In any case, an intensive training period would still have to be provided for the reservists in case of a war emergency, before they could be sent into combat.

There is little to suggest that the United States, if it had adopted peacetime conscription, as was proposed in 1920, would have been better prepared for World War II than were European nations with such training. It could hardly have been foreseen, for instance, that we would have to fight the Japanese in the jungles of New Guinea, nor the Germans in the mountains of Italy. Amphibious operations of the type that have characterized this war had never been used before, nor had radar, rocket weapons, or atomic bombs. It is likely that our military training of the twenties and thirties would have been poor preparation for the fighting of the 1940's.

Arguments in its favor boil down to the time element of the increased speed with which armies can be put in the field in the event of conflict, and of the respect which this might possibly create in aggressively minded nations. These arguments can hardly be considered very convincing, especially in view of the danger that new developments in scientific warfare may render mass land armies obsolete.

Industrial technology

America's great war potential in peace is her industrial might. No other single factor has contributed so much to her outstanding military success in two world wars. As war becomes more mechanized, only a handful of nations have the industrial capacity to produce large tanks, huge bombing planes, and the tremendous quantities of ordnance and munitions necessary for modern

[27] According to General George C. Marshall's testimony before the House Military Affairs Committee, in explaining the sending of 18-year-old boys into combat.

conflict. The United States is one of those nations.

The war potential of a nation now rests upon its industrial and scientific technology. A country with a high output per worker, with an economy in which new techniques are quickly diffused and adopted by producers, with a tradition of co-operative relationships between industrial management, labor, and the government, and without the waste and moral frustration which accompanies widespread unemployment and economic distress—such a country will be the best prepared in the event of another war.

Military defense also calls for a highly competent and modern professional armed force. Its effectiveness will depend less on its size than on a well-trained corps of officers, upon the conducting of research in materials, equipment and armaments, kept up-to-date with the newest developments in science and technology, as well as in organizational techniques.[28]

Universal military training would not bankrupt the economy of the United States. The main issue is rather whether it really is the most effective means of bolstering our defense, or whether an equivalent amount of resources might not be employed in a different way to greater advantage. Having 4 million reservists available at any time does not mean that they are all ready for combat duty; if ever a new world war should break out, it would take some time to build the arms and munitions needed for all-out war effort. Soldiers without arms are not ready for battle. While industry is being converted to war, the masses of draftees could be trained, perhaps the more quickly and efficiently on account of the pervasive sense of emergency and patriotic morale which will surely be at a low ebb during peacetime.

CONCLUSION

Leading military and naval authorities claim that this Nation needs around one million professional fighting men organized in alert and well-armed standing forces regardless of what postwar policies be adopted. The costs of such a program have been described. The economic costs of universal military training have also been estimated; whether or not these large additional costs are justified depends upon what such a training program can add in concrete benefits to America's military potential that are not already obtained by this Nation's industrial capacity and its proposed regular armed forces.

[28] According to an Associated Press report of June 27, 1945, Senator Kilgore of the Senate Military Affairs Committee "disclosed that General Eisenhower had told him that military research actually is the secret of preparedness for another war . . . for the next war, if there is to be one, will be fought by entirely new weapons."

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Education—By Whom, For What?

By A. J. Brumbaugh

MUCH is being said about the educational benefits of universal military training. The spokesmen for the armed forces do not themselves base their arguments for military training in peacetime on the educational benefits to be derived from it. They stress military necessity. They also point out that there will be concomitant educational benefits to the youth of the Nation which should not be ignored. A number of civilian agencies, however, support peacetime universal military training on the grounds that it will provide large educational benefits to the youth of the nation. Spokesmen for these agencies argue that this training will reduce illiteracy, improve health, provide vocational education, and prepare for citizenship.

It is indeed encouraging to find large groups of organized citizens arguing for the abolition of illiteracy, for the improvement of health, for the development of vocational proficiency, and for the promotion of good citizenship, all of which are basic to the welfare of our society. But it is difficult to understand why anyone should argue that a year of compulsory military training in peacetime can be justified as a means of achieving these values when our public schools and our colleges are already organized for exactly that purpose. Do the civilian organizations that support military training on educational grounds attribute benefits to military training that the representatives of the armed forces do not themselves claim for it? If they do, as now appears to be the case, it is imperative to clarify the issue by examining the facilities that already exist for the achievement of educational benefits that are attributed to universal military training, and to consider the kind of training that would be provided under military auspices to achieve these same benefits.

Civilian Educational Program

Civilian education at the elementary and secondary level has long been dedicated to objectives that include the reduction of illiteracy; the inculcation of good health habits; the promotion of good physical growth through exercise and adequate diet; the development of ideals of citizenship and the promotion of the practice of good citizenship through instruction in social studies, sportsmanship in competitive games, and the practice of self-government in school and community organizations; the development of vocational competence through an exploration of vocational fields and opportunities, instruction in vocational curricula, and placement services designed to aid the individual to find appropriate employment or to enter advanced instruction leading to his chosen professional goal. These objectives were clearly and forcefully stated in the Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education formulated in 1918 by the Commission on Reorganization of Secondary Education of the National Education Association.[1] They have been restated with increased emphasis from time to time since that date.

The colleges and universities also have given special consideration in recent years to clarifying their aims. Their statements of aims generally include the development of health, the cultivation of ideals and attitudes essential to good citizenship, and the de-

[1] Bulletin No. 35, U. S. Office of Education, 1918.

TABLE 1

State	Median Expenditure per Classroom Unit [a]			Rejections for Educational Deficiency per 1,000 Registrants Examined at Local Boards and Induction Stations, April 1942–March 1943 [b]	
	State	White Schools	Negro Schools	White	Negro
Alabama	$ 700	$ 800	$ 300	50.5	186.6
Arizona	2,100			—	—
Arkansas	500	500	200	63.8	101.9
California	3,500			17.8	17.3
Colorado	1,700			8.2	—
Connecticut	2,500			7.1	19.0
Delaware	2,200	2,300	1,700	4.1	26.0
Dist. of Columbia	3,200			3.7	32.3
Florida	1,200	1,400	500	29.3	110.1
Georgia	800	900	300	34.5	157.5
Idaho	1,400			7.3	—
Illinois	2,200			3.2	20.0
Indiana	1,700			13.5	45.5
Iowa	1,500			8.8	—
Kansas	1,500			6.2	12.1
Kentucky	700	700	800	48.6	45.3
Louisiana	1,200	1,300	300	43.3	106.0
Maine	1,200			16.5	—
Maryland	1,500	1,500	1,300	26.3	135.1
Massachusetts	2,400			8.4	14.0
Michigan	2,100			6.2	26.9
Minnesota	1,700			7.1	—
Mississippi	400	700	100	38.8	154.8
Missouri	1,200	1,200	2,500	13.5	25.4
Montana	1,700			5.8	—
Nebraska	1,300			6.6	—

[a] John K. Norton and Eugene S. Lawler, *An Inventory of Public School Expenditures in the U. S.*, Washington, D. C.: American Council on Education, 1944.

[b] *Physical Examinations of Selective Service Registrants During Wartime*, Medical Statistics Bulletin No. 3, Washington, D. C.: National Headquarters Selective Service System, Nov. 1, 1944.

[c] States having less than 0.3 per cent of total Negro registrants are omitted.

velopment of specific abilities in the individual's chosen vocation.[2]

EDUCATIONAL DEFICIENCIES

The evidences of progress through the years in the achievement of these objectives by the schools and colleges are encouraging, but there still exist large unfulfilled social needs in the areas of literacy, health, vocational education, and citizenship. For example, reports from the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System show that in some states the rejections for military service because of educational deficiency ran as high as 74 per thousand among the white population, and 258 per thousand among the Negro population. "Educational deficiency," as used by the Selective Service System, does not distinguish clearly between those who are illiterate and those

[2] Melvin W. Hyde and Emil Leffler, "The Institutional Purposes of Seventy-Five North Central Colleges," *North Central Association Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, No. 3, Jan. 1942.

TABLE I—*Continued*

State	Median Expenditure per Classroom Unit [a]			Rejections for Educational [b] Deficiency per 1,000 Registrants Examined at Local Boards and Induction Stations, April 1942–March 1943 [c]	
	State	White Schools	Negro Schools	White	Negro
Nevada	2,300			5.9	—
New Hampshire	1,700			19.7	—
New Jersey	3,200			8.4	45.3
New Mexico	1,500			34.9	—
New York (excl. N.Y.C.) [d]				4.4	25.1
New York City				3.3	13.0
North Carolina	900	900	500	36.0	258.7
North Dakota	900			18.0	—
Ohio	2,000			6.6	35.1
Oklahoma	1,200	1,200	1,200	27.2	51.1
Oregon	1,800			2.3	—
Pennsylvania	2,000			6.6	28.6
Rhode Island	2,300			11.8	—
South Carolina	1,000	1,200	400	30.3	162.2
South Dakota	1,100			4.8	—
Tennessee	800	800	600	74.4	74.7
Texas	1,300	1,400	700	58.7	55.5
Utah	1,700			4.3	—
Vermont	1,300			8.3	—
Virginia	800	900	500	57.0	122.1
Washington	2,200			5.8	—
West Virginia	1,300	1,300	1,200	34.5	36.7
Wisconsin	1,900			6.2	—
Wyoming	1,800			6.6	—
U. S. median	1,600+	1,700+	400+	19.0	99.8

[d] 4,100 total state.

who are mentally deficient. The data do indicate, however, that serious mental deficiency occurred in six cases per thousand registrants examined. There appears to be a reasonable basis for inferring that the major factor in rejection because of educational deficiency was illiteracy. Owing to a change in policy on the part of Selective Service beginning in June 1943, when illiteracy per se was no longer considered a cause for rejection, the data on rejections for educational deficiency cover only the period from April 1942 to March 1943.

Important as are the number of rejections for educational deficiency, of greater importance is the fact that the number of rejections for this cause is directly related to the educational opportunities afforded individuals in the various states. This relationship is evident in Table 1, which shows the median expenditure per classroom unit and the number of rejections per thousand registrants in each of the states.

It will be noted that in the states where the educational expenditures are relatively high (for example, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Washington) the number of rejections per thousand registrants because of educational deficiency is much lower than in those states where the median educational expenditure is comparatively low (for example, Alabama,

TABLE 2—REJECTION RATES PER 1,000 REGISTRANTS EXAMINED AT LOCAL BOARDS AND INDUCTION STATIONS
April 1942 to March 1943

Cause of Rejection	For Continental United States		Range Within the States	
	White	Negro	White	Negro
Musculoskeletal	37.4	32.4	14.1–67.4	12.4– 48.3
Cardiovascular	33.8	42.5	18.3–59.4	13.0–103.0
Hernia	31.6	26.9	16.8–50.8	5.4– 38.4
Eye	31.5	27.0	20.1–70.7	19.5– 45.9
Neurological	23.1	14.6	10.4–39.8	5.5– 29.6
Ear	22.4	[a]	10.5–39.0	[a]
Tuberculosis	15.2	[a]	5.1–47.6	[a]
Syphilis	14.9	170.5	2.9–45.1	21.2–273.8

[a] Tuberculosis and Ear not included in "Ten Leading Causes for Rejection of Negro Registrants."

Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Virginia, and West Virginia).

The inferences to be drawn from these data seem very clear. The problem of educational deficiency, of which illiteracy is an important phase, among American youth cannot be solved adequately by the introduction of remedial measures as an incidental part of a program of universal military training at the ages of 18 to 21. The Army has achieved commendable results in teaching illiterates as a phase of its training program. It would no doubt be equally effective in teaching illiterates as an incidental phase of peacetime military training. But the long-term solution of the problem lies in the provision of adequate educational facilities during the period when youth should normally be in school and should profit from such facilities. This is basically an economic problem because many of the states whose educational expenditures are comparatively low and whose educational facilities are correspondingly limited do not have the economic resources necessary to provide adequate educational opportunities. The alternative to a program for educating illiterates through military channels is the provision of federal funds to supplement the resources of the various states where the need for better educational advantages is most obvious and where the resources within the states are most limited.

The percentage of young men who fail to qualify physically for military service is also disturbing. In his Annual Report for the fiscal year 1941, Surgeon General Thomas Parran says:

> During this past year, physical examinations of nearly a million young men registered for service in the armed forces revealed 43 per cent physically unfit for general military duty. About 28 per cent were rejected as unfit for any military duty. Some of the defects are correctible; most of them could have been prevented. But these men . . . are being sent back into their communities untreated.[3]

According to the data published by the National Headquarters of the Selective Service System, the rejections per thousand registrants between April 1942 and March 1943 because of physical conditions were as shown in Table 2.

These data must be examined with

[3] *Annual Report of the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service of the U. S.* for the fiscal year 1941 (Washington: Government Printing Office), p. 12.

care before they are used either as an indictment of civilian health education and services or as an argument in support of universal military training as an agency for promoting public health. Some of the rejections for military service were due to congenital or constitutional factors that could not be remedied by any program of health education. In other cases the physical conditions leading to rejection were remediable in nature. Many of the remediable conditions can be attributed to inadequate diet or inadequate medical services. The fact that any considerable percentage of American youth who reach the age of 18 should be rejected for military service because of physical defects that might have been avoided had the schools and the communities provided adequate health services certainly is no credit either to the schools or to the communities. It must not be forgotten, however, that the health services in the schools are still in the early stages of development; that in many communities they are wholly lacking; and that even at their best the health programs in our schools are limited to the control of communicable diseases, the prevention of disease, and the provision of lunches. The school health services are especially limited because generally they are not equipped to provide remedial health services and can, therefore, only recommend to parents that teeth, eyes, ears, or tonsils be given attention. In far too many instances parents fail to co-operate in providing the necessary medical services, either because of the cost involved or because they are not sufficiently enlightened about the importance of medical care to accept the recommendations of school health officers.

Even more important than the financial inability of parents to provide adequate health services for their children is the general economic status of the community that supports the schools. Schools located in the poorer regions of the United States where the ratio of children to adults is relatively high usually have very limited community health services, if any at all.

The data on rejections for health reasons of men examined for military service show that the percentage is relatively high in the geographical areas of low economic status.

These inadequacies in the health services of the schools and of the communities in which the schools are located may well lead to the hasty generalization that the solution to this problem lies in the adoption of universal military training. It may even be argued with considerable force that under military regulations every youth must undergo a rigid medical examination and must accept the remedial services that are provided under military auspices. It must be admitted, furthermore, that in certain respects the medical services and the physical conditioning programs of the Army surpass in excellence the school and community health programs as they now operate. Even though it may be conceded that under a program of universal military training many of the physical defects of youth admitted to military service may be corrected, we cannot depend upon military training to provide the solution to the health problems of youth throughout the nation. The limitations of military training as an agency of health education must be kept in mind and alternative possibilities must be considered.

HEALTH EDUCATION

It must be recognized, first of all, that when a youth reaches the age for entering military training the status of his physical condition is already largely determined by factors affecting his development during childhood and adoles-

cence. The most that can be done at this age is to repair teeth, remove tonsils, remedy hernias, and improve muscular tone.

In the second place, in any program of military training the approach to the health problems of young men is not primarily educational but largely remedial. The chief objective is to put men into physical condition so that they can endure the rigors of military training in anticipation of possible combat duty. The instruction in health and hygiene is of the most elementary nature, focused primarily upon the prevention of communicable diseases. Also the physical conditioning phase of military training is designed to develop physical strength and endurance; it is not of a type to cultivate recreational habits and skills that the men in training are likely to employ in their later civilian life.

In the third place, there is no indication in plans that have been announced thus far that youth with marked physical deficiencies will be eligible for military training. Those who will need most to improve their physical conditioning will be excluded from such benefits as may be derived from military training. The argument for health education through universal military training, therefore, loses much of its force for only those who can qualify for the training will be benefited by it.

In the fourth place, the health and physical vigor of our citizens, which we all recognize to be as essential in peacetime as in war, does not depend wholly or even primarily upon the physical conditioning of youth who can qualify for military training. It depends to a large degree upon the health status and the health education of the young women who will be the mothers of tomorrow's youth. The argument for military training as a means of health education has no pertinence to a large percentage of our population. The problem still remains one to be attacked vigorously by our civilian institutions.

The alternative to universal military training in the area of health, as in the area of illiteracy, is clear. We must improve the health education in our schools. We must provide better facilities for parent education and for maternal care. We must develop school and community programs of recreation and physical education that will maintain physical vigor and that will cultivate recreational habits appropriate to adult life. We must educate our citizens regarding sound diet; and we must improve the standards of living in the underprivileged groups so that the impressive number of physical defects due to medical neglect and to dietary deficiency may be prevented. To throw these large responsibilities upon the Army, with the hope that in one year of military training designed primarily to achieve other ends any appreciable gains will be made in improving the nation's health, is merely to close our eyes to the need for a comprehensive program of health education.

VOCATIONAL TRAINING

The third educational argument advanced in support of military training is that it will give youth vocational training. The desirability of vocational training for many American youth, in fact for all excepting those whose goal is a profession, is not an issue here. It is accepted as a fact. But before granting that military training can be looked to as the means of giving vocational education appropriate to the needs and demands of our civilian society, several questions must be carefully considered. What types of vocational skills are required in military service apart from certain highly specialized mechanical operations engaged in by limited num-

vanced in support of universal military training is that it will train youth for democratic citizenship. It is claimed by those who advance this argument that youth from all sorts of social, economic, racial, and religious backgrounds will engage in a common co-operative enterprise; that they will be imbued with a deep sense of loyalty to their country and its government; and that they will be benefited morally and spiritually. One of the terms that occurs time and again in the arguments advanced to support military training as a means of educating for citizenship is "discipline," which is construed to mean orderliness, respect for authority, and self-control.

Taken at their face value these claims have a strong popular appeal, but before they are accepted at their face value they must be critically appraised. What is the nature of the democratizing influences under military auspices? Are they in any important respects different from or superior to the influences in the schools where children of all national, racial, religious, and economic classes study and play together, excepting, of course, the schools in those communities that segregate the races for educational purposes? Are the democratic influences in the Army any more potent than they are in industry and business under fair employment practices? When one takes into account the documented cases of racial discrimination in the Army and Navy and the class system of rank, which is inherent in a military organization, he is forced to answer these questions in the negative.

The readiness with which some citizens accept the argument that universal military training should be adopted because it will promote good citizenship is evidence of confused thinking. For example, it is assumed that military indoctrination will contribute to the development of the individual's civic competence as a free citizen. Indoctrination in military training is indispensable and has legitimate ends within the framework of an army. But those ends are to orient the individual to the purposes of military training; namely, to win a war, to kill in order not to be killed, to follow orders without question. These emphases are directly opposed to the ideals embodied in the secular and religious instruction given during childhood and youth. In fact, this very antithesis between the purposes of military training and the development of a sense of responsibility as a free citizen will give rise to confusion and emotional conflicts at a time when youth's sense of values should become clearly defined.

DISCIPLINE

There is, moreover, obvious confusion regarding the meaning of discipline. Military discipline implies ability to obey orders. It is the product of regimentation under a hierarchy of commands. There is no distinction between military discipline as such in the army of a democracy and in the army of a fascist state. Discipline for democratic citizenship in contrast to military discipline implies that the individual as a free citizen voluntarily subordinates his personal interests to the interests of the group. He thinks problems through and arrives at a rational course of action in terms of values which he himself accepts. The discipline of regimentation points toward dictatorship. It is not the discipline that fits for free citizenship. It is important that we clarify the widespread confusion based on the assumption that military discipline trains for citizenship.

EDUCATORS' POINT OF VIEW

It should be kept in mind constantly that this discussion is not concerned with the question of universal military

training as a strictly military measure based upon military necessity. It is concerned only with the educational aspects of military training, particularly the arguments that were advanced to make military training more palatable to a dubious public. These arguments as they relate to illiteracy, health, vocations, and citizenship have little foundation.

But there are other questions regarding the bearing of universal military training on education that must not be overlooked. Why do so many educators, particularly college and university presidents, oppose military training? The first answer that occurs to those who favor military training, in fact one of which much has been made in public statements, is that these educators are endeavoring to protect vested interests. Those who make these statements naturally imply that the Army has no self-interest in promoting its program. The facts are that educators do not know what would be the effect of a year's military training. Will it reduce enrollments? Will most young men who would normally go to college attend college before taking military training? Perhaps college enrollments will actually increase. Educators are concerned about issues far more fundamental than enrollments and income. They believe that a year of regimentation runs counter to the independent thinking that must be the privilege and the responsibility of free men. They believe that if the year spent in military training were given to liberal or professional education, some of the major objectives of military training might be achieved. In fact, military officers of high rank have recently made eloquent and convincing statements regarding the value of liberal education to men in the armed forces. They have stressed the importance of being able to think independently, to face unexpected problem situations, and to solve those situations on the spot. They have, moreover, demonstrated their belief by assigning selected groups of competent men to the colleges and universities to be instructed under the auspices of these institutions. This policy is sound because it recognizes that it is not the function of military agencies to provide the type of education that can be given effectively in civilian institutions. But now it is proposed to withdraw physically qualified male youth from civilian life for a full year of training under military auspices. Does this represent a shift in point of view? Does the Army now intend to assume the educational functions for which civilian agencies already exist?

On April 17, 1945, General Marshall, in a letter addressed to Senator Thomas, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, opposing legislation which was designed to prohibit the employment of men inducted under 19 years of age in actual combat service until they had been given six months or more of military training, said:

> The training program is very intensive and equally thorough. Furthermore, most of the instructors now concerned with this work are veterans of actual combat experience. Under the present procedure the newly inducted soldier who is being prepared as a replacement for the ground forces undergoes a training course of from 15 to 17 weeks. He is taught how to care for himself in the field; how to employ both his primary and secondary weapons; and how he and his weapons fit into the squad and platoon. Satisfactory completion of the course means that he is qualified for service to which he is to be assigned.[5]

It is true that General Marshall indicated further that additional training was provided while these men were en-

[5] *Congressional Record,* Vol. 91, No. 79 (April 23, 1945), p. 3700.

route to assignments overseas and that they were placed in experienced units where they might have the leadership of veterans. The fact remains, however, that on the basis of General Marshall's statements a full year of universal military training would contemplate extending the scope of the program far beyond the training that was regarded adequate in the present war for combat service.

CIVILIAN TRAINING SHOULD BE IMPROVED

We cannot continue to provide inadequately for the important educational needs of our society which the war has brought into sharp focus. Nor can we meet these needs by adopting peacetime universal military training. The educational needs of the nation are one thing; the defense needs are quite another thing. To confuse the two is merely to neglect the former and to misrepresent the latter. The course of action with reference to our educational needs seems obvious: Improve the schools so that all youth capable of learning shall not remain illiterate until they reach the age of 18 or 20. Develop health education and health services on a national scale so that the physical vigor of both young men and young women may be improved, instead of concentrating on that segment of youth that is already in the best physical condition. Combine liberal and vocational education in existing institutions so that youth may have command of the technical skills that may be required in war and at the same time may be versatile in meeting emergency situations, civilian or military. Educate youth for the responsibilities of citizenship under conditions in which they may acquire a pattern of values to guide them in their decisions as citizens.

Intelligence, health, vocational competence, loyalty to the ideals of democracy—these are the foundations of our national strength. To build these foundations throughout childhood and youth is the responsibility of civilian institutions. Now is the time to extend and strengthen the services of these institutions so as to meet the needs that are so clearly apparent.

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Professional Army Versus Military Training

By Hajo Holborn

IT IS understandable that the chiefs of our armed forces are desirous of bringing about an early decision with regard to our military peacetime organization, but it is difficult to see how we can make correct judgments as long as we confine the discussion to the problem of compulsory military training. Army and Navy representatives have assured us that general military training is being advocated by them strictly for military reasons and not as a program of national education, social welfare, or employment, though they are personally convinced that military training would not be detrimental to the youth of America.

Our military leaders have shown real genius in directing the strategy of the present war and have displayed true democratic statesmanship in managing the vast mobilization of our human and industrial resources for the common war effort. There is every reason to assume that the Army and Navy initiated the legislation concerning obligatory military training only after examining the lessons of the present war with regard to both our national security and the preservation of our democratic life. However, by singling out compulsory military training for advance debate, the basic aims of our future military policy cannot be sufficiently clarified, and many people are misled into a discussion of secondary issues. Obviously, the introduction of a permanent military draft law constitutes only *one* step towards the achievement of an adequate military peacetime establishment, though in the opinion of responsible sponsors of the bill it may be the most important measure.

It is highly desirable that the American people should receive from authoritative sources a frank description of the general plans for the defense of the United States, in order to arrive at a realistic military policy which Congress not only could pass today but would sustain as well in future years when military problems will seem less pressing. Without such information a systematic exploration of American military organization is impossible, and most citizens will form their opinions about conscription largely on sentimental grounds. Nor can the scope and character of a military training scheme be defined without a full investigation of other aspects of military preparedness.

Experience of France

It has been the popular view in America to consider peacetime conscription as incompatible with democratic institutions. Historical study does not bear out such assertion. Leaving ancient history alone, the modern citizen soldier was the result of the new democratic and liberal ideas. The American Revolution showed for the first time on a still modest scale what common citizens could do in the military field. Thereafter the French Revolution proclaimed unreservedly the obligation of every citizen to take up arms in the defense of his country. Though in theory this obligation was never revoked, universal conscription was never put into practice under the two Empires or in the restored monarchy. Prior to the Third Republic the dictatorial and pseudoconstitutional rulers of France were afraid of using conscription to the full, since this could have been done by a popular militia system which could have menaced the social order. To gain the support of the bourgeoisie its members

were largely exempted from military service, while the actual draftees were persuaded to re-enlist. The French Army before 1872 was practically a professional army which used for recruitment a plutocratic selective system.

As a consequence of this perversion of democratic principles the officers held complete control of the armed forces and, on the strength of it, exerted a great influence upon the policies of the Government. The French officers class resisted liberal reforms when the Third Republic began to enforce national service on a universal basis and was often compromised by its collaboration with antirepublican movements which endangered French democracy. The political anemia of republican government in France was not caused by peacetime conscription, but rather by the relative strength of the reactionary forces which encouraged the military groups to cling stubbornly to the political and military privileges which they had enjoyed under the authoritarian regimes of the past.

EXPERIENCE OF GERMANY

In Prussia and Germany the introduction of universal conscription also occurred under liberal auspices. The new policy was, in the opinion of its authors, not only a means of liberating Prussia from French domination but an integral part of a comprehensive plan for reforming the state of Frederick the Great along liberal lines. The old Prussian monarchy was built on the absolute rule of soldier kings, who exercised their power over state and army through a corps of obedient civil servants and officers composed of members of the Prussian gentry. In return for these services the kings safeguarded the social benefits and exemptions of the Junker class. The Prussian reforms after 1807 planned to undermine the position of the Prussian nobility by creating self-government and a people's army. Every citizen was to serve in the army, but army commissions were to be on a merit basis. Moreover, the regular army was to be relatively small, and the great mass entered a militia which was to be finally administered by the representative councils of self-government.

The whole reform program was thwarted after 1815. With the restoration of the Germanic states the conservative forces rallied to the support of the old prerogatives of the Crown and gentry. In military affairs this meant the preservation of the exclusive royal command and of the virtual monopoly of the Junkers over officers commissions. Obligatory military service was maintained and was socially broader than in France. However, there were no citizen soldiers, since Prussia had no citizens but merely subjects. Conscription was only a different, and incidentally cheaper, system of recruitment for an army which reflected the lack of political rights of the people and was a tool for the suppression of liberalism.

Twice during the century this system was challenged by the rising tide of the liberal movement. First the Revolution of 1848–49 tried to establish a liberal regime. But Prussian as well as Austrian absolutism was largely saved by the armies. In the early sixties the Prussian liberals and democrats attempted to wrest control over the army from William I but were defeated by Bismarck. Germany was a militaristic state before the adoption of universal conscription. The new military organization did not affect the fundamental character of the state, since its old rulers continued to wield supreme power and consequently could manipulate any army system according to their own political desires.

A new situation arose in Germany after 1919. The Weimar Republic was

bound to face conflicts with the army officers similar to those of the French Republic after 1871. But the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles prohibiting conscription strengthened the hands of the professional officers caste and made the *Reichswehr* a domain of the antirepublican elements.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY

These examples may suffice to show that conscription of itself does not hinder democratic development, as is commonly believed in the United States and in Britain. Conversely, a professional army and navy is by no means necessarily a menace to democratic life, as many Europeans are inclined to assume. This happened to be true, as we saw, in the German Republic. However, the evolution of liberal institutions in modern England was never seriously hampered by her military organization, although the existence of monarchical institutions might have served as a rallying point for a military *fronde*.

In 1919 the Americans and British on one side and the French on the other heatedly debated the democratic virtues of the two systems of military organization, trying to impose upon Germany the one best suited to democratic forms of government. The American and British officers and statesmen carried the day, with results which will be studied by everyone interested in the origins of the Second World War. Though it would be rash to say that they were wrong in all circumstances, it should be emphatically stated that recent historical events afford an excellent object lesson showing the futility of comparing systems of military organization in an abstract manner. The various forms of military service can be profitably studied only in the setting of the constitutional and political structure of individual states.

EARLY AMERICAN VIEW

In America, for the century after 1812 it was customary to consider a professional army as the type of military force most ideally fitted to democratic conditions. This was a complete reversal of the philosophy of Washington, who put the emphasis on popular forces. However, his fears about "mercenary armies, which have at one time or another subverted the liberties of almost all the countries they have been raised to defend" [1] were not borne out by the history of the United States. But this may have been merely the result of the small size of the American Army, and not at variance with Washington's general sentiment as stated in his report to Congress of 1783:

> Although a large standing army in time of peace has ever been considered dangerous to the liberties of a country, yet a few troops, under certain circumstances, are not only safe, but indispensably necessary. Fortunately for us our relative situation requires but few.

However, even when the American Army was large, as at the time of the conclusion of the Civil War, it did not become a politically unruly group.

The republican government was soon so firmly established that the generations following the Fathers of the Constitution forgot to speculate on the relationship of military organization and democracy. To most people in the United States the minimum of a mili-

[1] "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment," in Vol. 26 of the Bi-centennial Edition of *Writings of Washington,* from which also the following quotation is taken. General John McAuley Palmer was the first student of American military history to rediscover this report and see its fundamental importance for an understanding of Washington's military theories. Cf. John McAuley Palmer, *Washington, Lincoln, Wilson,* 1930, and *America in Arms,* 1941.

tary establishment, no matter whether militia or professional army, became the logical policy of a peace-loving nation. This again was in sharp contrast to the conceptions of Washington and practically all the eminent leaders of the founding period of the United States. They were very conscious of the unique international constellation which had enabled the Colonies to become independent. They were worried by the thought that the young Republic might be drawn into the turmoil of international conflicts and might have to defend its new liberty in less favorable circumstances. Therefore they not only proposed to maintain the old general muster but wanted to establish an effective military reserve by a more intensive peacetime training of the able-bodied younger men.

This plan was not adopted, and for more than a century the militia proved of doubtful value in contributing directly to the military strength of the United States in times of war. All wars of the nineteenth century into which the United States was drawn were unnecessarily costly in human and material losses. But most foreign wars were minor conflicts, and American security was safe as long as the great military powers of the age could not strike at the Western Hemisphere.

EXPERIENCE DURING WORLD WARS

With the new century this situation was irrevocably changed. Twice in the last thirty years America has had to improvise the mobilization of all its young men after the outbreak of the crisis. Both times, truly democratic armies were created. The higher staff and command work was chiefly done by the professional officers, but conscripts and volunteers were rapidly promoted to posts of responsibility in accordance with their ability for military leadership, while the political direction of the war and the mobilization of industries were largely in the hands of civilians.

In the course of the war the officers committed blunders in dealing with political, social, and economic problems for which they were little prepared by their peacetime training. But the best civilian experts were often enough equally baffled by these war tasks, and they frequently showed complete incapacity to live up to the urgent needs of actual warfare. On the whole these were minor shortcomings, which can be explained by the separation of civilian and military life before the war and by the speed with which the Nation had to be readied for the struggle. The armed forces have certainly managed to attract the confidence of all groups and parties within our democratic society.

The question remains whether we should consider the type of armed forces of World Wars I and II as the best instrument of future warfare, which, as we know, may be fought by different methods. Before the present war, military scientists asserted that mass armies had become powerless and that the future belonged to the highly trained elite armies. An American writer disparagingly characterized the big national armies of the nineteenth century as "armed hordes" [2] which had ruined the fine art of war and made wars bloodier and more inhuman. Charles de Gaulle expressed similar ideas in his remarkable study *Vers l'armée de métier*.[3] The book from which the German generals learned so much contained his conception of the role of modern tank forces, but it advocated in the first place the creation of a picked army of tank men. In de Gaulle's opinion the trend was away from big armies.

[2] Hoffman Nickerson, *The Armed Horde*, 1940.

[3] Published in 1934. Translated under the title: *The Army of the Future* in 1941.

The Second World War has not confirmed these predictions. We have witnessed the revival of mobile warfare through the use of armored troops and air forces, but the same large numbers of soldiers as in the First World War have been employed, and employed usefully, by the fighting nations. Mere numerical superiority of itself has not settled the battles of this war, and quality has played a decisive part. But not only quality and quantity of men but those of matériel as well have to be taken into consideration. An abundance of fine weapons and equipment goes far to make up for less training and experience. The present war consequently has been both a race in the mobilization and training of fighting men and in mass production and the scientific development of weapons.

The character of modern war calls for a more highly trained nucleus of professional military men in the armed forces. The modern officer is still supposed to possess the timeless virtues of a leader of men in battle, but at the same time he is expected to master and to teach the most heterogeneous technological subjects, while showing a sound critical judgment on intricate political and economic problems. An industrial society like ours produces many of these professional skills, and in many respects an officer can never hope to equal the civilian specialist. In time of war many army jobs should be turned over to civilians; in peacetime there should be at least regular contact between the military and the civilians. But no good system of national defense can be built without a group of military professionals with an adequate understanding of many specialized activities which enables them to construct combined operations and a total war effort.

THE QUESTION OF A SKELETON ARMY

As progress in the modern science of war is rapid and requires tireless effort on the part of its students, it may be asked whether it would not be wasteful to impose on the officers the obligation to train continuously large masses of green recruits. Would it perhaps be wiser to maintain a small model army the members of which could concentrate on the preparation of industrial and military plans? Such program could be supported by another argument. Since in our age equipment and weapons are so quickly outdated by new inventions, it may seem useless to stock up large quantities beforehand. It would be practical to start mass production only in an emergency, and to be satisfied with the manufacture of samples in normal circumstances.

A small skeleton army free to experiment with new scientific inventions and to pioneer in modern tactics has many supporters in the public and in the services. Undoubtedly an army of this type would be capable of fulfilling some of the most important tasks of any modern defense organization, which becomes helpless if it cannot be adapted smoothly to changing conditions of warfare. Without a highly efficient brain trust of defense, which is at leisure to develop new ideas and has ample funds to test them, even the largest peacetime establishment will remain weak.

Yet, the rapid change of weapons has been exaggerated by many writers. If the still serviceable implements of war which were manufactured before this war were enumerated, they would fill a long list. It was part of our trouble that we did not have enough of the older weapons in 1941. Moreover, it seems questionable whether or not reliance upon a professional skeleton force would give us the best brain trust of national defense. If it is true that in any war skills developed in civilian pursuits will have to be used, it appears extremely doubtful that the establish-

ment of a strictly professional army would be a wise policy. It would again segregate the Army and Navy from the general social life and could lead to an independent military policy, the more so since the standing forces will be much stronger than in the past.

It is unnecessary here to follow out this line of thinking. A program of founding our military defense chiefly upon professional forces meets its strongest objections in another field. It rests upon the assumption that America would again, as during the two World Wars, have the necessary time of, let us say, eighteen to twenty-four months to mobilize fully for war. This is possible, but only if we ourselves prepare the defense of the Western Hemisphere. In the two World Wars the United States could rely on her allies as her first line of defense. In 1917 Russia fell by the wayside, in 1940 France was overpowered, not to speak of the severe punishment that all our allies took on both occasions before American help became effective. It would be bold, indeed, to expect that America could forever count on having her allies perform these services or on being the last big power to be attacked. It should also be remembered how unable America was to assist in the prevention of wars before either World War, on account of her military unpreparedness.

International Aspects of National Defense

The American people is now committed by the United Nations Charter to play a leading part in the policing of the world. The security organization presupposes that the big powers, or at least for the time being the Big Three, would be unassailable within their frontiers and thus able to provide protection to other members of the United Nations. The strength of their national position has been made the cornerstone of international security. From this fact another conclusion can be drawn. If the three, or finally five, powers are to use their power in common they will have to guard, in addition to their own ramparts, their communication links. Germany gained her tremendous military advantages in the First World War largely by her ability to isolate and thus overwhelm Russia. The present war would have taken a very different course if Germany had cut the last lines of communications between Russia and her western allies or had been able to establish direct contact with Japan.

The three powers will have to construct their national defense systems not only with a view to their own safety but with an eye to co-operation in the interest of peace. Only a common strategy can lead to an economy of forces in time of war and a reduction of national armaments in time of peace. Without discussing details, the application of these principles would call, on the American side, for the maintenance of most of our bases in the Atlantic, from Greenland and Iceland over Bermuda to the Caribbean. This chain of defense points should be linked up with the British system by an advanced base in the Azores. The British defense "axis" would consist of Gibraltar, Suez, Aden, Bombay, Singapore, Australia. In the Dutch East Indies it would join our Pacific system, which would stretch from the Philippines over points in the central west Pacific to the Aleutians and Alaska. Access for supplies to Russia and lines for bringing the national contingents of all three powers together in an international force would be through the Straits and the Black Sea and over the Pacific.

Expansion of Recruitment

Not only our national security but the functioning of the United Nations

Organization depends on defense arrangements of this general nature. In our case this requires forces which cannot be produced by a law making military *training* obligatory. Training is not identical with military service, and the naval, air, and land forces which are needed to make the bases secure and provide striking power in case the Security Council should decide on military action cannot be mere trainees. These forces should be composed of men willing to serve overseas at least for one year, and preferably even for a longer period after having passed through their elementary military training.[4] It would be useless at this moment to set down concrete figures, but it is obvious that the naval, air, and ground forces needed will be considerably larger than our military establishment of 1939.

To expand recruitment beyond the prewar level will be extremely difficult, particularly in the Army ground forces. The active Army comprised 174,000 men on July 1, 1939. But the quality of its personnel was most uneven. Enlistment should be made more attractive by higher pay, better housing, changes in discipline, and so forth; but it would be oversanguine to expect a large numerical increase of effectives from such measures. As long as the armed services are outside the purview of the average American boy, he will normally regard military service as an undesirable career. The introduction of compulsory military training would change this situation, and it seems reasonable to anticipate in this case a marked increase both in enlistments and in the numbers of candidates for commissions in the reserves.

[4] The maintenance of adequate occupation forces in Germany and Japan over a period of years constitutes a special problem. For the first two to three years fairly large and well-equipped troops will have to be employed which will have to be kept in service by an adaptation of the National Service Act of 1940. In the second period of occupation, which is likely to last a considerably longer period, smaller military forces will be needed. It is only in this second period that the peacetime organization proposed in this article may be used.

CREATION OF SUFFICIENT FORCES

Universal military training appears as the only way to create active armed forces sufficiently strong to protect our immediate defense needs and make our participation in international action under the United Nations Charter possible. Such punitive military actions as the United Nations may take in the future should not be visualized in dimensions approaching the World Wars and requiring the total mobilization of the great nations. Under the Charter the big powers can intervene at the earliest sign of danger, and it is probable that they will act long before the whole world is again in flames. However, though total national mobilization may be unnecessary, temporary reinforcements would be required. A universal training law of itself would not produce such additional troops, but reserve forces would have to be formed by special arrangement. Universal training would produce a large pool of manpower trained in the elementary skills of the military trade, but it would not create military units which could be dispatched at short notice. But it may be assumed that many trainees would be willing to volunteer for a few years' service in such a mobile reserve. The National Guard, if properly organized, may afford the best method to institutionalize this force.

The existence of standing forces and a mobile reserve would enable the United States to feel safe and play her role in the United Nations. The Charter, in contrast to the Covenant of 1919, has strong teeth, but it does not

pretend to make conflicts altogether impossible. In particular, it depends on the free co-operation of the big powers. We have a vital interest in the growth of their unity and, on the whole, can be satisfied with the progress made in this direction. A serious breakdown of the co-operation among the big powers would be a calamity of the first order, but it would not necessarily mean war, particularly if our outer defense positions were strong. It would be a signal for new armaments over the whole world. We could face this situation calmly by an intensification of universal military training.

Meanwhile, a universal military training law is needed, but its scope and character cannot be defined without fuller discussion of our entire peacetime establishment, which should be judged in the light of military experience and American democratic traditions. A combination of universal peacetime military training with provisions for standing forces and organized reserves is demanded by the present world situation. Such a program is unobjectionable, perhaps even desirable, from a democratic point of view if the necessary precautions are taken. The services have been reticent about the organization of the future Regular Army and Navy, their disposition, the selection and training of officers, and the way in which universal military training is to be integrated into the general scheme of national defense. No satisfactory bill for universal military training can be drafted if the debate is not focused on these points.

PERIOD OF TRAINING

Is it necessary to have a full year of military training? Or would six months with refresher courses in subsequent years be sufficient? The elementary training of the draftees of the present war takes seventeen weeks. Such results could not be achieved in peacetime, but twenty-four to twenty-six weeks ought to be adequate. It should be kept in mind that in the case of a total mobilization in future, former military trainees would need additional specialized training adapted to the theater in which they would be deployed. This would be almost equally true with trainees of twenty-six weeks as with those of fifty-two weeks. Moreover, their overseas deployment depends largely on the conversion of our industries to war production, which, even with better preparation than was possible in the situation before 1940, will take time. A shorter period of training than the one year now usually given may well be the right scheme; for the loss of precious time for vocational and professional training in our civilian life weakens our national defense, too, and can only partly be made up by speeding up our educational processes.

While the general principles of our future defense organization can be described in outline, their practical application calls for additional investigation and new public discussion.

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Wanted: An Over-All Plan of National Defense

By Ernest H. Wilkins

WHAT we as a nation desire above all else is to live in freedom and in peace. If we are to succeed in living thus, two things are necessary: (1) we must make all possible efforts to lessen the development of international tensions; and (2) we must maintain in our own country a strength so obviously adequate that a potential enemy or combination of enemies would be unlikely to risk attack, and so actually adequate that we could make a good defense if we should nevertheless be attacked.

Avoiding International Tensions

In order to lessen the development of international tensions we must, in the first place, help to complete the establishment of a strong international organization. It is true that we are at the present time the strongest nation in the world in terms of production. But it is also true that the population of this country is only 7½ per cent of the population of the earth. Hitherto the greater part of the other 92½ per cent has been negligible as constituting potential enemies. That is no longer true. Masses totaling far more than our own population are already as capable of modern military action as we are; and the swift increase and distribution of technological knowledge will soon bring other hundreds of millions into the category of dangerous potential enemies. We have not been gifted in making other peoples love us. It is perfectly conceivable that unless a strong international organization is established, with ourselves as loyal members, there may descend upon us a coalition of enemies so overwhelmingly strong that the most extreme degree of preparedness in this country would be of no avail. It is perfectly possible that if we kept under arms at all times all able-bodied men not indispensable for the maintenance of life and the production of military munitions and supplies, we might nevertheless be overwhelmed by hordes far greater than the sum total of the millions we could muster. And it is perfectly possible that the attack would be of such a deadly scientific nature that the sheer volume of our defense would have little or no significance.

It follows that the paramount task before this country at the present time is participation in the complete establishment of a strong international organization. No single element in an over-all program of national defense can possibly be justified unless it is clearly consistent with such participation.

But even after the establishment of such an organization there will remain the huge and continuous task of supporting it with high intelligence, genuine good will, and firm resolution. No matter how sound the plan of the international organization may be, it will not run itself. Its intricate and far-flung activities will require the guidance and the championship of the world's ablest leaders, among whom we should be well represented, and the services of a very large number of skillful and well-trained men and women, among whom there should be a great many of our own citizens. In our own country the international organization must have the continuing support of the great majority of men and women of influence in many fields, particularly in the fields of politics and business. Whatever the safeguards of the international charter, and whatever the competence of the leaders and of all the per-

sonnel of the international organization, policies will be formed in the national political field and projects will be launched in the national business field that will affect the strength of the international organization for good or ill. In our own country, moreover, the international organization must have the continuing support of the majority of our whole population.

All this means that we must set up a program of general international education for all our youth, and a program of specialized international education for a far larger number of young men and women than have ever received such education hitherto.

STRONG NATIONAL DEFENSE

However, participation in a strong international organization is not sufficient to guarantee our peace. It is probable that future means of attack will be such as can be employed with great suddenness, and that any outlaw nation in a future attempt at large-scale aggression would attack us first. In that event, the attack might come with such suddenness and power that whatever international defense might be assigned to us would be too little and too late.

It is therefore necessary that we have the national strength to discourage or repel attack. An adequate program for the attainment of such strength, actual and obvious, would contain at least these five elements:

1. Military strength adequate in quantity, in quality, and in its over-all unification.
2. Sufficient general and special scientific and inventive activities to keep us in possession of the most advanced military weapons.
3. Medical and related professions adequate in quantity and quality, and linked, in so far as may be necessary, to the program of national defense.
4. An industrial organization linked, in so far as may be necessary, to the program of national defense.
5. Internal unity of a degree so high as to make men and women generally ready to participate actively in any program of national defense, and to save us from internal cleavages that would lessen or nullify our strength in time of danger.

The lack of any one of these five elements would constitute an area of fatal weakness.

1. *Military strength*

Military strength must center in a permanent military establishment, which must, of course, include men and machines prepared for fighting on the ground, on and under the sea, and in the air. It should be large enough to fulfill our military obligations as members of an international organization, to take care of national police duties, and to present a very considerable surplus of additional strength. It should be much larger, in any case, than the pitifully small skeleton forces which, for all their valor, so nearly did not suffice to save us, at the beginning of the present war, from invasion and possible defeat. Yet it should not be so large as to menace the character or the stability of our national life or the adequacy of other phases of our national strength.

The size of the permanent military establishment cannot rightly be determined by the military command alone, though the recommendation of that command should have very great importance. It should be determined as part of an over-all plan developed by a statesmanship conscious of all the interlocking needs recognized in the present discussion. Speaking as a layman perfectly willing to be proved mistaken, but as a layman not entirely bereft of

knowledge of the problems of the present military establishment, I should guess that the number of men concerned should be not less than 1,000,000 and not more than 1,500,000 (with gradual disarmament in prospect as the international organization gains in strength). It is to be remembered that no size would suffice to meet the largest possible coalition of potential enemies or to avert sudden attack of a deadly scientific nature: there is no such thing as the provision of military strength adequate through its mere mass.

It is obvious also that military quality is as significant as military quantity, and that military quality must manifest itself in a new inventive and organizational imagination and in a new thoroughness of liaison both as among the various branches of the military establishment and with all other elements in the whole program of national defense.

There is a fair question as to whether the permanent military establishment should suffice for our specifically military strength, or should be supplemented by a constantly renewed body of reserves. The weight of such evidence as is now available to me leads me to think that there should be some such supplementation. I am not entering into the details of this discussion, except to assert four convictions:

a. Such a body of reserves should be strictly and frankly supplementary to the permanent military establishment.

b. A proposal for such reserves should be in relation to the size and character of the permanent establishment. It would be one thing to suggest the development of a body of reserves as supplementary to a permanent establishment of 500,000 men: it would be quite a different thing to propose it as supplementary to a permanent establishment of 2,000,000 men or more.

c. Such a proposal should be based on a reasoned argument as to the number of men needed for such a purpose. So far as I am aware, no one has yet suggested any valid criterion for the determination of what is "adequate" in this connection.

d. The general question of the necessity for the development of such a body of reserves is prior to and more important than the question as to how such reserves might best be obtained. Even if an extensive and elaborate reserve plan were to be adopted, it would not follow that there is only one way to secure the necessary number of men.

2. *Scientific and inventive activities*

We must have sufficient general and special scientific and inventive activity to keep us in possession of the most advanced military weapons. This involves far more than the maintenance of ordnance research within the military establishment itself. It involves a far closer liaison with the scientific research bodies and laboratories of the country than was maintained before the outbreak of the present war. The contribution of these bodies and laboratories during the war has been invaluable; and plans already developed for continuing liaison appear to be excellent. The only point I care to make in this connection is that for the production of a few thousand men devoting themselves wholly or almost wholly to work on the top levels of military research and invention there must be very large numbers of less specialized scientists and vast numbers of young men and women with a good general training in science from whom, as they mature, the specialists can be drawn. The strength requisite at the top of the pyramid cannot be reached unless the base is broad. Even in the present war the operation of the Selective Service

System—which has in general been so admirable—has been seriously at fault in the spending, for unspecialized and unscientific duty, of men who had it in them to make major scientific contributions. The development of young scientists, moreover, depends upon the maintenance of the flow of young teachers of science—and the recent stoppage of that flow will have very serious results for years to come.

3. *Medical and related professions*

We must have medical and related professions adequate in quantity and quality, and linked, in so far as may be necessary, to the program of national defense. This is too obvious to need further discussion—save to remind any reader who may need the reminding of the tragic shortages of medical and nursing care both in the services and in civilian life.

4. *Industrial organization*

We must have an industrial organization linked, in so far as may be necessary, to the program of national defense. Such linking involves, obviously, the maintenance of constantly renewed plans for conversion to war production; but, more than that, it involves the maintenance of healthy and co-operative conditions within every one of the industries concerned. The best of plans will be of no avail if men will not work.

5. *Internal unity*

We must have internal unity. The existence of major tensions within our country would be a constant invitation to designing aggressors, and a potential instrument ready for their hands. "Divide and conquer!" How much easier to conquer if the division is already there, ready at hand for exploitation! A nation known to be divided is a nation known to be weak; a nation known to be united is a nation known to be strong.

There exist today within our country divisive tensions of the utmost seriousness, tensions which have in some measure impeded our effort even in the present war. They will not cure themselves, and there are no signs that the various agencies that have been laboring with them hitherto will suffice to cure them. They are indeed growing worse rather than better. If they are not cured, or at least very greatly relieved, it is unlikely that our Nation could again achieve sufficient unity to enable us to withstand such peril as we have now withstood.

The most dangerous of these tensions are those of poverty and near-poverty, and those of race prejudice and race hatred.

It was true not long since, and it is probably still true, that more than half of all the families of this country receive incomes which are below a fairly defined decency standard, too many of them being below even the subsistence level. This economic "other half" has little reason for national pride, for contentment with democracy, or for love of those who are economically fortunate. So long as this "other half" exists and suffers, it is material ready for the manipulation of any fifth columnist whose assigned task may be the fanning of flames that are already alight.

Within this area the struggle of capital and labor represents the most acute form of tension—that struggle being in essence, on the side of labor, its determination to win a place in the sun of democracy for the vast numbers of individuals who are the laborers. I am not discussing the rightness or wrongness of means and motives active on either side; I am merely underlining the gravity of the tension, which is all too likely to assume still greater seriousness after

the present war—eventually, if not immediately.

How can such dangers as these be mitigated? They are not being adequately met by government agencies, by capital, management, or labor, or by private foundations. The masses concerned are too vast and too various to render possible the finding of quick and easy solutions. Yet the dangers are very great.

The immediate need would seem to be for a wise and powerful leadership which would bring together and keep together influential representatives of the conflicting interests concerned; would toil with them for temporary conciliation and understanding; and would enlist their support for a very extensive program of economic research and education.

The long-run need would seem to be for the establishment of such a program, which should include: first, greatly expanded efforts, both governmental and private, in the field of economic research; second, general economic education for every potential leader and every potential follower in the field of earning, and for every potential consumer—which is to say, for everyone; and third, specialized economic education for a far larger number of young men and women than have ever received such education hitherto.

For the sake of brevity I refrain from the parallel discussion of the field of racial tensions—a field in some ways even more dangerous. Here too the existing agencies, public and private, are losing rather than gaining ground, while those who suffer most from these tensions are increasing both in numbers and in the consciousness of their grievances. Here too, if the tensions are not abated, there is increasing danger that the seeds of war may swiftly grow. Here too, there is need for a new type of great concerted national effort to deal with a great national danger.

Utilization of Resources

The plan thus outlined involves an over-all vision and a synthesis of resources that call for the highest statesmanship: it must not be and cannot be beyond the powers of democracy to produce such statesmanship.

The plan calls also for the directed utilization or education of vast numbers of persons: in the international organization and in international education; in the permanent military establishment and in the training of supplementary military reserves; in the medical and related professions; in scientific research and education; in industrial liaison; and in the fields of economic and sociological research and education. No single one of all these elements, I repeat, can safely be neglected in an over-all plan of national defense.

Such a plan would seem to call for the creation of a General Staff for National Defense, in which, in addition to executive and co-ordinating officers, there should be representatives of the international interest, the military establishment, science, medicine, industry, economics, and sociology. Each of these interests, in turn, should have its own General Staff. The military establishment already has such a staff: each of the other interests should have a general staff concerned with activities in its own field relating to the national defense.

Educational Possibilities

Those activities include a vast amount of education and training: international education, general and specialized; military training; scientific education, general and specialized; economic education, general and specialized; and sociological education, general and specialized.

The general education—international, scientific, economic, and sociological—is a matter for our schools, public and private, and for the more elementary phases of college and university work in those same fields. Such education already exists in a considerable measure; but it should be greatly enriched and should be so extended as to touch and orient all students. From the General Staffs of the interests concerned there should come persistent suggestions and ample supplies of appropriate material.

Specialized education

Specialized education in international affairs should include not only the obviously appropriate college courses, but also work in the language, geography, and history of a particular foreign country, plus a year's study in the country concerned, under staff direction—or, in this case, under international direction—and at government expense. Such a plan, as I see it, would represent the ordinary plan of student exchanges made systematic and very greatly magnified. We have sent some millions of young men to Europe on an inevitable mission of war: why should we not send a hundred thousand young men and women to Europe or to South America or elsewhere, every year, on a mission peaceful in itself and productive of an understanding which would thereafter make constantly for peace?

Specialized economic and sociological education should include not only the obviously appropriate college courses, but also at least a semester, and preferably a year, of field work done under the direction of the General Staff concerned, and at government expense. I believe that our country would profit greatly through the ultimate relief of tensions, if for many years to come fifty thousand or even a hundred thousand young men and women should engage annually in each of these two types of education. Only in such a massive directed approach to these most critical problems do I see hope for the solution of what has hitherto remained so tragically unsolved.

Specialized scientific education can be handled much more completely in college and university laboratories; but I would suggest that as a climax there might be, for some thousands of those who prove to be most gifted, a year of work, at government expense, in military or in public or private civilian research institutes.

Size of reserve corps

If there is to be an annual training of military reserves, it is obvious that success in such training would call for a skillful and imaginative revision of the whole program of military training—a revision which is already under way in some very able military minds.

As to the number of men requisite annually for training as reserves—assuming that there are to be reserves—I repeat the statement made above that so far as I am aware no one has yet suggested any valid criterion for the determination of the number which would really be adequate. The War and Navy Departments are quite simply and quite understandably asking for the utmost they could possibly get: it remains true that under certain conceivable conditions the utmost they could possibly get would still be inadequate. And it remains true that to take all able-bodied young men for such training would not only incur the objections commonly raised against it, but would also interfere disastrously with the several types of education discussed in this paper, and would thus weaken, rather than strengthen, the program of national defense conceived as a whole.

It is my considered opinion that the number of young men and women desirable for the various types of education and training here discussed—including military training—could be secured on a voluntary basis, provided the General Staff for National Defense were duly efficient in the indication of quotas, and provided that the several types of education and training—including military training—were made as excellent and as soundly attractive as they could and should be made. If, however, the attempt to get the required numbers of persons on a voluntary basis should fail, then the necessary quotas for all phases of the over-all program should be set by the General Staff for National Defense, and should be secured by a plan of conscription which should provide for both the military and the other needs.

. . . . .

The costs of the over-all program here proposed would indeed be absolutely great; but I can see no reason to think that they would equal more than a tiny fraction of the costs of war.

Some one—or many—must see the over-all vision and translate it into reality. Only so can we hope for national unity, for national strength, and for the opportunity to live in freedom and peace in a world in which the nations, for better or for worse, have been drawn into mutual relations which are now far more insistent, far more complex, and far more interpenetrating than they have ever been before.

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Military Training Through the National Guard

By Omar B. Ketchum

AS AMERICAN soldiers were settling down for the second time in less than thirty years to the disheartening, but essential chore of policing a conquered Germany, a United States Senator unveiled a startling plot he discovered in the Reich that might have succeeded in fomenting World War III.

This Senator, Kilgore of West Virginia, returned from Germany with details of hitherto secret documents that fortunately found their way into American hands. He released a confidential report on a meeting of German industrialists at Strasbourg on August 10, 1944, that dealt with their plans to dissociate themselves from the Nazi party, strengthen their economic contacts with foreign firms, and cloak future activities under the guise of nonmilitary research.

The long-range objectives of these representatives of Krupp, Rochling, Messerschmitt, Rheinmetall, Bussing and Volkswagenwerk, and of the German Naval Ministry and Armament Ministry, was readily evident to the Senator, for this was his reaction:

"Masquerading as 'neutral' businessmen without political allegiance, they have already conceived vicious plans for a third attempt at world conquest."

Supporting this view was the confirmed Nazi trick of reporting the arrest of industrial leaders for alleged defeatist utterances and resistance efforts—a double-barreled effort to prevent seizure of "private property" by the Allies and to establish the operators as non-Nazi.

Even as these revelations of masterminding by the self-styled "master race" were being impressed upon Congress, the news and editorial columns of the American free press were reflecting another throwback to conditions that led to World War II. Sincere, but misled groups of such varying interests as education, labor, and religion were reported girding for the imminent fight to forestall military preparedness of this nation by vigorous opposition to compulsory military training.

Their spokesmen and writers were aligned on one side, ready to battle with the leaders of the armed forces united in the demand that every American youth be required to take one year of compulsory peacetime military training in the Army as insurance against the rise of another Hitler.

Military Point of View

The military position that peace can be maintained through the willingness and ability of the powerful American republic to enforce it has been carefully and impressively expounded to Congress this summer, for all proponents of preparedness realize that if an adequate peace force is to be secured legislation must be enacted before the travesty of this latest war is too readily forgotten.

There was no underestimating of the opposition as Army, Navy, and Marine Chiefs presented their situation report to the Postwar Military Policy Committee of the House of Representatives. A glittering array of the highest brass shone brilliantly as the case for compulsory military training was presented. There was Admiral King, Marine Commandant Vandegrift, and General of the Armies George C. Marshall, flanked by a determined corps of military and naval experts.

It was a familiar duty to General Marshall. After World War I he aided General Pershing in preparing universal training plans that an indifferent nation

refused to consider. Those plans that parallel the pending program for one year of compulsory training were then incorporated in a bill by Senator Wadsworth of New York. Now a member of the House of Representatives and a member of the policy committee, Congressman Wadsworth once more has seen the necessity of supporting the cause of a strong national defense.

The Army's argument was effectively summarized for the committee by Secretary of War Stimson, that veteran champion of the preservation of peace by force who, as Secretary of State in 1931, walked alone when he sought to threaten Japan out of warring on China. Unimpressed by America's ability to maintain peace, the Japanese war lords ignited the flame of destruction that finally engulfed the entire world.

Declaring that in almost every international crisis that arises the eyes of all nations turn to the United States for leadership, Secretary Stimson said the principal objective of universal training is to produce the necessary military strength for the purpose of national defense and for the purpose of enabling this nation to discharge its obligation under an organized plan for world peace.

Veterans organizations without exception wholeheartedly supported the principle of compulsory peacetime training before the committee. Only one group of combat veterans, however, took cognizance of the opposition to the War Department's one-year-in-the-Army plan. That organization is the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, and it is the V.F.W.-suggested alternate to the bitterly opposed War Department formula with which this article is concerned.

ALTERNATE PROPOSAL

The Veterans of Foreign Wars proposed that the National Guard, Naval, and Marine Reserves be employed to give "at home" compulsory peacetime military training over a period of years to every young man. The proposal was presented to the House Committee as a suggestion to satisfy objections to the Army plan raised by educators and authorities on social problems.

The V.F.W. idea was not conceived as a reply to the expressed fears of labor organizations that "labor would be the first to suffer if America were to follow a path of militarism," the Congress of Industrial Organizations' statement, and, as the American Federation of Labor put it, that the nation would be "building a huge military machine for future wars."

No group of citizens has a more realistic awareness of the significance of the demand for military and naval preparedness than the Veterans of Foreign Wars who have personally experienced the realistic effects of unpreparedness. Nearly one million strong, including more than 600,000 servicemen of the present war, we have lived through bitter trials assigned us by a complacent, peace-loving nation—trials that tragically emphasize the results of inadequately trained manpower, shortages of weapons and supplies, and a pitiable lack of knowledge of the ruthlessness of modern war by the green troops forced into it.

Not so many years ago—but a longer period of time by far than it might have been had we been prepared—many witnessed with alarm and shame the spectacle of men being trained for a war that has leveled Europe. Instead of rifles, they shouldered wooden guns. Instead of cannon, they were sighting stovepipes. Instead of tanks, they maneuvered with clumsy trucks.

Our green troops have ripened into the most powerful body of fighting men in the world. They have defeated the greatest armed threat to its security

that the world has ever faced. We may well give profound thanks for that amazing achievement. But, will we be given the grace of time to prepare in the event of another war? And, at the same time, some sober thought must be directed to our casualty total that approaches one million of maimed and dead, one of whom was my own son, killed before he lived twenty-three years.

The Veterans of Foreign Wars states emphatically that it is for preparedness to maintain peace by force of arms, if necessary. We believe this can best be accomplished through universal compulsory peacetime military training. We believed this twenty-five years ago at a time when another costly war had ended with its lesson unlearned. For twenty-five years we have preached the tragedy of unpreparedness. For twenty-five years we have sought compulsory training.

At the last National Encampment of the V.F.W. in August of 1944, at Chicago, our views on peacetime training were again restated. A resolution was unanimously adopted that closely follows the language and intent of the earlier resolutions of twenty-five years ago. Here is an excerpt from that resolution:

> On the assumption that no generation of Americans will ever fail to give its talents for the protection of our great country, be it resolved by the 44th National Encampment of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States that it once more reiterate its stand on this—one of the most burning questions of the hour—and demand that the Congress of the United States enact a universal peacetime compulsory military training law.

While the thousands of delegates to the V.F.W. National Convention are clearly on record for a compulsory training law, it is significant they did not attempt to specify the formula by which compulsory training was to be effected.

THE OPPONENTS

The formula or method of training has wisely been left to the determination of those better qualified to plan. Unfortunately, it is the lack of unanimous agreement between those who are for compulsory training which makes the task of Congress more difficult. The opponents of universal training are united against any plan while those who support the idea are divided on methods and formula. It must be admitted that the leadership of the V.F.W. has been groping for months in an effort to find a workable solution which would do the job and minimize the arguments of the opposition.

The opposition is generally directed at the proposal to give every boy one full uninterrupted year of training in the regular Army. The charges brought against the proposed year of training are largely of the four types given by a group of educators and authorities on social problems, in a recent poll conducted by the *American Magazine*. These are effectively summarized in an article in the June 1945 issue of that magazine by Dr. Arthur Kornhauser, Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University. His poll showed that expert opinion feared:

1. Taking a valuable year out of a young man's life, keeping him from continuing his education, delaying his career, preventing or interrupting his marriage, and uprooting him from his home or community at a most important stage of his growth.
2. Undemocratic influence of military and naval discipline, running counter to the qualities of individual initiative and self-discipline and instilling regimentation.
3. Rebellion to dull routine, with resultant development of slack habits.

4. Moral effect on the young man called into training at a time he is too easily tempted by sex, drinking, and gambling and when he might be prompted to blow off steam in the company of strangers and questionable influences.

Fifty-eight per cent of the experts were of the opinion that one year of compulsory training would be harmful, 26 per cent were doubtful of the harmful effects, and 12 per cent said they believed this type of training would be good. On the beneficial side were listed physical development and training in citizenship and leadership, points which parallel the preamble to the V.F.W. resolution in favor of compulsory training.

While testimony to the House Committee hearings showed that the Gallup Poll on compulsory training moved from 37 per cent favorable in 1939 to 63 per cent for approval in November 1943, that the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Denver found 79 per cent in favor of the plan in an interview conducted in December 1944, and that the Chamber of Commerce of the United States recently voted 2,229 to 239 for universal military training, the opposition of many educators is well known.

On January 24, 1945, twelve of America's most prominent college presidents addressed an open letter to President Roosevelt, urging him to drop his request to Congress for a universal military training law. And at the House Policy Committee hearings postponement of legislative action was urged by such organizations as the National Education Association, the Association of American Colleges, and the American Council on Education. Appearing against the plan were groups directly concerned with social problems and groups apparently formed for the express purpose of blocking universal military training—"The Women's Committee to Oppose Conscription," and the "Greater Philadelphia Committee Against Wartime Enactment of Peacetime Conscription," for example.

SUGGESTION OF V.F.W.

In the light of current opposition to the demand for one year of training in the Army during peacetime, the National Legislative Committee of the V.F.W. has been re-examining the entire problem. They have come up with a suggestion, not a plan. What Mr. R. K. Christenberry of New York, Chairman of that Committee, has proposed is not offered as an inflexible or unyielding demand which would discard other thinking on a method for compulsory military training. It represents only some serious thinking by the able members of our National Legislative Committee.

Our legislative committee believes they may have a workable plan in a suggestion to employ the National Guard, Naval, and Marine Reserves in giving military training over a period of years to every young man. They believe that such training should be compulsory and for the period of one enlistment of three years. In other words, at a predetermined age and in accordance with workable regulations, each boy would automatically become a member of the National Guard, or Naval, or Marine Reserve for a period of military training.

Under this proposal, compulsory military training could be given in a boy's own community, leaving him in his home, in his job, with his family, and with the opportunity to continue his education. The trainee would have only the same obligation as the voluntary members of the reserves—to participate in drills and training periods set each week at the local armory, and

to take two weeks of training each summer at a reserve camp.

We believe this type of training will be equally as beneficial to the man involved, and to the nation's maintenance of an adequate defense force, as one year of training under the barracks life that marked our prewar training of some of our present fighting men. Who doesn't recall the cry "OHIO"—"Over the Hill in October"—our pre-Pearl Harbor draftees coined to express their disgust and dissatisfaction with their assignment as barracks soldiers?

We believe that training under the National Guard formula will instill a respect, if not admiration, for military life. We believe many of the young men exposed to this type of training would desire to continue voluntarily in the reserves, thus building upon that keystone of national defense.

There is a most efficient parallel for this type of service, and that is the compulsory training plan of the Swiss. Their tiny republic has remained a bulwark for peace in its mountain fastness from the days of Napoleon through Hitler. Its strategic location and diplomatic importance have some bearing on Switzerland's continued neutrality, but its small, efficient Army has caused many a conqueror to debate trying to penetrate through the Alps to face it.

The Swiss require every young man to receive 116 days of military training over a period of two years—just about the equivalent of the drill periods and summer encampments of our National Guard plan. And this is supplemented by refresher courses from time to time, as advances in military tactics and new equipment require.

The same opportunity would be available to our men under our suggestion. By continuing in the reserves, they would keep abreast of the progress effected by the Army's and Navy's general staff, as the entire program would be directed by the War and Navy Departments. The men in training would learn far more, and not be found in the position of having to learn all over again in the event of hostilities, than under the one-year-and-out plan.

ORGANIZATION AND COST

It may be asked, how would training on the National Guard basis be organized and how much would it cost? The answer presupposes that the Army and Navy assume full direction and that the cost of providing sufficient facilities—such as armories, ordnance, and supplies—be borne by the Federal Government, rather than by the states that could not afford to underwrite the Guard's expansion.

Some may argue that there are too few National Guard units established today to permit successful operation of this proposal. But, with the support of the Federal Government, in a reasonable time there could be a Guard unit established in each essential area. The facilities are readily available, including thousands of camps, air fields, and installations built by the Army, and wartime Naval stations, too, that can be turned over to the reserves. And there will be ample surplus equipment for a start. Only a plan is needed.

And, as regards leadership. Today, we have a nucleus of 200,000 soldiers commissioned from the ranks through Officer Candidate Schools. These men have demonstrated the effectiveness of the citizen-soldier type of training, and many have written the V.F.W. to support them in their desire to continue their military career on a part-time basis. Opportunity for commissions, too, would prove attractive to men training under any form of compulsion.

Here, it should be stated that the Veterans of Foreign Wars would insist on a proviso in whatever form compulsory military training is drawn, that

no man forced into service would be required to participate in any civil emergency in which the National Guard or regular Army might be called out.

As for cost, the National Guard plan would likely place a lighter load on the taxpayer than maintenance of trainees in Army Camps and naval stations, year in and year out. Those in the reserves would be paid for weekly drills and summer camp, an aggregate sum far under the regular Army or Navy pay for one full year. Whether the Guard plan is adopted or not, facilities and equipment for training civilians would be the same.

The National Guard plan, as conceived by the V.F.W., would not interfere with education in the colleges or disturb the status of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. It is logical that R.O.T.C. training could be accepted in lieu of National Guard service, provided that the R.O.T.C. cadets underwent maneuvers under field conditions during the summer vacations. The officers prepared through the R.O.T.C. have set an enviable record in this war. They were indispensable in the training stages and they have proved their valor and efficiency in combat.

And a junior edition of the R.O.T.C. likewise made its contribution toward reducing the need for extended periods of elementary military indoctrination—the cadet corps that operate so effectively on a volunteer basis in America's high schools. For this reason the V.F.W. Legislative Committee also has advanced the thought that the rudiments of basic drill and discipline could be taught in high school cadet corps in preparation for compulsory training in the National Guard and other reserve units.

The idea of training men at home, in the company of intimate friends, should quiet many of the fears of those opponents of any type of compulsory military training. The objections of the groups I have identified should be answered if we are to have compulsory training in order to prevent another devastating war, or at least to be sure that our fighting men know how to take care of themselves at the start of another war.

Regardless of whether or not the National Guard suggestion is adopted we firmly believe some form of compulsory military training should be enacted by Congress. If the experts of the War and Navy Departments are definitely committed to a program of one full year of training and Congress believes the majority of opinion follows that of the War and Navy Departments, the Veterans of Foreign Wars would not attempt to obstruct such a plan or program.

Omar B. Ketchum, National Legislative Representative of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, has been active in V.F.W. activities since 1930. He saw action in World War I as a member of the 35th Division. He spent many years in Kansas in newspaper work and in organized labor activities. He served as Mayor of Topeka for two terms, and was Landon's opponent for the governorship of Kansas in 1934 and Capper's opponent for the senatorship in 1936.

National Security and Great Britain

By A. P. Young

THE policy of national security that Great Britain will follow in the postwar years will be colored and determined by her past traditions and especially by the moving experiences of five and a half years of total war. It is well to recall that during 1940, when Great Britain stood alone and even her friends felt within their hearts that she could not survive the terrible threat coming from the diabolical, yet highly efficient, Hitler military machine that faced her across the channel, a great spiritual change took place throughout the British family. I was in London during those momentous months of 1940, from May to September, working at the Ministry of Labour and National Service as a colleague of Ernest Bevin, and to me they were the most impressive and formative months of my whole life. I think all the British people, from the highest to the lowest, must have felt as I did, and certain it is that during that time when the determination of the British people was so wonderfully expressed by Churchill in the famous passage: "We shall fight on the beaches, in the fields, and in the streets," the spirit of the British team rose to exalted heights such as we had never known before. The sacrifices and suffering, both mental and spiritual, experienced by this island people at that time generated a profound spiritual change which expressed itself in a unified team effort projected into the uncertain future with a complete faith and confidence that this team spirit could not be overcome. Under the inspiring leadership of Churchill, who expressed and exemplified all that was best in the British character and temperament, the team faced the ordeal of fire, conscious all the time that through the expenditure of blood, sweat, and tears, victory would some day come.

I stress this spiritual change to bring out the important points which have direct bearing on my main theme. First, that this change was the root cause of certain important trends in British thought, which were manifest in tangible form during the subsequent four years; and secondly, to point the lesson that no profound spiritual change can take place within the heart of an individual or of a group of individuals unless great suffering entailing sacrifice is endured. It so happened during the last two and a half years that the future policy of Great Britain has been clarified in two main directions, expressing thereby the universal wish and desire of the whole people—a direct outcome, as I believe, of the spiritual change to which I have referred.

New Education Bill

It may well be that future historians will say that the new education bill was one of the greatest happenings in Great Britain during the war period. Parliament, in passing this bill, not only took a decisive step towards rehabilitating and improving in the years to come, beyond all recognition, the educational system in Great Britain, but at the same time recorded by this act the sound instinctive judgment of the British people that in the years to come we must use more effectively than ever before the instrument of education to solve those many problems that are distressing mankind.

In the first place, the education bill removes what has long been a blot on the educational escutcheon of Great Britain, namely, that for several gen-

erations 85 per cent of the population has been poured out of the elementary schools into the stream of the working world at the age of 14. In that respect, the American educational system has been ahead of ours, but in the next few years we shall attain in this respect a comparable position whereby all the young people will remain at school until the age of 16. Of equal importance, this progressive move is coupled with compulsory part-time education for those between the ages of 15 and 18, and later on between 16 and 18, whereby all boys and girls at work will attend for at least one day a week school or college, where opportunities will be afforded them for blending a liberal education with their specialized work, whatever it may be. This scheme of part-time education connotes the fullest co-operation between industry and commerce, and the education world, and the industrial world will, of course, have to plan for the use of young people on this basis to permit their absence from work at stated periods. Unquestionably industry will see to it that this national system of part-time education does not impose any financial hardship on the participants.

The new education bill also gives, for the first time in British history, due and proper recognition of the importance of what is known as adult, or further, education—that process of education that goes on after the preliminary stage at school, college, or university has ended, and the young boy or girl has taken up his position in the world of work. There has been a profound and significant change in the thinking of educationalists in Great Britain during the last two or three years concerning this matter, which I personally feel holds out great hope for the future, in that at long last it is now fully recognized that education in its broadest and deepest sense is not something that begins and ends with the early preliminary stage within the world of education, but it is a continuous process stretching from the cradle to the grave. From this fundamental concept there is growing apace in Great Britain at this moment the realization that as a new house of education is constructed in the years ahead to meet British needs, increasing attention must be given to further, or adult, education, and I visualize that in twenty-five years from now, the main pillar of this new educational house which we are setting up to build may well be adult or further education.

INDUSTRY'S PART IN EDUCATION

It is fully realized that as we develop education in this new and largely untilled field of endeavor, new educational instruments will have to be developed, and I believe profoundly that industry in its broadest sense will have to play an ever-increasing part in the further educational process. One aspect of this problem is the urgent need to move people from one country to another, so that the citizen of one country, by residing in another country for a period of time not less than a year, can get to know his brother citizen of the other country and thereby develop a spirit of good will and fellowship that is necessary to the achievement of an enduring peace. For some months before leaving England early in March of this year, I was working with an important group of educationalists and industrialists on a scheme for transferring people from Great Britain to America, starting with the boys of the age of 17-plus in the schools, then going to the teachers colleges and later on embracing the craftsmen, foremen, technicians, and managers in the world of industry. The idea behind the thinking of this group is that the individual so moved would re-

side for at least a year in America and then return to his home country. The plan visualizing such transfers is being made on a very big scale, and it is hoped that once such a scheme is launched, a similar group might be established in the United States to plan transfers on a corresponding basis in the opposite direction. Whilst the idea at the moment is to organize transfers within the English-speaking nations, it is realized, of course, that once such a foundation has been established, it would be necessary to extend the idea further, to embrace other countries throughout the world. The group with which I have been working had further visualized that such a transfer scheme might well be launched under the all-embracing title of Atlantic Foundation.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EDUCATION

The economic world, or, if you like to call it so, the world of industry, embracing all the workers who are doing four fundamental things to support life and continuity on this planet—growing things, mining things, making things, moving things—is now so much the central dynamic core of national life that from it evolves the wealth, well-being, and to a high degree the happiness of the people. If this central core suffers a maladjustment of its atomic structure, then the evil forces generated radiate afar, and affect the body politic. Nothing, therefore, can be of greater importance to any nation than to ensure that the government or management of this world of industry is dedicated to democratic principles such as those which have held dominant sway in the political firmament for generations. If we can, through education, bring about better management of the industrial world, thereby bringing greater life, liberty, and happiness to all the people working in this world, then most surely we are marching forward along a path of enlightenment, leading to a better future in which the danger of war will subside.

I think it can be safely said that there has been a growing realization of these fundamental truths in Great Britain during the war years amongst all strata of the community, and this realization is now manifest in the determination of the British people that whatever happens after the war, the pursuance of a full employment policy must be given first attention by whatever government is in power. By this I mean that the British people are determined that their economic world in the postwar years shall meet what they feel is a primary obligation, to give satisfying work to all those citizens, male and female, able to render a work service. By full employment we do not mean that at any point of time there will be no unemployment; on the contrary, we visualize that under the best conditions there may be a pool of possibly half a million people out of work, but only for short periods of possibly six or eight weeks at the most, necessary to bring about the transfer of the worker from one employment to another. Certain it is that never again will the British people tolerate the terrible condition of mass unemployment that obtained between the wars, when for certain periods we had as many as three million persons out of work for periods of years.

In reaching this conclusion, I personally feel that the instinctive thinking and judgment of the British people is absolutely sound, because it seems clear that in the postwar era all national economic systems will have to face squarely this supreme test, as to whether or not the economic world can satisfy this primordial human condition of giving satisfying work to all citizens

able to render a work service. In dealing with this problem, I feel that I am touching the core of the subject of national security of the larger powers, because I am certain that if, in the postwar years, every national economic system could evolve in such a way as to satisfy this primordial condition of providing work for all those able to give this service, then the biggest single step would be taken by each nation to guard its own security, and in combination this action of all the nations would be decisive in preventing, as we must, another world upheaval.

POSTWAR MILITARY TRAINING

The question naturally arises as to the British attitude towards compulsory military training in the postwar period. The British temperament and character are opposed to regimentation of any kind. In certain respects the British are the most rugged individualists in the world, but they have the unique capacity of combining this individualism with a spirit of co-operation that has served them in such good stead in the terrible years of total war. I feel, therefore, that the current of thought in Great Britain at the moment, and with even greater strength in the postwar years, will run against enforcing compulsory military training in Great Britain. Rather will the British rely on voluntary methods for developing physical fitness and the team spirit that is engendered by groups of people working and training together for a common cause, and generally, I feel the conclusions reached by the Youth Advisory Council, under the chairmanship of J. F. Wolfenden, which are embodied in an important report entitled "The Youth Service After the War," issued in August 1943 (H.M.S.O. 27–259), will color the governmental policy in the postwar years. It is, perhaps, desirable, therefore, that I should reproduce the outstanding conclusions reached by this important Advisory Council when they investigated this matter less than two years ago.

REPORT OF THE YOUTH ADVISORY COUNCIL

Recognizing that the problems of education are not confined to the four walls of the school, the Government asked the Youth Advisory Council in August 1942 to consider "the position of the Youth Service as an element in the educational system after the war."

The Report reviews briefly the background of young people at home, at school, and at work. Its recommendations are:

1. That a building program be carried out which will guarantee healthy living conditions for all young people.

2. Full-time attendance at school should be made compulsory up to the age of 16 as soon as possible. Up to the age of 18 the first call on the working day should be education. The upper limit to membership of the Youth Service should not be lower than 20.

3. In peacetime, maximum hours of work for young people up to the age of 18 should be forty-four hours, inclusive of part-time education. They should also have a minimum annual holiday of twenty-four working days. Under the Factory Act, 1937, employment for juveniles in factories was limited to forty-eight hours a week. In January 1939, the maximum hours for children under 16 were reduced to forty-four a week, but this limit has been relaxed during the year. (The Council also recommends reduction of wartime working hours.) There have hitherto been no government regulations about annual holidays for juveniles.

4. Existing vocational guidance services should be extended in order to

avoid children entering unsuitable or "dead-end" jobs. Local Education Authorities should be obliged by statute to give boys and girls information, advice, and assistance with respect to choice of employment.

5. During their leisure period the widest possible variety of interest should be encouraged, but any sort of compulsion should be avoided. Holiday facilities should be increased, wartime army camps being turned into holiday camp sites and arrangements for overseas travel made.

6. Voluntary organizations already doing valuable youth work should be encouraged and financially aided, but brought under some measure of public control.

7. Youth Centers should be provided throughout the country for the educational, physical, and social recreation of both young people and adults. The aim should be to lead young people on to adult life and not keep them unduly in an atmosphere of adolescence.

8. The Sea Cadets, the Army Cadet Force, and the Air Training Corps should continue after the war, but the educational, social, and recreative side of their work should be greatly expanded. The National Association of Training Corps for Girls should also continue as a uniformed organization.

RESHAPING OF HUMAN RELATIONS

The broad answer to world security is, of course, some form of world council, backed by force if and when necessary, and it is surely a great event in the history of the world that the San Francisco Conference has opened, having brought together the representatives of some 46 nations, who have given sustained thought to this world problem in which the whole of humanity is so deeply concerned. This Conference marks a decisive step forward along the path leading to the establishment of a world council, whereby disputes between nations shall be settled around the conference table and not by the bloody arbitrament of war. All thinking people agree that the elimination of another war is absolutely essential. The world has now been so compressed by the onrushing scientific mind, that the 2,200 million people now living on this planet are related to one another much as were the two hundred people living together in a village community a hundred years ago. In a real sense the only problem facing the world is the reshaping of the whole sphere of human relations to conform with the totally new conditions of living on this planet which have so suddenly been forced upon us all by the growth of scientific mind intelligence.

This can only be accomplished through a change of heart; a spiritual change which honestly recognizes that the intangible transcends the tangible. The scientific mind at this moment is delving more deeply and efficiently into the untold secrets of nature than ever before, striving to unleash the unlimited energy encased within the atom itself. All this means that another world war, say twenty years from now, breaking out at any point on the surface of this compressed world of living, would open the floodgates for new sources of energy to be applied to destruction, many times greater than those harnessed during the present conflict. Under such conditions, a war breaking out at any point would instantly, like a flame, engulf us all. Therefore, as sensible people, with abiding common sense, we must all agree that such a happening must at all costs be avoided in the conscious realization that if we do not achieve this primary aim, then nothing else really matters. I am sure that the people who have met together in San Francisco have been fully conscious of the ap-

palling dangerous threat of another world conflict. With this constantly in our minds, I am one of those who optimistically believe that the difficulties that arise through free discussion of these problems can and will be overcome through a spirit of mutual trust and toleration, so that at long last some form of world government supported by force, if and when necessary, can be evolved to protect mankind from this terrible danger and save us all.

CONDITION OF GREAT BRITAIN AFTER WAR

All this implies that each nation will have to devote money and energy to the perfecting of an instrument of force to be used solely for the purpose of protecting the world family if it is found necessary to do so in this way, and the British people will see to it that whatever government may be in power, this aspect of the problem will receive proper and adequate attention at all times. Britain, even after five and a half years of total war, having suffered great physical destruction, is in better shape than ever before for handling this mechanistic aspect of the problem of avoiding war. First, her productive equipment is greater and better than ever before, this taking the form of factory buildings, machine tools, and other manufacturing appliances.

Secondly, the craftsmanship skill of her people is at a higher level than ever before, and especially have we learned during the war years the miraculous results that can be achieved quickly through intensive training and education in the craftsmanship field. This is evidenced by the fact that three million women are now working in our manufacturing plants, and in many cases the work they are doing equals that which was done in the prewar years by some of our finest craftsmen.

Third, we have for long built up a fine spirit of co-operation between the so-called labor and management groups, having for more than a generation absorbed the trade union system into our body politic. In prewar years, the home policy of the Ministry of Labour was to encourage industry to develop from within self-government through the closest co-operation between the trade union and management groups. Long before the war the engineering manufacturing industry had built up a fine piece of negotiating machinery from within, through close working of the trade union and management groups. This negotiating machinery served Great Britain well during the war by virtually eliminating all strikes. This is proved by the fact that the total time lost through strikes during this period was about one-fiftieth of one per cent of the total time worked in British factories.

Fourth, great impetus has been given to research during the war, and our physicists and scientific workers rank with the best to be found elswhere in the world.

All these factors in conjunction mean that on the mechanistic side we can pursue with greater efficiency then ever before the problem of "keeping our powder dry," so that should the occasion arise, we shall be ready to forge an instrument of war second to none to be used solely for the purpose of destroying a potential aggressor should the world council decide that such positive action is necessary.

I conclude on the note of co-operation. This is the key to the future, and whether or not we use the key aright will largely depend on the steps we take through our educational systems to bring about better understanding of one another in the realization that we are, whatever our country, race, or creed may be, brothers, living to-

gether on a compressed planet, each possessing what is after all the individual's most treasured gift—that inviolate linkage between the individual's free spirit and his God, the Creator of all.

A. P. Young, O.B.E., is a member of the Factory and Welfare Advisory Board of the British Ministry of Labour; Visiting Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, Chairman of the Confederation of Management Association of Great Britain, and of the Works Management Association of Great Britain. For many years he was manager of the Rugby Works of British Thomson Houston Co., Ltd. He has written both technical and non-technical books.

National Security and the Soviet Union

By John N. Hazard

SECURITY has been the keynote of Soviet policy since the Revolution. With civil war and intervention by foreign powers the heritage of Soviet leaders, they test any proposed policy against their estimate of its effect upon the national security of the U.S.S.R. In the past twenty-seven years the manifestations of the policy have varied, but the policy itself has remained essentially unchanged. There is every reason to believe that the postwar period will be one in which the same policy will be found to be paramount with Soviet leaders.

Support for Collective Security

Foreign Commissar Molotov restated his government's policy most recently at San Francisco in his opening remarks as the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation. He indicated one form in which it is manifested, when he said:

> The Soviet Government is a sincere and firm champion of the establishment of a strong international organization of security. Whatever may depend upon it and its efforts in the common cause of the creation of such a postwar organization for the peace and security of nations, will readily be done by the Soviet Government.[1]

Support of any agency which gives promise of restraining wars which threaten the security of the Soviet Union is not new on the part of the U.S.S.R. The League of Nations was supported when it offered some hope to those who were trying to stop Hitler, even though it was not entirely trusted. Stalin stated this point of view to Walter Duranty in the year Hitler came to power. Stalin was responding to the correspondent's question as to whether or not the Soviet position towards the League would always be negative. In answering "No, not always and not under all conditions," Stalin explained:

> . . . the League may become a sort of brake to hold back the development of military activities or to prevent them. If this is so, if the League can offer itself as a sort of hillock on such a path, so as to somehow make warfare more difficult and to facilitate to some extent peace, then we shall not be against the League . . . in spite of its collossal shortcomings.[2]

The next year his country indicated its willingness to accept an invitation to join, and it was tendered and accepted.

While supporting the League as at least a "hillock" delaying passage down the path to war, the Soviet Union did not consider that membership in the agency relieved it of the necessity of maintaining a strong army. A month after talking to Duranty, Stalin made this point clear in a sharp statement: "Those who try to attack our country will receive a stunning rebuff to teach them not to poke their pig's snout into our Soviet garden again."[3] Five years later on the eve of this war he addressed the 18th Communist Party Congress in March 1939 and set forth four tasks in the sphere of foreign policy.[4] After the

[1] V. M. Molotov, Speeches and Statement at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, Information Bulletin, Embassy of the U.S.S.R., Washington, D. C., Special Supplement, May 24, 1945.

[2] A. Kolskii, *Liga Natsii* (*ee organizatsiya i deyatelnost*), Moscow, 1934, p. 5.

[3] Report to 17th Party Congress, January 26, 1934, J. Stalin, *Voprosy Leninizma* (11th ed.), Moscow, 1939, p. 438.

[4] Report to 18th Party Congress, March 10, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 574.

first plank calling for continuation of the policy of peace and the second one calling for caution to avoid being drawn into conflicts from which the U.S.S.R. could not be expected to gain, he stated the third task: "To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Navy to the utmost." Peace, caution, strength were the watchwords, rounded out by a fourth task which has always been dear to Soviet leaders—strengthening the bonds of international friendship with the working peoples of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

SOVIET RECORD ON DISARMAMENT

Stalin's 1939 statement of policy indicated the extent Soviet leaders had moved away from the struggle for international disarmament, which Foreign Commissar Chicherin had begun at the Genoa Conference in 1922, and which Litvinoff had sought to have accepted at meetings of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva from 1927 to 1930 and at the Disarmament Conference itself in 1932.[5] The day now seems remote when the Soviet Government proposed to its neighbors at the Moscow Conference in December 1922 "to establish a definite plan for the reciprocal reduction of military effectives, a plan based on the reduction of its army to 200,000 men on the condition that there be a reciprocal reduction of the armies of the states on the western boundary of Russia."

Disarmament proposals were a product of the early postwar period following the last war, but they were silenced finally by the Disarmament Conference's adoption of the principle of "armament consistent with national security" in accordance with the formula of Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Since that time Soviet thought has turned to strengthening its own Army and Navy to keep pace with the needs of the times. There is every indication that such a policy will continue.

"WITHERING AWAY" OF THE STATE

A. Y. Vyshinsky, Vice Commissar of Foreign Affairs and dean of the legal profession in the U.S.S.R., has given support to the conclusion that the Soviet Union will support a powerful army and navy in the postwar world. In a careful analysis of the political theory on which the Soviet state rests, he reviewed the problem for the Moscow University on June 12, 1944, drawing attention to Bukharin's elaboration of the theory known as the "withering away" of the state.[6] Vyshinsky remarks that Bukharin taught that in this withering away process as society approached Communism, the first manifestations of state power to wither would be the army and the fleet. Vyshinsky explains how this theory was used by the German General Staff to their own ends in attempting to defeat the Soviet Union from within, and proceeds to expose the dangers of such a theory. He concludes by quoting Stalin to the effect that the form of the Soviet state is changing and will change in accordance with the development of the country and in accordance with the changes in conditions beyond its borders, but during the current phase the Soviet state has two functions: (1) military defense of the country from attack from any direction, and (2) economic-organizational and cultural-educational work on the part of agencies of the state.

[5] See Eugene A. Korovine, *The U.S.S.R. and Disarmament*, International Conciliation, No. 292, September, 1933.

[6] See A. Vyshinsky, *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo v Otechestvennoi Voine*, Moscow, 1944, p. 32.

From the foregoing, the conclusion seems justified that in its search for security the U.S.S.R. will adhere to and support any organization or coalition which can be expected to maintain the peace while following a policy of friendship for the U.S.S.R. At the same time a strong army and navy will be maintained and developed to the extent necessary to meet threats arising from the potential failure of collective security measures. The remaining part of this paper is devoted to the manner in which this military force may be expected to be maintained.

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE

Military service of a compulsory nature has long been the law of the Soviet Union. The principle has even been incorporated in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Stated in the briefest possible terms, the duty is set forth in Article 136 as follows: "Universal military service is law. Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is an honorable duty of the citizens of the U.S.S.R."

An analysis of recent legislative begins with the basic compulsory service law of 1930.[7] This law remained in force after the adoption of the new Constitution of 1936 and provided the means under which the U.S.S.R. prepared for war. It was amended in August 1936 when the age of entrance into the training period was lowered. On the day the Germans invaded Poland, in 1939, the U.S.S.R. enacted a new law lengthening the term of service, and after the German Army actually entered Soviet territory in 1941, there was a further extension of compulsory training to provide extensive reserves among the factory workers on whom the Government would call as cities were overrun. In this extended form, the tradition of compulsory military training has served as the foundation for the Red Army and Navy.

[7] See Law on Compulsory Military Service, August 13, 1930, *Sobranie Zakonov, S.S.S.R.*, 1930, I, No. 40, Art. 424.

PEACETIME CONSCRIPTION

The 1930 law may be taken as an example of what the Soviet Government thought adequate in peacetime when there was no immediate threat of war. Three stages of service were provided for—pre-service training, active service, and service in the reserve. Citizens, unless excepted for reasons to be discussed below, entered upon their pre-service training on reaching their nineteenth birthday, and their active service on reaching their twenty-first birthday prior to January first of the year in which the class was called. The period of the "active list" was five years for privates, while the commanding staff was subject to service to the age of 40 for junior commanders, 45 for middle commanders (major), and 50 for senior commanders. Full time during the five years was not required. Service was not necessarily in the field, for personnel could be assigned to nonfield activities such as studies or military production. All branches of service—army, navy, and air forces—were included in the same law.

On completing the period of active service or on the order of the Defense or Navy Commissariats, the service man was placed in the reserves. If a person had not been called for active service for one reason or another before reaching his thirtieth birthday, he could be placed in the reserves by the Defense or Navy Commissariats, without having entered upon the period of active military service.

Voluntary enlistment was permitted men and women who were not yet of

military age, but who had reached their eighteenth birthday (seventeenth birthday, if they wished to enter military school), or to men who had been assigned to nonfield duties, although the regular physical examinations had to be passed, and applicants had to qualify politically. This meant that they must not be under court examination or sentence. Their period of service was the same as that of persons called in the compulsory manner. Women were not subject to compulsory service, except in time of war, and then only for specialized services.

DEFERMENTS

Deferments were granted students, scientific workers, agricultural immigrants, persons who had been settled in new places by state agencies, and qualified agricultural specialists employed by collective and state farms and by machine tractor stations. Even during the period of deferment, the persons were required to take courses in military science. The period of deferment and the list of schools granted the privilege were determined by the Defense and Navy Commissariats in consultation with the commissariats immediately concerned in the work of the persons under consideration. As a general rule, the period of deferment was sufficient to permit completion of the course or the special work concerned, and extensions were given to those who had this work interrupted by special duties which required the person concerned to leave this study or work, under orders of government, professional, or Communist Party agencies. In no event would the deferment extend beyond the thirtieth birthday, at which time active service was begun, or the person was transferred to service in the reserves. If on the completion of study, a person wished to continue at an advanced school, his deferment was extended if he gave evidence that he had been accepted for admission to the advanced school, and it was one of those for which deferments might be extended.

Students abroad could likewise be deferred if they had been sent abroad by government or professional agencies, or if the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs agreed.

Teachers, laboratory specialists, and assistants in the institutions approved for deferment were also deferred, as needed, but only until reaching the age of thirty years. Other persons not included in the categories given could be deferred in exceptional cases on the application of the interested agency. Even persons included in the categories granted deferments could be called for service if the need arose.

EXCLUSION FROM SERVICE

Certain groups of persons were excluded under the 1930 law from front line service with the Army or Navy. They were those who, because of their background as elements against which the 1917 revolution had been fought, had been deprived of political rights under the early constitution of each Republic of the Union. They were also persons convicted of crimes against the state or of other crimes for which a court had deprived them of political rights. Such persons were conscripted for service in the rear. With the change in constitutional law in 1936, when political rights were granted to all citizens, regardless of their background, this exclusive provision lost reality.

Members of a religious sect, which before 1917 as well as at the time of call for service, forbade military service under arms, could be released by a

court from such service, after the fact had been established. The court order had to be presented to the commission administering conscription not less than six months before the regular call for the person concerned, together with a certificate showing the state of his health. If his health was bad, he was excused entirely, but if it was good, his name was kept on a list until he reached the age of forty. He could be called for nonmilitary work at any time, such as lumber-jacking, rafting, plant collection, fire fighting, and work against epidemics, in accordance with procedures established by the Commissariat of Internal Affairs in agreement with the Commissariat concerned with the activities listed. In wartime, service commands were to be formed from these groups.

PRE-SERVICE AND THE RESERVE

Pre-service training was carried on at schools in the neighborhood in which the candidates lived. Persons found physically dificient were excluded. The training consisted of military science, military-political orientation courses and body-building. The period of training was two months. When a candidate passed to the "active list," he served full time for two years if assigned to the ground forces, followed by three years on call with refresher training at intervals. The full-time period was lengthened to three years for coast defense commands and border patrol guards with two subsequent years on call, and to four years for the fleet or for those given special technical training, with one subsequent year on call. During the period on call, the refresher service was not more than two months, of which not more than one month could be required in any one year.

Service in the reserves continued until reaching the forty-first birthday and was divided into two periods—to the age of thirty-four and thereafter. Refresher service was not longer than three months during the full period in the reserve, of which not more than one month could fall in any one year.

THE RISE OF HITLER

After the rise of Hitler, the Soviet Government began expanding its appropriations for defense, and it also reduced the age for compulsory military service by a law of August 11, 1936.[8] Under this law, the age for beginning service on the "active list" was reduced to 19 from 21. The same principle of the basic law to the effect that the determining date for age was January first of the year of the call was retained.

At the time military titles were introduced into the Army and Navy by law of September 22, 1935,[9] there was approved a statute covering service by commanders. It extended the periods of active service for junior officers to the age of forty, and reserve service to the age of fifty; for majors to the age of forty-five and fifty-five respectively and for senior officers to sixty and seventy respectively.

WARTIME CONSCRIPTION

Complete revision of the law on military service occurred on September 1, 1939,[10] as the German Army advanced into Poland. It followed the pattern of the 1930 law but provided changes in those instances expected to improve

[8] See Law on Compulsory Military Service, August 13, 1930, *Sobranie Zakonov, S.S.S.R.*, 1936, I, No. 46, Art. 392.

[9] *Ibid.*, 1935, I, No. 57, Art. 468.

[10] For text as approved by Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., see Stenographic Record (in Russian), Extraordinary Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1939, p. 222.

preparation for active military operations. Three periods of service were defined—pre-service training, active service, and service in the reserves.

A preparatory pre-service training was established to begin in the fifth grade in school, when a child was usually eleven or twelve years old and to progress at the rate of two hours a week for three years. The pre-service training itself was to begin for students in the eighth grade, who were usually fifteen years old, and continue for three years at the rate of two hours a week. If a student were deferred after the tenth grade, the same pre-service training continued. Training was to be in the hands of military specialists assigned to the staff of the school and under the supervision of the Commissariat of Defense.

Active service began for those who had completed ten years of school when they had reached or were to reach eighteen years of age during the year of the call, and for others when they had reached or were to reach nineteen during the year of the call. Calls were to be made annually between September 15 and October 15. Registration for each class of recruits was to occur in January and February preceding the call.

DEFERMENTS AND EXCLUSIONS

Deferments were to be granted only to those certified as completing their higher education, and to persons temporarily ill. During peacetime, persons who were the only wage earner in a family and who were supporting two incapacitated parents were given special status. Incapacity of parents was found when they were actually invalided or were beyond fifty-five years of age for the mother and sixty years of age for the father. Persons with such dependents were excused from active service and placed in the reserve of the second category, unless status changed during a five-year period following the date active service would ordinarily have begun.

Persons under arrest or deprived of political rights under a sentence for crime, or banished to remote regions because of political or other reasons, were to be exempt from service during the period of their incapacity.

Women with medical or veterinary training or with special technical skills could be placed on the service list during peacetime and required to serve in time of war.

PERIODS OF SERVICE

The period of active service was set at two years for privates in the ground forces, and three years for noncommissioned officers. The period in the air forces was three years for privates and noncommissioned officers. Four years of service were required from privates and noncommissioned officers in the coastal defense units. The longest period, five years, was reserved for the Navy. The Commissariats of Defense, Navy and Internal Affairs could extend the period of service up to two months, and could transfer personnel from one type of service to another.

After service, the privates and noncommissioned officers remained in the reserves to the age of fifty. The reserves were to be divided into two categories, the first of which comprised persons who had had full actual service, and the second category, persons who for one reason or another had not undergone full active service. First category reservists faced two-month refresher services up to six times while they remained in the category, while second category reservists made up for their lesser training in active service by reporting for two-month refresher

courses nine times during their period in the reserve. Officers served longer refresher periods, and were to be held on active duty longer in accordance with their rank and whether they were in the Army or the Navy.

Approaching wartime conditions brought forth in 1940[11] an amendment to the 1939 law, by extending the training period in the Army and Navy air forces from three to four years for privates and noncommissioned officers. Candidates who failed in their studies at officers schools or who were ousted for disciplinary reasons were required to serve full time as conscripts. The amendment also provided that conscripts should report for service with a full complement of winter and summer clothing which would be held in army warehouses until discharge and used to reclothe the trained soldiers at that time. Provision was also made in the amendment for free postal service for privates and noncommissioned officers, both as to letters written by them and to them.

The principle of compulsory military service was extended in the early days of the war to all males from sixteen to fifty years of age.[12] They were required to take military training in their spare time outside their regular work. In this way the industrial and professional population was prepared to play its part in the guerrilla bands when the German army overran cities and country settlements.

Officers are trained as a profession in a series of military academies and specialized schools. The war has been the occasion for adding to these schools at the level of early youth, for in August 1943,[13] there were established nine Suvorov Military Schools for boys who would make the army their career. These schools offer a seven-year course to 4,500 boys who are children of Red Army men and guerrillas, and for sons of Soviet citizens who were killed by the occupying forces of the German army. Children enter at the age of ten. A preparatory course is given candidates from the age of eight who plan to enter the schools when they reach ten years of age.

ECONOMIC POTENTIAL

National security is not preserved alone by a foreign policy directed towards collective security and by compulsory military service. Soviet leaders for a generation have kept before them the goal of full economic development of their country. Coupled with efforts to install industries essential to the production of tools of war has been the effort to place these industries out of reach of a potential invader. This war has shown the success of some aspects of that policy, and at the same time the crippling effect of loss of plants near Leningrad and in the Ukraine for which no real replacement existed behind the Urals.

It may be assumed, and present indications as to the types of plants which the Soviet engineers want from abroad support the assumption, that Soviet planning after the war will center on the capital goods industries. The manufacture of aluminum, copper, chemicals, steel and telephone wire, and communications equipment which were the deficiencies of this war will be specially selected for expansion in areas remote from frontiers.

Labor power can be expected to be short for years, in spite of an expand-

[11] For text as approved by Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., see Stenographic Record (in Russian), Eighth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, 1941, p. 571.

[12] *Izvestiya*, No. 221 (7597), September 18, 1941.

[13] *Ibid.*, No. 198 (8191), August 22, 1943.

ing birth rate which knows no equal in Europe, and such labor power as there is will have to be distributed over the country in the places where it is needed. The groundwork for this distribution was laid in the years after the war began in Poland but before it had engulfed the Soviet Union. It can be expected that this legislation will be continued to the extent necessary to assure labor in areas where it does not appear under the normal persuasion of higher wages.

Surplus agricultural labor was siphoned off for industry by a law of October 2, 1940,[14] which required urban and collective farm centers to send forward for training in technical schools a fixed number of boys and young men between the ages of 14 and 17. Each graduate of the training school must serve for a five-year period in the post assigned by government officials.

At the time the work day and work week were lengthened on June 26, 1940,[15] the right was denied workers to leave their jobs without permission from the administration. Permission could be withheld except in cases involving ill-health or withdrawal to enter a technical training school. This law was strengthened by a decree of December 26, 1941 [16] which provided for penalties ranging from 5 to 8 years in prison for workers who leave military industries without permission. Action of this nature is declared to be the equivalent of desertion from the Army and subject to review by military tribunals. Under this decree labor was required to follow its industry when it was evacuated to the interior.

[14] *Ved. Verkh. Sov., S.S.S.R.*, No. 37 (100), October 9, 1940.

[15] *Ibid.*, No. 20 (83); approved by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at its Seventh Session, *ibid.*, No. 28 (91), August 22, 1940.

[16] *Izvestiya*, No. 306 (7682), December 27, 1941.

Even before this law relating to all workmen there had been a decree of October 19, 1940 [17] granting to the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. the right of obligatory transfer of special categories of professional and skilled workmen from one enterprise or institution to another, regardless of the territorial location of the institution or enterprises. The law provided for the payment of bonuses in salaries and the moving expenses for the family. Penalties for those refusing to move were the same as set forth in the law of June 26, 1940, already discussed.

CONCLUSION

Support of measures designed to assure collective security is the declared policy of the U.S.S.R. in its effort to preserve its national security. The history of Soviet policy supports the conclusion that this direction can be expected to be maintained until international measures give promise of preventing wars and do not threaten to produce anti-Soviet blocs.

Retention of a strong army and navy as a guarantee of security in the event of failure of international measures can also be predicted. The Soviet tradition has been to recruit the major part of its armed forces by way of conscription, and this principle is set forth in its Constitution. Conscription does not, however, lose sight of the needs of the state outside the armed forces, and a liberal policy of deferments to complete education in essential fields may be expected to emerge.

The economic potential for military action has been the center of attention for Soviet planners for years. The current war has re-emphasized its importance. The prewar trend in this direction can be expected to continue as a corollary of a strong army and navy.

[17] *Ved. Verkh. Sov., S.S.S.R.*, No. 42 (105), October 26, 1940.

While the severe wartime laws relating to labor discipline may be relaxed, labor power to man the machines will be conscripted as well as the warriors, if less rigorous measures of persuasion prove ineffective.

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National Security and France

By André Mesnard

THERE are few French families living today, one of whose members, at least, does not preserve the vivid memory of three invasions: 1870, 1914, and 1940. For many of the old people, whom the blitzkrieg of 1940 turned loose upon the roads of northern France with their wretched belongings, this was actually the third time they had been driven from their homes by the German invader. And, whereas, before 1940, most Frenchmen had had only a vicarious experience of the enemy, this time *all* Frenchmen lived in direct contact with the invader for four years and conceived for him a personal hatred which cannot fail to accentuate their concern about security and to color their conception of what that security shall be.[1]

France's Attitude

It is noteworthy that even in this war, which has so completely eradicated the distinction between the front lines and the rear, the experiences of the civilian populations in the various allied nations have not been exactly similar. Some have been bombed but not invaded, some have been both bombed and invaded, some have experienced neither invasion nor bombardment. It is not a question of establishing a hierarchy among the types of suffering, but rather of pointing out that differences in the quality or the immediacy of the suffering are often responsible for the kind of measures which each people advocates for its protection. Indeed, it is this difference between the wartime experiences of the civilian populations which has been at the root of whatever misunderstanding has existed among the Allies regarding the organization of collective security.

Mr. Stephen Bonsal relates that, during the sessions in Paris, attended by President Wilson, at which the first draft of the League Covenant was drawn up, Léon Bourgeois irked the other delegates more than once by his insistent proposals that provision be made for placing an armed force at the disposal of the future League. To the American delegates especially, this suggestion seemed inconsistent with the high purposes of the new organization. Again, when it was proposed to prohibit the raising of colonial levies for other ends than purely local defense, the French delegation raised the unpopular objection that this would endanger her national defense. No more popular with American and British public opinion was the thesis which France defended before the League of Nations, when it insisted that disarmament should come *after*, and not before, security, that is to say, after France's allies had committed themselves to come to her assistance in case of an aggression by Germany. It is not irrelevant, I think, to recall these facts before discussing the attitude of France toward conscription and collective security. If we can only keep in mind that nations disagree on the means of attaining se-

[1] A conservative estimate of civilian casualties will give an idea of the extent to which the French people were involved in the war: 120,000 were killed through enemy and Allied action, 250,000 were killed in concentration camps or executed by the enemy as hostages. These figures exceed the losses, in killed alone, suffered by the armed forces of the British Empire and Dominions, and by those of the United States. In addition, some 1,300,000 French citizens were deported to Germany. Among the material losses, approximately 1,500,000 dwellings are recorded as destroyed—half a million more than during the First World War.

curity principally because each one's experience of danger does not exactly coincide with her neighbor's, we shall be inclined to greater patience and understanding.

Being placed by a sort of geographical fatality in the path of invasion, it is safe to say that, until the organization entrusted with international security has been thoroughly tested, France will emphasize the desirability of a procedure that will permit the taking of instant action against an aggressor. Indeed, one of the points which she pressed at San Francisco was that bilateral agreements directed against former enemy powers—like the Franco-Russian pact—be allowed in time of emergency to operate without interference from the Security Council. This implies the maintenance of a standing army sufficiently strong to make its weight felt decisively in any intervention which might be judged necessary, and this, in turn, presupposes a continuation of the system of conscription which, in one form or another, has been in force since the French Revolution.[2]

ELEMENT OF DEFENSE

It should be understood, when we speak of conscription, that this word, to a Frenchman, is not synonymous with regimentation. This is so for several reasons, of which the most cogent one is the immediacy of the danger—referred to above—to which France feels at all times exposed. Conscription, then, is not considered as a means of indoctrinating the youth of the nation with nationalistic or imperialistic ideas, but as one of the elements in a system of defense. The problem which it tries to solve is, briefly: How can there be made available at short notice (emphasis upon *short notice*) for the defense of the territory a large body of trained citizens? The young Frenchman who, at the age of 21, reports for one year of military service is only performing a civic—and, sometimes, rather disagreeable!—duty. It can be fairly said that, at no time, has conscription created among Frenchmen a spirit of blind obedience to orders or fostered among them dreams of conquest.

Another reason that explains this acceptance of conscription as part of the system of national defense has to do with its revolutionary origins. The first total mobilization of French manpower occurred in 1793, at a time when the frontiers had been overrun, and it was only her citizens' army that saved France from a crushing defeat by the coalition of European powers. While it is true, of course, that the wars of the Revolution degenerated into wars of conquest, the fact that universal conscription is associated with a struggle which was, in the beginning, a struggle for the triumph of individual and popular liberties, the fact that the very idea of conscription is based on the notion of equality, accounts for the particular tolerance with which it is viewed by the great majority of Frenchmen.[3]

LENGTH OF SERVICE

Since the advent of the Third Republic, the problem has been, not whether, but how long, young Frenchmen should

[2] The losses suffered by the French armed forces during the Second World War (over 250,000 killed), added to those suffered by the civilian population (including children) will deplete the ranks of the young men who are called up for military service twenty years hence, just as the losses of the First World War (over 1,700,000 killed) depleted the ranks of the armies that opposed the German tide in 1940. This, the French think, is one more reason why *all* citizens should be required to serve.

[3] Furthermore, universal conscription is considered particularly democratic, since it places all able-bodied citizens on exactly the same footing.

be required to serve. The length of military service has varied considerably during the last 70 years. It was reduced from five years in 1875, to three years in 1889, and to two years in 1905. In 1913, in the face of the obvious German threat, it was increased again to three years. After the end of the First World War it was set at 18 months, and finally, in 1928, at one year, a level at which it remained until the outbreak of the present war.

This element of time is an important aspect of the problem, for it is obvious that no more years of a young man's life should be devoted to military training than is absolutely necessary. In France, the two- and the three-year periods of military service were defended by the General Staff on the ground that they provided the country with a standing army large enough to withstand the initial shock of an invasion. It was apparently assumed that the enemy would attack with his first-line troops without waiting for his reserves, and that the fate of the war would be largely decided during the first weeks by the standing armies of the two belligerents. The falsity of this assumption was demonstrated both in 1914 and in 1940, when the French first-line troops found themselves submerged by the massive reserves which the Germans threw into the battle, the French reserves being themselves called upon to play a crucial role. This was true at the Marne, where the reserves thrown against General von Kluck's flank turned defeat into victory, and at Sedan, in 1940, where the German break-through was effected against reserves badly armed and badly trained.

In the light of this experience, it is to be expected that the duration of the initial period of compulsory military training will not be increased (it may even be reduced from one year to six months) and that more emphasis will be placed on continuing and bringing up to date throughout the years the training of the so-called "reserves," that is to say, of the vast body of Frenchmen between the ages of 22 and 41 who are returned to civilian life after completing their preliminary training and on whom experience has shown that the defense of the country ultimately rests. In an able book, which may well inspire future legislation on conscription, *L'armée nouvelle,* published in 1910, the French socialist Jean Jaurès advocates especially that a better use be made of the periods of instruction (of 14 and 21 days) for which Frenchmen are now called up every year until they reach the age of 41. This point is apt to be overlooked, and yet, it is, perhaps, the essential feature of any program of training. The initial six months or one year of military service are indeed wasted if they are not followed at regular intervals by brief periods of real training *in the field* that will toughen the body as well as stimulate the mind.

A further military reason that will, in all probability, accentuate this shift in emphasis toward a more efficient training of the "reserves" lies in the character of modern warfare and in the awful possibilities for confusion and destruction which it possesses. After what has happened in Europe during the past four years, one seems justified in predicting, in the terms of Pascal's definition of the universe, that the fighting front of the future will be like a circle whose center is everywhere, and its circumference nowhere. Of this fact, the French, like every other European people, are keenly aware, and it would be surprising if, through their representatives in Parliament, they did not *insist* on a reorganization of the system of national defense permitting constant adaptation to changing conditions and for a thorough and sustained training of all citizens.

Spiritual Problem

But, while conscription, to the French, is first and foremost a military necessity, it is bound up with the spiritual problem of national unity, and one may expect that after France's experience with defeat and invasion it will be envisaged, like most other problems confronting her, as a moral problem. It might be interesting, therefore, to consider at this point how France was affected spiritually by the catastrophe of 1940.

Unlike the Germans today, the French, in defeat, lost none of their lucidity, and many are those who have been seeking in their conscience and in the moral climate of their time an explanation of the terrible misfortune that befell them. This is especially true of the men and women in all walks of life who participated in the Resistance and who, because they risked their lives daily, have even more reason than their less active fellow citizens to be concerned with the correction of the evils which brought about the defeat. As we read the Resistance newspapers and reviews of both the preliberation and postliberation periods, we find agreement on a number of essential points.

Perhaps the best way of summing up the criticism of the Resistance writers would be to say that, since the last war, men's lives were being emptied more and more of their spiritual content. This applied particularly to the men who held in their hands the destiny of the country, but it applied also, in a certain measure, to the citizens at large. It was not so much that the ideals had changed, as that they had become inoperative. Thus, men continued to speak of the dignity of the human person, but in Parliament for example, or in the world of journalism, the dignity of the human person was being constantly subjected to the vilest indignities. The intolerant factionalism which plagued French politics and reduced democratic government to a state of impotence was but one manifestation of this lack of respect for the dignity of the human person. The same cause can be assigned to the abasement to which so large a part of the French press had fallen. How else can one account for the frightful campaigns of slander which led, in one instance at least, to the suicide of the person defamed? Men continued to speak of universality, that classic quality of the intellect which might be described as the ability to view in men the eternal traits that bring them together rather than the idiosyncrasies that divide them. But the tribute that was paid to universality remained, in most cases, purely platonic. The political factionalism, previously referred to, was certainly not in the universal tradition, nor were the sit-down strikes of 1936, nor the flight of capital during the period of the Popular Front Government, nor the sabotage of the French war effort in 1939 by those who sympathized with the fascist and communist ideologies, nor the insistence, by Pétain and Weygand, upon surrendering to the Germans in order that France might be saved from a communist revolution. Lack of respect for the human person, loss of the sense of universality, lack, too, among the leaders, of a certain spirit of heroism, compounded of faith, vision, and abnegation—who can doubt that these failings, stressed by the underground writers, contributed to the French defeat?

Resistance Movement

The reaction against this state of mind has been clear-cut. There developed among the members of the underground, during the German occupation, a spirit that was the very antithesis of that which had reigned

during the insecure period of the peace. As one of the Resistance writers, the critic André Rousseau, put it, in an article published after the liberation:

> Their faith in France was nourished by a force that transcends matter. Their battles were fought in a sphere beyond the realm of positive laws. . . . This renunciation of all that binds a man to his family, to his calling, to his home, this total break with daily existence, is the mark of a life that rises . . . [to the level of sainthood].

To the men and women animated by this new spirit, the reconstruction of France is, then, a matter of spiritual revival as much as one of physical rebuilding, and indeed the two are inseparably linked. For it is not enough to have specialists who are familiar only with the technical aspects of reconstruction. To build securely, these specialists must be men who feel deeply that the structure which they are helping to create will be favorable to the development of the noblest human virtues.

One of the conditions, therefore, which the members of the Resistance deem essential to this spiritual revival is the removal from key positions in public life of the men who have been connected in any capacity with the bankruptcy of 1940, and their replacement by men who have given evidence during the occupation of their moral courage as well as of their technical ability. Such a change in leadership was partially realized within France itself by the National Council of Resistance, which co-ordinated for two years the activity of the underground movements, and outside of France, by the Committee of National Liberation, over which General de Gaulle presided. Unfortunately, some of the ablest Resistance leaders were caught and executed, and today it is not always possible to replace a skilled ex-Vichy sympathizer with an equally skilled member of the Resistance. Furthermore, great numbers of technicians and trained administrators, who for selfish or ideological reasons served under Vichy and have been retained by the Provisional Government of the Republic, are bending every effort to make their positions secure by actively propagating the myth of their indispensability. Since General de Gaulle, in the interest of peace and quiet, is apparently putting a brake on the purge and on the structural reforms advocated by the Resistance until national elections have been held, it will probably be some time before France is ready to undertake the housecleaning so essential to her moral health.

THE SPIRIT WITHIN THE ARMY

It is obvious that the problem of conscription cannot be considered apart from this spiritual renaissance. National unity can be achieved only if the young men who are called upon each year to do their military duty can be made to feel that they are contributing not only to the protection of democracy, but, by the very fact of their serving, to its perpetual re-creation. Compulsory military service, whatever may have been its imperfections in the past, has had at least the effect of breaking down provincial and, to a certain extent, social barriers. It is this latter aspect of the problem which will certainly engage the attention of those entrusted with the reorganization of the Army. For the greatest weakness of the French military establishment in the years preceding the war was the ever-widening gap which separated the officers from the privates. It is not enough to say, as General Giraud once did in a report to Marshal Pétain on the spiritual causes of the defeat, that the lower classes have lost all respect for authority and that they think of their rights rather than of their duties.

What the "lower" classes resent is not authority, as such, but authority devoid of moral stature. Countless officers who are loved by their men could, I think, verify the truth of this statement. The fact remains that in every country, the professional officer too often regards himself as the guardian of law and order—order being synonymous in his mind with the established social order. I believe it fair to say that this was so in France and that the suspicion created among the rank and file by this attitude was not a little responsible for the failure of the Army as a whole (due allowance being made for its technical unpreparedness) to function efficiently as a guardian of democracy when danger came.

If the Army, then, is to become a "school for democracy," in which the young conscript will learn to respect his fellow citizens and to co-operate with them, receiving at the same time the opportunity to display and to cultivate whatever intellectual and moral qualities he may possess, it will be necessary to develop a corps of officers who are imbued with some of the faith in the perfectibility of human nature which distinguished eighteenth-century pre-revolutionary thinking. For unless human beings are credited by those who aspire to lead them with a certain capacity for reflection and self-discipline, the leadership will degenerate into paternalism, and that fruitful exchange of ideas which enriches the relationship between teacher and student, and which constitutes the essence of democratic leadership, will be missing.

FRENCH FORCES OF THE INTERIOR

A very interesting example of the fraternal (or shall we say democratic) relationship which can be established between officers and men is afforded by the French Forces of the Interior (F.F.I.), in which professional army officers, reserve officers, and volunteers acting as officers, led an ill-clad, ill-equipped, heterogeneous body of citizens in guerrilla warfare against the enemy, to such good effect that the task of the invading allied armies was speeded considerably. Certainly, never were conditions less favorable for the imposition of discipline. Nevertheless, discipline was achieved through the sheer strength of the affection which bound together men united in a single purpose. And so successful was this unplanned experiment in fraternal co-operation between all classes of Frenchmen that, after the liberation, the French Forces of the Interior sought to maintain their identity and to continue the fight against Germany as a separate force. In this they did not succeed, for they were incorporated with the regular Army. But they did manage to get themselves integrated as separate units, retaining as far as possible the officers who had commanded them. What is more important, in the various services of the War Ministry the F.F.I. are represented by officers who can be counted on to exert a liberalizing influence within the Army itself when its reorganization is debated by future representative assemblies.

FUTURE REFORMS

It is obviously impossible to tell in advance just what reforms will be adopted, but it is already clear that conscription will not be treated purely as a military matter. How the young men of the nation can receive military instruction through membership in an organization, the new Army, which will represent democracy in action and which will make each one fully conscious (this is the important point) that he is participating effectively in the protection of a way of life that places freedom of the spirit above all other ideals —such is the basic problem that con-

fronts future reformers.[4] But this transformation of the Army depends in turn upon a reform of the public school system that will make higher education more easily accessible to all and prevent the liberal professions, from which the majority of the country's leaders are drawn, from becoming the appanage of one class. Such a reform has been under way for some time. There is no doubt that the men and women of the Resistance will press vigorously for the realization of this and of any other reform which will tend toward re-establishing the circulation between the head of France, represented by its leaders, and its body, represented by the great mass of its citizens. The recent municipal elections, with their marked trend toward the left, indicate that the country at large is favorably disposed toward the broad social reforms ("révolution dans l'ordre," as Premier Georges Bidault has termed it) advocated by the National Resistance Council in its manifesto of March 1944 and endorsed in October 1944 by General de Gaulle in the name of the Provisional Government. But only the national elections will reveal with any degree of certainty whether or not the new France which is smoldering beneath the ashes of the old will burst into flame and realize the magnificent possibilities inherent in its Resistance movement.

CONCLUSION

To set this discussion of France's attitude toward conscription in its proper perspective against the background of international security, I should like, by way of conclusion, to quote from the Preamble to the amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks plan submitted last April by the Provisional Government of the French Republic:

> She [France] believes that a durable peace presupposes an international organization at the same time more extensive and stronger, and requires the establishment of a system of justice and an international authority superior to those of the different states. She would be ready, on her part, to commit herself even further than the Dumbarton Oaks plan and to consent to greater limitations of sovereignty, in exchange for a better international organization. But she admits that during the period which will follow the war, the maintenance of peace depends above all on the agreement of the great powers. She will take care, therefore, to propose nothing which could compromise such an agreement.
>
> Viewed in the light of all that has been accomplished at the San Francisco Conference, at the cost of such infinite patience, this lucid statement of the obstacles that still stand in the path of international security is, at the same time, a token of France's determination to keep her eyes fixed on the distant horizon, beyond which lies the goal so devoutly sought by a war-torn humanity.[5]

[4] It is interesting to note that an ordinance adopted on April 22, 1945 by the Provisional Government of the French Republic institutes for a period of three years immediately preceding their incorporation into the Army a required course of training which is intended to prepare the future conscripts "physically, technically, and *morally*" for their duties as citizen-soldiers. (Italics ours.)

[5] The stake of France in collective security is all the more real since the effects of the biological warfare which the Germans have waged with such signal success throughout occupied Europe will make themselves felt for generations. Lack of manpower, not only for material reconstruction and economic recovery, but also for national defense, is one of the major problems confronting the nations of Europe today. For France, international co-operation is, therefore, more than a question of idealism. It is a vital necessity. No more convincing proof could be offered of her sincere desire to participate actively in the organization of a lasting peace.

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79TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 515

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 3, 1945, Mr. May introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

A BILL

To provide military or naval training for all male citizens who attain the age of eighteen years, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the Congress hereby declares that the reservoir of trained manpower built up at such enormous expense during the present war should not be permitted to become empty again as after World War I, but should be perpetuated for the peace and security of future generations.

(b) That Congress further declares that this end can be assured only through a system of military training for all able-bodied male citizens in their early manhood. While the details of future military organization cannot be determined with precision until after the terms of a permanent peace can be envisaged, there can be no thoroughly effective national defense system that does not rest upon the democratic principle that all citizens of a free state should be trained to defend their country.

(c) The Congress further declares that the training system should be inaugurated as soon as practicable after the cessation of hostilities in order to utilize material resources and training experience which will otherwise soon be dissipated.

SEC. 2. Under such regulations as the President shall prescribe, every male citizen of the United States and every male alien residing therein shall, upon attaining the age of eighteen years, or within four years thereafter, be subject to military or naval training, and shall be inducted into the Army or Navy of the United States, for this purpose alone, for a period of one year, except persons as shall be serving in the armed forces at the time this section takes effect, such exception to be under regulations to be prescribed by the President for the exemptions of such persons by reason of service with the armed forces. The period of training shall be one year, less such time, not exceeding one month, as may be reasonably necessary for induction, mobilization, and demobilization: *Provided,* That any person subject to training under the provisions of this Act shall have the privilege of electing in such manner and at such time as may be prescribed by regulation, whether such training shall begin when he attains the age of eighteen years or whether it shall be deferred for not more than four years and of expressing whether he desires to train in the Army or the Navy, and, so far as practicable, he shall be trained in accordance with such expressed desire: *Provided, however,* That any person who has been graduated by a preparatory or high school may, after his seventeenth birthday, elect with the consent of his parents or persons standing in loco parentis to be inducted before his eighteenth

birthday: *And provided further,* That during the period of training prescribed in this section, it shall be the duty of all officers charged with the training to select and record the names of all trainees who show capacity for leadership with a view to encouraging them to qualify as reserve noncommissioned officers and officers during their period of enrollment as reservists under the provisions of section 3 of this Act.

SEC. 3. Each young man after the completion of his training under section 2 shall be enrolled as a reservist in the land or naval forces of the United States for a period of six years, but shall not be subject to compulsory military service during that period except in an emergency declared by the Congress and then only under such conditions as the Congress may prescribe: *Provided,* That any man who completes his training under section 2 and who thereafter serves satisfactorily as a volunteer in the Navy, the Marine Corps, or the Regular Army for a period of at least one year, or in the National Guard of the United States or the Naval Militia for a period of at least two years, or in an organized reserve unit for a period of at least three years, shall be deemed to have completed the six-year period as a reservist prescribed in this section, but nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any such man, while in the National Guard of the United States or the Naval Militia, from being ordered or called to active duty therein by appropriate Act of Congress.

SEC. 4. After the period of reserve enrollment prescribed in section 3 no man shall be subject to compulsory military service except when the Congress shall have declared a national emergency requiring such service, and then only under such conditions as the Congress may prescribe.

SEC. 5. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act, or regulations made pursuant thereto, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not more than $1,000, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

SEC. 6. This Act shall become effective six months after whichever of the following dates is the earlier: (1) The date of a proclamation by the President that the war is ended, or (2) the date specified in a concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress.

Sec. 7. All laws or parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.

SEC. 8. This Act may be cited as the "National Military Training Act of 1945."

An identical bill, S. 188, was introduced in the Senate by Mr. Gurney, January 10, 1945.

Book Department

KUCZYNSKI, JURGEN. *Germany: Economic and Labour Conditions under Fascism.* Pp. 234. New York: International Publishers, 1945. $2.50.

SEYDEWITZ, MAX. *Civil Life in Wartime Germany.* Pp. viii, 448. New York: The Viking Press, 1945. $3.50.

These two books supplement each other in a certain way. Published both in the spring of 1945, shortly before the final defeat of Germany, they describe the conditions that emerged in Germany under fascism. While Kuczynski is concerned almost exclusively with describing the concrete economic developments after 1933, Seydewitz is more interested in the effects of these developments upon the population.

Kuczynski divides his book into two parts, one dealing with general economic policies since 1933 and the second part tracing more specifically the role of labor in that period. He adds little to our knowledge of the changes which fascist policies imposed upon the German economy. It is regrettable that Kuczynski did not emphasize with more precision the typical impact of fascism upon labor, and that he did not expound with greater clarity the change in labor's position as compared with its position under democratic capitalism. Even granting Kuczynski's implied thesis that fascism and military aggressiveness are synonymous, he should have made it much clearer which of the many developments in fascist Germany were unmistakably the by-product of war preparation and which were characteristic of fascism. This Kuczynski has not accomplished, and the reader doubtless will be confused by the study, which treats many economic policies that have become known in the war economy of almost all belligerent countries, as typical fascist phenomena.

Seydewitz has painted a kaleidoscopic picture of the daily lives of German civilians during the long years of war. He has accumulated from public Nazi sources a stupendous mass of detailed information. Less might have been more and might have given the reader a better idea of what conditions in war-torn Germany appeared to be to a painfully careful observer outside the country. Seydewitz' main interest, however, is to speculate about how those developments affected the German people. He is convinced that by the summer of 1943, after four years of war, about three-quarters of the Germans had become opposed to the Nazi dictatorship. Seydewitz' proof is anything but convincing. Developments since completion and publication of the book have hardly corroborated Seydewitz' optimistic assumption that anti-Nazi sentiments were growing among broad masses of the German people long before complete military defeat was achieved.

OTTO NATHAN

Washington, D. C.

KOCH-WESER, ERICH (OLGA MARX, Translator). *Hitler and Beyond: A German Testament.* Pp. xii, 217. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945. $2.75.

Erich Koch-Weser, one of the founders and leaders of the German Democratic Party, saw his party rise to great heights of power and then be shattered to bits, first under the impact of the disappointments in the field of foreign policy which greeted the new Republic in the first years of its existence, and then under the corroding influence of the world economic crisis. His faith in the principles of the party remains unshaken, however, and while he is exceeded by none in the vigor with which he denounces what was wrong in Germany, he also sees the other side and trusts to the healing force of democratic government to bring about a reorientation of the people of Germany.

German nationalism, Koch-Weser says, arose as a reaction to Napoleonic oppression. Fichte, the leader among the spokesmen for a national consciousness, was, however, a patriot rather than a nationalist; he demanded its proper place for his own nation, but also insisted on the rights of others. "None but a generation that has lost the leisure and the inclination to

read and imbibes its 'education' ready made from newspapers, popular speeches, radio, and movies would suffer [the current] misinterpretations to arise. Fichte stood for eternal peace and for a league of nations, for the freedom and equality of peoples, of citizens. . . . He stood for a republic, for government by the people, for freedom of speech and of the press" (p. 3).

These sentences show that Koch-Weser hews to a line of his own. He was one of those who stood against Nazism in Germany, and he now stands against the principle of collective condemnation when applied to his own people, which to him is Nazism in reverse. As a member of the Republican government in its early days, Koch-Weser defends its acts, and is quite outspoken about such matters as the invasion of Upper Silesia and the occupation of the Ruhr district. Again he shows his independence of mind when, as the leader of a party which—apparently, if not in reality—owed its continued existence to proportional representation, he says: "The system of proportional representation only increased the evils of the situation. It had been claimed that proportional representation in the Reichstag would afford a mirror of public opinion. But actually it shattered the mirror into splinters that could not be used for government purposes" (p. 39).

In subsequent chapters, dealing with developments before and during World War II, the author has to travel over ground covered by many others. For the most part he has something interesting to say and often something important, although there is a certain amount of repetition. His views never fit into a general pattern, and therefore defy summarization. There are passages which those could quote who criticize the people of Germany as much as their government; there are others in which the author emphatically rejects any practical conclusions which might be drawn from such premises.

In the German original, Koch-Weser's writings sparkle with wit and are studded with aphorisms. The English translation preserves many of these traits, but by no means all. Now and then there are clumsy phrases; in a few instances the meaning has not been faithfully rendered. Thus the book loses some of its force; besides, several chapters are "dated." This is all the more to be regretted since Alfred A. Knopf is also the American publisher of Lord Vansittart, and may have taken Koch-Weser on its lists as a representative of the other side of the controversy. Or perhaps one ought to conclude that since Vansittart's social function is the confirmation of wartime prejudices, even the most brilliantly presented rational arguments would be impotent to stem the tidal waves of irrationality.

FERDINAND A. HERMENS
University of Notre Dame, Indiana

EBENSTEIN, WILLIAM. *The German Record: A Political Portrait.* Pp. ix, 334. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., 1945. Text ed. $2.25; trade ed. $3.00.

Displaying an array of impressive erudition, Ebenstein discusses the pattern of German politics in terms of such social forces as historical indeterminacy, the meaning of "Reich," the role played by religions and violence, the concepts of culture, politics, state, and society, and the influence of Prussianism; devotes a whole section to the problem of liberty and authority in German politics; and concludes with two chapters on "German Politics, World Peace and Democracy" and "The Future of German Politics."

More ably than any other writer in this field, Ebenstein establishes the theory that Nazism is but the culmination of "Germanism," and no distinction can be made between "good Germans and bad Nazis." "Those who have tried to paint Nazism as a coterie of bankers, Junkers and rich industrialists ought to remember that the fourteen million Nazi voters in 1932 or the seventeen million Nazi voters in March, 1933, could hardly have been all Junkers and rich bankers" (p. 231). But Ebenstein gives us a ray of hope when he insists in the concluding chapter that "we remain true to this great stream of Western civilization, the rationalism of Greece, the monotheism of Israel, and the love and charity of Christianity, if we insist that the Germans, too, because they are human,

are capable of change and reform if they want to change and reform" (p. 308).

Although Ebenstein insists that his conclusions are based on a survey of the available evidence, somehow the work gives the impression of being a thesis which Ebenstein has decided to prove with the available evidence. Here and there he makes some wild statements, such as: "Throughout these fifteen hundred years Germans have migrated to all corners of the earth, but they have always been absorbed by other nations" (p. 5). Have they? How about the German settlements in Russia or the Balkans?

But these are very minor weaknesses of Ebenstein's product, which has the distinction of being the most competent evaluation of the foundations of Germanism as an integral part of Nazism.

JOSEPH S. ROUCEK

Hofstra College

BILMANIS, ALFRED. *Baltic Essays*. Pp. 268. Washington, D. C.: Latvian Legation, 1945. No price.

Baltic Essays is a most fortunate title for this book: it does not bind the author to any specific topic and justifies the inclusion of a wide array of data as long as they have something to do with the area. As a matter of fact, this book can perhaps best be characterized as an encyclopedia on the Baltic and especially Latvia, except that the materials are not arranged in alphabetical order. The author treats geographical, economic, historical, political, and educational topics; he deals with religion, folklore, and art, and interjects brief characterizations of outstanding personalities as well.

The bulk of the data is of historical character, however. Developments are traced from prehistoric times up to the present day. The author is unquestionably an outstanding authority on the intricate history of the Baltic and surrounding countries, with their very involved political structures, endless wars, treaties, and intrigues. The more recent history is the more authoritatively presented, since the author was an eyewitness and participated in shaping events from the time the Baltic countries became independent in 1918. Since Dr. Bilmanis served for many years in the Latvian Foreign Office and is primarily a statesman (he served as Latvian Minister to the United States), he presents most materials in such a way that their political relevance is conspicuous. He believes in independent Baltic States, perhaps united in a Baltic Union, as the only solution for the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Promotion of this cause is the underlying motive of the book. The author is meticulous in pointing out that neither Soviet Russian nor Nazi German domination is acceptable to or wanted by these peoples. Of course, this stand is to be expected from a great patriot who firmly believes in the righteousness of his cause. As Dr. Bilmanis is a native of Latvia, the book is especially rich in information on this country, but also treats, as the title implies, the rest of the Baltic and surrounding countries. The latter treatment is really indispensable, since the developments in those countries are so interwoven that one can understand them only by studying the area in its entirety.

A person who conscientiously reads the book will emerge with a wealth of information about the Baltic and its history.

A better job of editing would have made the book more attractive to the reader. For instance, some of the repetitions could easily have been avoided and the present inconsistent arrangement of subtitles readily rectified.

The 35-page bibliography will interest a student of the Baltic.

P. LEJINS

University of Maryland

KARSKI, JAN. *Story of a Secret State*. Pp. vi, 391. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1944. $3.00.

This is a personal story of Jan Karski, a lieutenant in the Polish Army who served for four years as liaison officer between the political and military authorities and as courier between the secret state in Poland and the exiled Polish Government. The author's personal story is also the story of the Polish people, the description of the life of a temporarily submerged nation which refused to die but persisted in living in the underground under the au-

thority of a secret state. Through Karski's eyes the reader may penetrate into what reveals itself as an amazing world of its own, one of those unique experiences which prior to the Second World War would have seemed incredible.

It is not the complexity of Polish politics that makes the most inspiring asset of this full-size book. Far more absorbing are the well-written passages showing how new democratic elements were being born under the Nazi rule and how courageously the common people of Poland shouldered the burden of invasion and how ingeniously they resisted the attempts at their extermination. In fact, while Poland was being erased, for a time, from the map of Europe, a new people was in the process of making, unseen and unsung and yet full of determination and faith. Courts functioned in the underground, schools held regular sessions, newspapers appeared illegally, war bonds were sold to support the underground resistance, and public morale was upheld through various devices, including open ridicule of the Nazis.

In thirty-three chapters the author tells his story, step by step, starting with the defeat of the regular Polish Army in 1939, describing his being taken prisoner by Russia, his exchange and escape, the devastation of Poland, and the gradual transformation of the people from defeat to an organized life in the underground. Then came the mission to France, capture by the Gestapo, torture, the confinement in an S.S. hospital, rescue, and a whole series of surprising incidents all of which converged upon the one supreme goal of keeping the nation alive and maintaining contact with the free and fighting world outside. The chapter on the Jewish death camp corroborates the gruesome accounts of Nazi atrocities known from other official and unofficial documents. The book ends with the description of the journey through France and Spain and a brief reference to the author's interesting interview with the late President Roosevelt.

JOSEF HANČ
Czechoslovak Economic Service in U. S. A.

DAVIES, RAYMOND ARTHUR. *Inside Russia Today*. Pp. 92. Winnipeg: Contemporary Publishers, 1945. 25 cents.

This is another journalistic report on "enigmatic" Russia, commencing with impressions of Moscow and winding up with a pythonic discussion of Russian-American relations. It is a pronounced pro-Soviet account tinged with idyllic sentiments. "Down the street is a flower kiosk at which there's almost always [*sic!*] a line of customers. You can get roses, asters, tulips, sweet peas. The Muscovites love flowers." Ice-cream girls can be seen on every corner down town and the stores "glitter and are always crowded," while the so-called commission shops are "a heaven for the collector and the avid purchaser."

It is in this maudlin vein that the picture of inside Russia is given. As I finished the book I could not help recalling another "report" of Mr. W. L. White, and I asked myself, Where lies the truth? One produces the impression of a "heavenly city" of our age; the other, that it is a little worse than the Kansas penitentiary. Here is your choice between the two midsummer-night fantasies. I wonder if the Russians themselves are pleased with such reports. The country is too immense and the nation too complex to be represented either by obsequious flattery or by unintelligent condemnation.

There is still a sharp hiatus between the reporter and the reported. Among the Americans these accounts create more confusion. Among the Russians they cannot but arouse a feeling of justified resentment. Every Budge and Toddy seems to give interpretations these days of Russia and the Russian soul. It is a subject discussed *ad nauseam*. Too many journalistic knights have been employed in the search of Russia's grail, but too few represent King Arthur's knights. The future historian will have to sift mountains of journalistic sand before he will avail himself of a few pure grains of gold that will symbolize the true soul of Russia.

ANATOLE G. MAZOUR
University of Nevada

FOOTMAN, DAVID. *Red Prelude: The Life of the Russian Terrorist Zhelyabov.*

Pp. x, 267. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. $2.75.

This work by an English novelist narrates the events associated with the assassination of Czar Alexander II, March 1, 1881 (O.S.), and tells the life story of the person who inspired and directed that deed. It also describes the inner history of the revolutionary movement known vaguely under the name *narodnichestvo,* and more particularly its terrorist branch, the *Narodnaya Volya* (The Will of the People).

It seems strange to find the author of a serious historical work on a major event content to retire behind the documents and to reproduce, without any attempt at adornment, the incidents in which the revolutionaries participated, as reflected in their letters or as recounted in the bald official archives. The story is told so simply, not to say baldly and effortlessly, that it is only towards the end, when events are moving towards the dramatic climax, that the reader begins consciously to feel that he has been a spectator of an almost Aeschylean tragedy in which man is the sport of a grim and inevitable destiny.

The writer partially reveals the motives that inspired him to this study and the objectives he had in view. In his Foreword he says, "This book is an attempt to set out why Zhelyabov and his friends abandoned their original policy of reform by persuasion to become revolutionary terrorists." He seems to have owed not a little to the late Vladimir Burtsev, and to have drawn on the assistance of scholars and libraries in London and Paris. There is an extensive bibliography. It would be ungenerous to say that there are omissions in it, since it lays no claim to completeness; but one notices the absence of Ludwik Kulczycki's *Geschichte der russischen Revolution,* 3 vols., Gotha, 1910–14; and there is no reference to Thomas Masaryk's *The Spirit of Russia,* 2 vols., New York, 1919. Despite these defects, the writer makes a passing grade on historical accuracy and objectivity. Perhaps his literary training has enabled him to mask a high degree of technical skill under what appears to be artlessness.

The assassination of Alexander II is a conspicuous event in the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia, challenging, if it does not transcend, the Decembrist rising of 1825. It is to these brave and tragic incidents that we must go back if we are to understand the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Even more does it give us the clue to much that is obscure in the ideas and deeds of later actors in the revolutionary drama and explain what is otherwise unintelligible in Soviet Russia today.

STUART R. TOMPKINS
University of Oklahoma

GORIS, JAN-ALBERT (Ed.). *Belgium.* Pp. xx, 478. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1945. $5.00.

The editor and twenty-seven other writers composed the thirty chapters in this admirable volume. It has been divided into seven parts which are named respectively: the scene, historical background, political and constitutional development, economic and social development, cultural aspects, Belgian Congo, and Second World War and after. Not only has the division of the subject matter into these seven carefully selected sections been done with exemplary skill, but the authors have woven together a well-organized mass of useful material. Both experts and laymen will derive much profit from the reading of this book.

As the editor has stated in his Preface, the authors have all striven for objectivity, in which attempt they have succeeded exceptionally well. On the other hand, they labored under the serious handicap of having been cut off from their sources, as the editor also freely admits. The Bibliography at the end of the volume has suffered somewhat from this unfortunate factor. In general, it is not a good policy to have composite works produced in the midst of wartime conditions.

The first chapter presents an excellent discussion of the geography and climate of Belgium, but the present reviewer is surprised to read that one-fifth of the country was reclaimed from the sea; half that fraction would have been closer to the truth. Five chapters have been de-

voted to the historical background, covering the period from the Roman occupation under Julius Caesar to the beginning of the Second World War. It is to be regretted that only one of these chapters tells the story of the first nineteen hundred years, that is, to 1814, with the result that the remaining one hundred and twenty-five years have received four chapters. This is not the proportion that the great Henri Pirenne would have selected, for he knew what Flanders and Brabant meant to the world at the close of the Middle Ages.

Fortunately, however, the contributions made by Belgium to the development of modern art, literature, social progress, religious institutions, and political parties have been treated with proper care and appreciation by those authors who were chosen to write the third, fourth, and fifth parts of the book. The treatment of Belgium's great colony in Africa is also very good, while the history of the last decade at the end of the volume leaves little to be desired. Particularly useful is the chapter dealing with the Flemish movement during the past fifty years, which indicates that the two races of Belgium have learned to live together in an exemplary manner. Another praiseworthy feature of the book is the sympathetic attitude displayed toward the Dutch people.

ALBERT HYMA

University of Michigan

FRIEDRICH, CARL J. *American Policy Toward Palestine*. Pp. vi, 106. Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1944. No price.

FRANKENSTEIN, ERNST. *Justice for My People*. Pp. vii, 208. New York: Dial Press, 1944. $2.50.

LOWDERMILK, WALTER CLAY. *Palestine, Land of Promise*. Pp. 236. New York: Harper & Bros., 1944. $2.50.

The general subject of these three studies is the Jewish home in Palestine. Each of the studies attacks the subject with tools of a different discipline. The conclusion, however, is in each case the same: Zionism is the main solution of the Jewish problem.

Not all three authors are equally emphatic on this point. Professor Friedrich, the political scientist, considers in the present pamphlet one specific aspect of the problem, America's political attitude towards Zionism. He sketches six periods of general American policy—ranging from the "crusading internationalism" of the Wilsonian era, over periods of disillusionment and indifference, to isolationism and appeasement, back to assumption of international responsibilities at the outbreak of the Second World War—which have influenced this attitude. But, whatever the period, America's interest in Zionism was never strong. As Professor Friedrich soberly puts it: "Intense as was and remains the feeling of Jewish people on the subject, there is no question that this concern affected their fellow Americans only to a very limited extent."

More ambitious, and more emphatic, too, is Ernst Frankenstein's study. Being an expert on international law, he feels called upon to plead the case of his people before the forum of humanity. He sees in Jewish homelessness the crux of the Jewish problem. Return to Palestine appears to him, therefore, as the only possible sound solution. The main part of his book is accordingly dedicated to legal and political difficulties obstructing such happy denouement. Both kinds of difficulties arise from the fact that the Land of Promise is inhabited by Arabs. This fact, combined with the vagaries of handling mandate responsibilities by the British Colonial Office, has at present created an impasse. The White Paper of 1939 marks the virtual end of the Zionist dream. Against such highhanded default Frankenstein musters an impressive array of legal and political arguments which, if right were always right and winning an argument on the verbal level identical with actual success, should give the Jewish home in Palestine a new and more secure lease on life.

The most constructive of the three studies appears to be that of W. C. Lowdermilk. The expert on soil conservation is not concerned with political or legal subtleties. He accepts the existence of the Jewish homeland as given, and goes down to the most substantial part of its foundation—the soil. In doing so, Lowdermilk

confines himself to the most positive aspect of the Zionist case, the stupendous achievements of Jewish agriculture in Palestine. The story of these achievements, fascinating to the expert of soil reclamation, is equally instructive to the student of human rehabilitation. The co-operative agricultural communities, the so-called Kvutzoth, have not only broken the ground for the Jewish settlements of Palestine; they have also produced a new way of life the study of which offers factual insight into modes of societal development based on the principle of production for use.

Lowdermilk concludes his study by making a concrete proposal as to how to raise the "absorptive capacity" of Palestine substantially. Profiting from the experience of the TVA, he proposes a JVA—a Jordan Valley Authority. He estimates that "full utilization of the Jordan Valley depression and adjoining drainage areas for reclamation and power will in time provide farms, industry and security for at least four million Jewish refugees from Europe, in addition to the 1,800,000 Arabs and Jews already in Palestine and Trans-Jordan."

In the light of the story Lowdermilk tells of Jewish agricultural achievements in Palestine, it becomes immaterial whether one agrees with Zionism or not. These achievements are objective and verifiable facts. One wonders, however, whether the arguments on which the three authors base their plea for the Jewish home in Palestine will in themselves prove compelling. America, as Professor Friedrich implies, ought to protect Jewish Palestine because this may help to secure oil interests in the Near East. Frankenstein demonstrates the historic and legal rights of Jews to that country, and points to moral profit accruing to humanity from recognizing them. Lowdermilk, finally, outlines a project realizable in Palestine but serving the whole Near East. These are all real and sound reasons for the preservation and extension of Jewish settlement in Palestine. But unfortunately, international diplomacy has so far—instead of heeding real reasons—devoted itself mainly to finding "good" reasons for questionable intentions. It seems therefore that only a spirit of real fair play among nations—which may or may not emerge from the various international conferences which seal the defeat of Nazism—can bring to this problem, as to many others, a good and real solution.

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FLEMING, DENNA FRANK. *The United States and the World Court.* Pp. 206. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1945. $2.00.

This book is the product of careful research, but it is not an "academic" book in the traditional sense. Professor Fleming looks upon world affairs with neither Olympian detachment nor amused unconcern. He is an active participant in the struggle for a better world, a crusader for international peace and for American collaboration in the effort to achieve it. He is convinced that the haughty aloofness of the American Government prevented effective international organization for peace, and marshals the evidence to show that a small group of willful men frustrated the evident purpose of the American people to share in the responsibility of maintaining world order.

The repudiation of the League of Nations signified an unwillingness on the part of the American Government to take common action against aggression. The World Court was only a "pale substitute," but our adherence would have been a gesture of good will, heartening the forces of sanity and peace. The Court was largely an American conception, born of American experience. Public opinion, as expressed by the press, professional associations, and religious and fraternal bodies, was overwhelmingly in favor of the Court. Eminent lawyers approved of it. The executive branch of the Government repeatedly urged favorable action by the Senate. Yet a handful of irreconcilables found it possible to block favorable action for twelve years, and in the end succeeded entirely in defeating the measure.

The author has written extensively and well on the role of the Senate in emasculating and destroying treaties of peace. In this book he shows how the perfected tech-

nique was employed by a minority to prevent our participation in the World Court. The obstructionists packed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations with uncompromising isolationists, and then proceeded to discover hidden dangers which required reservations and ever more reservations to guard innocent America, which had no conceivable interest in European affairs, from the machinations of "them furriners"—a classic phrase of Senator Reynolds. The reservations required careful consideration, and the Foreign Relations Committee proceeded with all the caution and deliberation necessary to prevent dangerous involvement. Reams of rhetoric and protracted argument added to the general confusion, until the public was fatigued. Finally an appeal to emotion by Father Coughlin, Huey Long, and the Hearst press supplied the "popular demand" necessary to defeat the project.

Total war overtook us despite our aloofness, and we must think again of peace and of collective action against aggression. To forestall this time the danger of obstruction by a minority, Professor Fleming proposes four possible safeguards. He considers the two-thirds rule for the ratification of treaties the root evil, and argues convincingly for a constitutional amendment to eliminate it. If this proves unattainable, he urges a pledge by the Senate to support international organization, approval of controversial international agreements by joint resolution of Congress, or, if need be, the by-passing of the Senate minority veto through the utilization of executive agreements for the conduct of our foreign affairs.

Professor Fleming has skillfully combined the learning of the scholar with the conviction and passion of the crusader. He holds the reader to the end, and succeeds in imparting a sense of significance and urgency. One can only hope that the book will have wide circulation.

OSCAR I. JANOWSKY
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HILL, NORMAN. *Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations.* Pp. vi, 248. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. $3.00.

The close of the war in Europe and the impending pressure of territorial settlements give this monograph of Professor Hill a rare timeliness. The author disclaims any intention of advancing solutions to particular territorial disputes; his stated purpose is to analyze territorial disputes generally "with a view to a better understanding of their nature and the procedures available for their solution." After brief discussions of the role played by territory in international relations and the nature and causes of territorial disputes, the author classifies his subject matter into "legal claims" to territory and "political or nonlegal claims." Eight of the twelve chapters deal with the latter category.

The principal nonlegal claims to territory—that is, strategic, geographic, historic, economic, and ethnic claims—are each discussed in a separate chapter. The basis or bases of each type of claim are analyzed and numerous illustrations from international practice are adduced, with copious citation of source material. A chapter on "Miscellaneous Non-Legal Claims" treats briefly of "political" claims, "sentimental" claims, claims based upon "sacrifice," "co-operation," "indemnification," or what not. Although the author asserts that disputes over territory "have been submitted in great numbers to arbitration" and that these have been mainly based on claims of a legal nature, he devotes only one chapter to legal claims to territory.

In a most interesting chapter on "Solutions in Non-Legal Disputes," Professor Hill discusses the logic and the comparative validity of territorial claims based on strategy, geography, history, economics, and nationality. Since, of two contesting states, each may have an apparently cogent claim based on one or more of these principles, how is the choice to be made? "There are other ways," he writes, "to satisfy economic, strategic, and ethnic interests than by the acquisition of territory." The problem of Saar coal, the free zones of Gex and Savoy, servitudes, the neutralization of Tangier and the Åland Islands, the transfer or exchange of minorities, mandates, and condominia are

cited as examples. A final chapter deals with international agencies and procedures for drawing frontiers and settling territorial disputes.

The book is not a definitive treatise on territorial claims, but students and teachers of international relations will find it a valuable monograph; harassed technical delegates preparing memoranda on frontiers will find it a useful handbook; and the layman can turn with confidence to its simply and clearly written pages for enlightenment in the coming months.

HERBERT W. BRIGGS

Cornell University

LEUBUSCHER, CHARLOTTE. *Tanganyika Territory*. Pp. x, 217. London: Oxford University Press, 1944. 18 s.

The publication of this book could not have been better timed. At a moment when mandates are again coming under international scrutiny and when their future status within the world security system is to be determined, this well-balanced and well-written book, dealing with the most important of the so-called B mandates, should receive serious consideration on the part of those concerned with colonial problems. In selecting Tanganyika as a test case for mandate rule, the author examines in considerable detail the policies which have bearing on land, mining, labor, foreign trade, and public finance. Problems of a social and political nature are not dealt with. Unfortunately the author limits her scope of investigation to the period prior to 1939. This was not an arbitrary choice, but was dictated by the fact that with the outbreak of the war official documentation for Tanganyika as well as for other colonial areas became inaccessible. If it had been possible to follow Tanganyika's economic policy during the war years, and especially if its often criticized labor policy had been studied during these years, it might very well have affected the general conclusions of the author.

Dr. Leubuscher believes that "the Mandates System was not only . . . 'the last expression of the conscience of Europe in regard to peoples not yet able to stand by themselves,' but has a solid foundation in economic facts" (p. 9). While evaluating mandate policy in rather positive terms, in the concluding chapters of her book the author enumerates a number of suggestions regarding the future administration of mandated territories. But in view of modern political tendencies, some of which are recognized in the preface of the study, these suggestions are now rather out of date.

The general reader will readily turn to the third part of the book, entitled "The Lesson: Results and Suggestions." The author's most valuable contribution, however, is the second part, "Working of the Mandates System in Tanganyika," which carefully analyzes the economic development of Tanganyika Territory and is interspersed with occasional references to other African mandates. Although this part is remarkable in its objective evaluation, there are a few statements which cannot be accepted uncritically. It appears to the reviewer as doubtful that "a certain amount of white settlement is almost universally considered advantageous, because it helps to develop a country's resources . . . , acts as an educational factor in relation to native methods of cultivation, and increases the wealth and taxpaying capacity of the population, native and non-native" (p. 29). A comparison between the economic standards of Tanganyika and, for instance, those of the Gold Coast, where no white settlement exists, will hardly bear out such a contention. The author realizes that the Indian trader, although important for the country at the present stage, is a definite threat to the African. She writes: ". . . there seems to be a certain incompatibility between the paramount object of the Mandates System, demanding that the African should be helped to stand on his own feet, and the economic equality clause which rules out any restriction on the immigration of the nationals of a particular country, so long as that country is a member of the League" (p. 80). If that is the case for Indians, it must be the case for Europeans too.

The reviewer finds it equally difficult to agree with the author's mild contempt for the policy which seeks to develop the Afri-

can "along his own lines" (p. 51). One can hardly deny that the cultural peculiarities of a people influence their economic development.

H. A. WIESCHHOFF
University of Pennsylvania

SCHUYLER, ROBERT LIVINGSTON. *The Fall of the Old Colonial System: A Study in British Free Trade, 1770–1870.* Pp. vii, 344. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945. $3.00.

Not even contemporary officials, it is stated, fully understood the intricate mass of statutes and regulations comprising the navigation system. Professor Schuyler, in his narrative of transition to free trade, has deftly brought together not only the main features of that system, but also the essential elements of other parts of the old colonial system. He has served to his readers not exactly an epicurean dish, but one that is well seasoned, well prepared, and certainly quite substantial. The volume is worth the attention not only of historians but as well of students and practitioners of statecraft. It is a blend, in the best tradition, of the author's own researches and of earlier studies. It is rather aptly described by the publisher as a supplement to the work of Beer, Osgood, and Andrews.

The introduction is a summary of the old colonial system as it involved commerce and defense. Administrative machinery and constitutional problems are omitted as having comparatively little bearing on the main theme. The account of the fall of the system emphasizes the views of a long succession of its critics, including publicists, economists, officials, and businessmen, from Josiah Tucker, who preceded Adam Smith, to Goldwin Smith and men of his way of thinking in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. These views are woven into the story of the various measures which actually eliminated protective tariffs, imperial preferences, the navigation acts, and the imperial garrisons.

Many of the critics of the old system had much in common with the men who sought a revival of imperialism. Few of the anti-imperialists were in fact opposed to the retention of strategic outposts or of India; and as for the Anglo-Saxon colonies, these, it was hoped, would have friendlier ties with the home country after separation than before. In much of the so-called anti-imperialistic literature there is, in fact, the spirit of the twentieth-century British Empire, with its Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth of Nations, its strategic outposts, and its unresolved Indian problem. There are only incidental references, as in the account of the views of Charles Dilke, to India and various other areas not preponderantly Anglo-Saxon. . These phases of empire, in fact, were usually discussed with reticence by the anti-imperialists. Not the least interesting point of emphasis is the role of the colonies themselves in opposing separation and in stimulating a revival of imperial sentiment in Great Britain.

Professor Schuyler gives comparatively little attention to the effects of basic economic changes. He does, however, in his concluding section, analyze the conditions which brought an end to anti-imperialism and gave rise to the new imperialism.

WITT BOWDEN
Washington, D. C.

SÁENZ, VICENTE. *Centro América en Pie.* Pp. 237. México, D. F.: Ediciones Liberación, 1944. $2.00.

This is a collection of four essays, all previously published (1942–44), together with a new preface and epilogue. In an unsystematic and somewhat repetitive but always interesting way the author sketches the conflict between liberty and despotism in Central America from the beginning of independence in 1821 to the latter part of 1944. Even in the essays that deal with the earlier phases of the conflict, he reveals a constant preoccupation with its current phase—the effort of liberal elements in Central America to overthrow the sawdust Caesars who at the beginning of 1944 dominated all the five republics of this region except Costa Rica.

Points of special interest in the author's treatment of the recent period are: his argument in favor of the reunification of Central America and its orientation towards liberal Mexico; his picture of the

social and cultural backwardness of Central America and the relationship of this to foreign economic domination; his Pan Latin Americanism; his assertion that the good-neighbor policy has frequently been sabotaged by United States foreign service officers in Central America; his bitter attack on the wartime freezing of political regimes in Latin America as a means of promoting the United Nations cause; and his account of how this situation began to thaw in Central America with the revolutions of 1944 in Guatemala and El Salvador.

Though written as a tract for the times, this book deserves the attention of serious students. The author has been studying and writing about its main theme for many years past (he was formerly a university professor and founder of the Socialist Party in his native Costa Rica), and in these pages he frequently refers the reader to his previous works on various aspects of the conflict. Moreover, he himself has been a participant in the "antidespotic" activities described at length in his concluding chapter. As a result, despite its *parti pris* and other flaws, his sociopolitical analysis of Central American history is not only much more vivid but more understandable and essentially sounder than the accounts given in some of our standard textbooks on Latin America.

ARTHUR P. WHITAKER
University of Pennsylvania

WHITAKER, ARTHUR P. (Ed.). *Inter-American Affairs, 1943.* Pp. x, 277. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944. $3.00.

The editor of this extremely useful survey implies in the Foreword that the venture has now come of age. It is a pleasure to realize that permanence now seems assured for *Inter-American Affairs*. Were it to be suspended for any reason, the void would seem the greater because of the dependence that both the scholar and, doubtless, the layman have come to place on it.

The new volume perhaps inevitably shows changes in the personnel of contributors. In addition to the editor, George Wythe of the Department of Commerce and John P. Humphrey of McGill University have been carried over as contributors from earlier volumes. Other contributors are new: Madaline W. Nichols, Charles F. Carson, Otis E. Mulliken, Sarah E. Roberts, Julian L. Schley, Don Francisco, and Clement G. Motten. The general organization of the volume resembles that of its predecessors: the editor writes on Politics and Diplomacy in the United States and Latin America, while Professor Humphrey covers the same topic for Canada. Mr. Mulliken and Miss Roberts, both of the Department of State, discuss Labor and Social Welfare. Industry, Commerce, and Finance are dealt with by Messrs. Wythe, Carson, and R. W. James. General Schley and Mr. Francisco describe developments in Transportation and Communications, and Miss Nichols those in Cultural Relations.

Two editorial problems strike this reviewer as not yet being completely solved with regard to this series of annual surveys; perhaps, in the nature of things, they cannot be solved. One is the problem of being able to subordinate the individual trees to the woods as a whole. The other is the striking of a proper balance, or at least the conscious acceptance of such a balance, between domestic developments in the several countries and international happenings. The several chapters are by no means uniform with regard to their organization in these respects. Professor Whitaker himself is notably successful in being able to establish a perspective and at the same time to include essential details; some other chapters are definitely pedestrian in their immersion in detail to the sacrifice of an over-all view. In regard to the second problem mentioned above, the nature of the subject matter of certain topics makes it almost inevitable that they focus on domestic or internal developments; other topics as naturally reflect an international approach or treatment. Some degree of uniformity—if possible—would be desirable.

But it seems captious to dwell at any length on such aspects of a volume so generally excellent and useful as this is. The increasing numbers of users and friends (and the two are doubtless synony-

mous) will all join in wishing the series "many happy returns."

RUSSELL H. FITZGIBBON
University of California at Los Angeles

QUILLIAN, WILLIAM S., JR. *The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism.* Pp. xiii, 154. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. $3.00.

If Dr. Quillian had confined himself to a study of intellectual history, this might have been a more satisfactory work. Instead he has tried to show that evolutionary science is not an adequate basis for a theory of ethics. In his Preface, Dr. Quillian takes his stand with those who believe that "the uncertainty about moral standards and political ideals which is abroad in the world today" is in very large part due to the belief that "science is sufficient for the full understanding of man and his place in the universe and can thus solve all his problems."

But those who are led by the title and the Preface to expect a review of contemporary naturalist ethics will be disappointed, for Dr. Quillian centers his fire on nineteenth-century writers only—Darwin, Spencer, W. K. Clifford, Guyau, and Leslie Stephen—and on problems and frames of argument that were lively in 1870 and 1880. It is hard to know just what to say of a book that seriously disposes of Herbert Spencer in 1945.

The author stands, to be sure, on sound if unoriginal ground when he maintains that a satisfactory ethics cannot be built upon biology. The nineteenth-century naturalists, as he contends, were unable to bridge the gap between a descriptive, genetic account of behavior and a framework of sanctions by which behavior can be praised or condemned. This failure, he says, came about because they refused to believe that there is a moral order which has a "more than human character." In thus jumping from his criticism of the nineteenth-century naturalists to the contention that ethics must be founded on supernaturalism, he commits a gross *non sequitur*. We are not confined to an alternative between an ethic based upon what nineteenth-century naturalists thought they knew about biology and one based on what twentieth-century supernaturalists think they know about the unknown. The extraordinary air of unreality which pervades this book is not due to the fact that its problems are old—most philosophical ones are—but to the fact that its approach is so highly formal. The age in which we live rightly demands a full-bodied sociological setting for its ethical discussions. Such a setting gives significance not only to what is artificially catalogued as "applied ethics" but also to works like this (which might properly be labeled unapplied ethics!); for it is within society, not within dogma, that our moral problems really arise.

RICHARD HOFSTADTER
University of Maryland

FIELD, MARSHALL. *Freedom is More Than a Word.* Pp. xxvii, 190. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. $2.50.

As archon in 594 B.C., a wealthy Athenian aristocrat named Solon fought the greed of the privileged landholders who had brought the masses of Attica to an intolerable state. Thomas Jefferson, born into a rich, prominent colonial family in Virginia, became the most conspicuous apostle of democracy in his time. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Hyde Park patrician and one of the great liberals of modern times, incurred the bitter enmity of his own social class.

These men have been called "traitors to their class." The most recent addition to this unique society, composed of men of wealth who believe in the dignity and the rights of the common man, is Marshall Field III. Inheritor of a fortune estimated at $150,000,000, Mr. Field has unabashedly disowned his socioeconomic class. He has made astonishing forays into liberal journalism and has plowed millions into New York's *PM* and the *Chicago Sun.* His patrician colleagues have lifted worried eyebrows and attributed it all to eccentricity, insanity, or the machinations of a New York psychoanalyst. Mr. Field's book proves them to be wrong. The man has some mighty fine gray matter, integrity and honesty, great courage, and an abiding love for liberalism, democracy, and free-

dom. Americans can well be proud of this new type of streamlined millionaire.

The author first describes his conception of a society of free men, with emphasis upon the disinherited. There are brief and stimulating discussions of such American problems as pressure groups, minority difficulties, American education, socialized medicine, and co-operatives.

Mr. Field tells of the founding of the progressive New York newspaper *PM*—certainly one of the most refreshing experiments in modern American journalism. He writes of his difficulties in establishing the *Chicago Sun* in the face of the powerful *Tribune*. He gives a blow-by-blow account of his battle with the Associated Press and "its monopolistic potentialities."

In his first book Mr. Field writes honestly, courageously, and convincingly of the liberal world in which he believes. His work is an exciting, magnificent testament of faith. It is packed with useful anger. It challenges the American people to revitalize the heritage of liberalism which has made it great. It issues a timely warning against those who, while paying lip service to the slogans of democracy, in their hearts are unwilling or unable to let democracy itself function and grow.

This embattled millionaire has a passionate faith in American democracy: "With all my heart I believe that democracy and human beings, given a real chance, can develop to heights as yet undreamed of." Americans should pay serious attention to his message.

LOUIS L. SNYDER
The City College of New York

CROCE, BENEDETTO. *Politics and Morals*. Pp. 204. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. $3.00.

Benedetto Croce commands a unique position, not only in Italy as the outstanding upholder of the liberal spirit during the Fascist night, but throughout the world as one of the most meaningful philosophers of our time. As an expression of and contribution to the burning social and moral issues of the twentieth century, this book will be welcomed. It should be stated at the outset, however, that it can hardly reach even the educated layman, if uninitiated. The presentation is involved and lacks the clear organization and concrete style that other writings of the philosopher of the "doctrine of the practical" reveal. This failure may well be blamed on the none-too-happy translation of the Italian original; it may be partly due to the fragmentary character of the loosely connected essays. Yet, coming from the pen of the Nestor of European philosophy, the sketches reflect the wealth of his historical knowledge and his institutional insight. The careful reader will be well rewarded by this rich collection of clarifying definitions and profound observations.

The essays may be divided under three headings: the first part dealing with elements of an empirical science of politics, the second sketching some main ideas as developed in the history of the philosophy of politics since Vico and Machiavelli, and the third presenting short analyses of crucial concepts of modern political science.

Croce is a radical thinker in the truest sense, trying to get at the very root of reality, to discover the valid first principles, and to erect a coherent system of thought adequate to all phases of man's experience. He is the declared foe of the abstract absolutism of positivism, and puts the vital intuition of living reality first. All truth "lies in knowledge of the particular in which from time to time the whole is present," as he stated in his *History as a Story of Liberty* (1938). Philosophy to him is nothing but methodology of historical thought. All values and ideal goals are immanent in history. The chief task of historiography in describing the past is to recreate the spirit of the period. There is no ever-present pattern in history.

The later Croce, however, seems to perceive in the concept of liberty the final cause, the constant thread, and the universal principle of history. Liberty becomes somewhat a rational constant amid the flux. Such an idea is certainly at the core of *Politics and Morals*, that is highlighted wherever the author hits at the principle of liberty, so close to him as a philosopher and a responsible statesman. The most revealing essays, therefore, are

"Liberalism as a Concept of Life" and "The Bourgeoisie: an Ill-Defined Historical Concept." The first represents a lofty interpretation which identifies the liberal mind with that of modern man. It may be regarded by many students of political ideas as a eulogy of a hardly existing liberal philosophy. Yet it will stand as a significant statement of the "ideal type."

The essay on the bourgeoisie can be regarded as a concrete illustration of Croce's broad concept of the "modern spirit" and, at the same time, as a case study in intellectual-moral history. It rejects a fashionable formula which has played an extraordinary role in the polemic literature of both reactionary and revolutionary parties and in the scientific writings of our time, too. Croce singles out for his well-directed attack the much-disputed books of Sombart and Groethuysen.

Croce, the liberal, combats throughout his life, in theory and practice, both the "retrogrades and the ultraprogressives." To him "they are all fundamentally retrogressive and antirevolutionary. . . . Only liberal uprisings bring about real revolutions." This is a most challenging statement. It can be understood fully only in the context of his fight against authoritarianism, right or left, and in the light of his reassertion of the eternal validity of a liberal individualism based upon a supreme faith in the moral conscience of mankind. Other essays, such as "Contrasting Political Ideals after 1870," "Free Enterprise and Liberalism," and "International Justice," profess this unshakable belief in the individuality and the immanent character of modern man.

On this ground Croce also refutes strongly the theory of equality that "has its true origin within the framework of mathematics and mechanics, both of them unable to comprehend the living world." To him this ideology necessarily leads to an anarchic doctrine and to antisocial man, and thus is in basic contradiction to historical experience. One can well see where Croce differs today from other anti-Fascists in Italy. It would be an oversimplification and an injustice to his whole political philosophy, however, to identify him with the nineteenth-century liberalism of a Count Sforza, though Croce's formulations could be easily used along these lines.

The concluding essay on—i.e. against—"Historical Pessimism" comes closest to what Croce stands for as a philosopher of history, which to him is "what we make it. . . . The problem is always solely one of knowledge and will; and there are no remedies which can take the place of the intellectual and moral conscience, or that can be of help to that conscience unless it can help itself."

SIGMUND NEUMANN
Wesleyan University

CRAIG, HARDIN. *Literary Study and the Scholarly Profession.* Pp. xiii, 150. Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1944. $2.25.

That the war has gravely warped the development of literary scholarship by leaving in the graduate schools and the colleges only those refused by the draft is patent. That the extraordinary development of scientific research as an instrument of military vengeance has left the humanities far behind is also patent. Therefore anyone who is interested to preserve balance in American education looks for light and leadership in the pronouncements of the universities. The present volume offers neither.

Confused and voluble, the author vibrates helplessly between his fixed idea that all modern problems are soluble by a return to Bacon and the ideas of the Renaissance, and his vague feeling that some change must be made in American education. He has no conception that the academicians themselves may have missed the boat; all he can say is that "there appeared in our society at that time [post 1918] a powerful group of rivalries and diversion so powerful that I think no body of academicians could have withstood them" (p. 25). It appears that because of the automobile, the movies, and the radio, the "minds of our students became diffused" and they "lost" "the powers of memory and concentration." This nonsense reappears on p. 109, where we learn that the country "has placed before the young an ideal of willfulness and pleasure-seeking instead of obedience to law."

These and other passages of a like scolding tone would make interesting reading on Okinawa, Guadalcanal, the Anzio beachhead, or Omaha beach. Most of us are under the impression that this same younger generation said to be following "an idea of willfulness" defeated the German Army and is about to defeat the Japanese nation. Until professors of the humanities cease the reiteration of clichés like these, there is little hope for the humanities.

HOWARD MUMFORD JONES
Harvard University

GORDON, ROBERT AARON. *Business Leadership in the Large Corporation.* Pp. xiv, 369. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1945. $3.00.

It is difficult to do justice to this book in a short review. It seeks to answer, for the large corporation, such questions as: What is the leadership function in business? Where does real leadership reside? How effective is it? Under what conditions is it carried on? The main general conclusion is that the real business leadership in the modern large corporation is exercised by the executive group—the professional salaried managers—not by owners or directors. Where adequate evidence is presented, the conclusions have real importance to economists and businessmen; where heavy reliance is placed on the author's interpretation of case studies and his own observations, the conclusions may be disputed on comparison with the reader's own experience. In any event, the book is unique and significant. It suggests a host of questions for further analysis.

The study begins on familiar ground with an analysis of the corporate setting for business leadership. Data are provided on the importance of the large corporation and the two hundred largest units, on the size of management's (officers' and directors') ownership of stock, and on the relative importance of the stockholdings of the largest stockholders. The data analyzed are drawn in the main from the National Resources Committee Study *The Structure of the American Economy,* and the TNEC Monograph *The Distribution of Ownership in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations.* The main finding from this portion of the study is that real leadership and ownership are very largely in different hands.

Part II (Chapters III–XI) contains an analysis of the scope and location of business leadership, meaning by that term the initiation and approval of important decisions and the creation and maintenance of organization. Here reliance is placed on case studies of sixty-five large corporations. The groups studied include the chief executive, the executive group, the board of directors, and "outside" interest groups such as financial groups, government, competitors, labor, professional groups, and in particular the stockholder group. The last-named is treated as an "outside" group because of the distinction between the *ability* to control and the *actual* decision-making and co-ordination encompassed in the author's concept of business leadership. Summing up the role of the stockholder, the author concludes that ultimate control, or the ability to change management, may or may not mean some degree of participation in management. "It never means, in the large corporation, complete assumption of the function of business leadership" (p. 188). Other conclusions of importance in this section are: (1) that the executive *group* is more important than the individual, and (2) that the board of directors in the typical large corporation does not actively exercise an important part of the leadership function. Later in the book the passivity of the directors is made the basis for the suggestion of an external governmental check on management.

Part III (Chapters XII–XIV) is concerned with a discussion of the incentives to business leadership and the professionalization of that leadership. To the real business leaders—the executives—the chief incentives are the relatively stable compensation and employment, together with such nonfinancial motives as personal power, prestige, and creative urge. (The difficulty of measuring the real importance of such factors is recognized.) Modern business leaders are increasingly taking on the character of hired business managers; profits from stockownership, the reward of the traditional business leader (owner-

operator), do not, in the author's opinion, appear to be a primary incentive to the majority of the top executives in our largest corporations.

The proposition of "professional" working directors as an outside check on management, which has been given much prominence of late, is rejected by the author on the ground that such directors would still be selected by management and would become in effect part of the working personnel. Leaving leadership where it belongs—in the executive group—some sort of governmental intervention would appear necessary if we want a strong and independent board of directors. This is the most controversial conclusion.

HERBERT E. DOUGALL
Northwestern University

WEISSMAN, RUDOLPH L. *Small Business and Venture Capital.* Pp. xii, 174. New York: Harper & Bros., 1945. $2.00.

Mr. Weissman has written a little book of big significance. To him, "small business is more than a form of business activity; it is a veritable way of life." Like farming, its problems are social as well as economic.

There has been much talk about small business, about industrial and economic concentration, about the need for remedies for the ills of small business and our economy. Now, Mr. Weissman, who is particularly familiar with the financial problems of small business and has a deep understanding of our social and economic problems, proposes that specific measures be undertaken to relieve small business of inequities and handicaps which threaten its survival.

Mr. Weissman's underlying assumption that the existence of healthy small business activity is essential in a competitive economy is logical. His admonition to small business to "ally itself with progressive forces if it wants to improve its prospects for constructive legislation" is sound. On the other hand, some of the so-called progressive political leaders have been more interested in the vote-getting possibilities of aid programs for small business than in advancing reforms which are fundamentally sound in their economic implications.

Men in the larger corporations will wince at the statement that small business "has nothing to gain by allying itself with big business, which has, in general, shown insufficient vision," but there is much evidence to support this charge. On the other hand, big business and small business need each other in many ways, and to a considerable extent the future of both is bound up together. If the private enterprise system is not to be supplanted by state socialism, consumers' co-operation, or some other form of socialized business, it would seem necessary to reconcile the conflicts between big and little business and to have each perform those tasks in which it can best serve society.

To overcome the difficulties and high costs of securing loans to finance small business, Mr. Weissman would establish a quasi-public corporation as a permanent and integral part of the Federal Reserve System, which would be available for advice on problems of management, engineering, and accounting, as well as for loans at reasonable rates. This is a constructive suggestion which is worth considering. The problem of financing small business must be met in some manner, perhaps in various ways through government aid and private banking facilities, if opportunities are to be available to create new enterprises and to expand present small undertakings.

The author wisely outlines other proposals for strengthening small business Tax relief is essential, monopolies must be discouraged and competition encouraged, patents must be accessible to small business, those in small business must be educated to conduct their enterprises more effectively, and other reforms must be undertaken.

This is a clear, comprehensive, and challenging analysis of the problems of small business which should stimulate some much needed constructive thinking. The little book is excellent reading and is recommended to all who are concerned about the future of small business in America.

ALFRED G. BUEHLER
University of Pennsylvania

NOURSE, EDWIN G. *Price Making in a Democracy*. Pp. x, 541. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1944. $3.50.

This volume comprises a collection of the materials on price policy originally published by the author in a series of thirteen pamphlets between January 1942 and July 1943. The main objective of the study is to inquire into the prospects that our economic system "might be turned from the business practices of the past with their emphasis on short-run profits even at the expense of production restriction and unemployment, to one of high and sustained activity" through the independent and spontaneous following of a "low-price policy" by individual business managers. Mr. Nourse believes that if a large part of the gain from technological progress were promptly passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, a high rate of industrial activity, larger long-run business profits, and a rise in general living standards would result.

The book is divided into three parts. In the first, Mr. Nourse discusses the general principles of free enterprise, competition, and the profit motive in a democratic, capitalistic economy, and analyzes the role played in it by the price system. The growing importance of "administered" as opposed to "automatic" prices is emphasized and attention is called to the important responsibilities placed upon the relatively small group of corporation executives who are responsible for their determination.

The second part of the book considers in detail some of the major problems involved in the application of low-price policies, such as their areas of applicability, responsiveness of market demand, and the role played by distribution costs and wages. Mr. Nourse believes that at the end of this war, when accumulated savings will make it relatively easy to continue prices on a war level, a low-price policy should be followed as a means of securing and maintaining a high volume of output.

In the last part of his book Mr. Nourse deals with the prospects of achieving the adoption by the business community of the price policies which he advocates. A chapter is devoted to the discussion of scientific aids to policy making; another explores the contribution which trade and other private business associations could make toward a broader understanding and a more general application of a low-price policy. The last chapter summarizes the argument of the volume as a whole and amplifies and elaborates its main thesis; i.e., that in the long run, maximum profits for capitalist owners are based on maximum real income for the population as a whole.

Mr. Nourse's argument is well made and clearly and forcefully presented. There can be little disagreement with his fundamental contention that if the gains resulting from technological improvement were readily passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, all the members of the economic community would benefit in the long run. The question, of course, is whether or not business leadership will be clear-sighted enough to follow of its own accord the course which Mr. Nourse advocates. There are hopeful indications that it may. But in the opinion of this reviewer, it would in the meantime not be amiss to use also, besides logical argument and continued exhortation, some more direct methods to ensure low prices, such as vigorous prevention of monopolistic combinations in production and distribution, limitation of patent rights, and broadening of competitive endeavor by encouragement of small and medium-sized business through freer access to credit and industrial research facilities.

WILLIAM G. WELK
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

WIPRUD, ARNE C. *Justice in Transportation*. Pp. xxii, 196. New York: Ziff-Davis Pub. Co., 1945. $2.50.

Mr. Wiprud, as special assistant to the Attorney General in the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, participated in the investigation of the alleged monopoly in transportation in the United States authorized by the Attorney General at that time, Francis Biddle. Thurman Arnold, formerly Assistant Attorney General, states the thesis of the volume in an introduction. He charges that the flagrant

abuses of the carriers have aroused the country to the evil consequences of monopolistic practices and controls which have produced high and discriminatory rates, restricted services, and suppressed technological improvements in the field of transportation, and that there is a nation-wide conspiracy among transportation companies which has resulted in the establishment of cartels which fix rates, divide territory, and retard the growth of industry. These cartels are acquiesced in by government bureaus, including the Interstate Commerce Commission which "hovers over" these restrictive arrangements.

Mr. Wiprud charges that the great banking houses have gone about their business of sacking the railroads in cynical disregard of the law, particularly the antitrust laws (p. 8). He alleges that the railroads have maintained high rates and compelled other carriers to charge high rates, and have stultified the development of other forms of transportation. He claims that the Government has been charged exorbitant rates for the transportation of war materials by the subterfuge of calling war materials by different names so as to remove them from the normal basis of rating (pp. 15–23).

In a chapter devoted to the discussion of the development of monopoly, Mr. Wiprud concludes that to the extent that regulation has promoted safety, the public has gained by it, but at an enormous and unwarranted price in reduced competition and exorbitant rates. He claims that the rate structures of the country have resulted in the development of the "colonial system" in our national economy in the south and west, and that this results in an unbalanced economy and a lower level of income.

In discussing the antitrust laws, particularly the Sherman Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914, Mr. Wiprud charges that those who advocate that agreements with respect to the services and rates of carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act should be regulated by the Interstate Commerce Commission and relieved from the application of antitrust laws are looking to future monopolistic schemes (p. 136). He predicts that "government ownership may be forced upon this nation, but if so it will not come primarily through the drains of railroad revenue to other forms of transportation, but when a thoroughly dissatisfied public becomes convinced that railroad financiers and railroad managements have not the imagination nor the resourcefulness to serve the public honestly and efficiently in the face of competition of newer forms of transportation" (pp. 147–48).

The only departures from a complete policy of laissez faire in transportation matters that Mr. Wiprud apparently would sanction are a sparing exercise of the minimum rate power and a liberal policy of granting certificates of public convenience and necessity to various competitive forms of transportation.

Mr. Wiprud's volume is a draft of an indictment, and not a discussion of the problem. His interpretation of the facts and his conclusions of law are subject to rebuttal and should be answered by those who hold different interpretations of the facts and a different interpretation of the law and regulatory policies. The book should serve a purpose in bringing these differences into sharp focus.

G. LLOYD WILSON
University of Pennsylvania

ROCHESTER, ANNA. *Capitalism and Progress.* Pp. 111. New York: International Publishers, 1945. $1.25.

The central thesis of this little volume (and therein it outlines a fundamentally new policy for Marxian socialism) is:

"With a decisive victory over fascism and with friendly collaboration between democratic capitalist powers and the one great socialist power, we have before us, for the first time in history the possibility of some relatively stable progress even within the capitalist framework" (p. 75).

"No longer must the workers and the owners of industry struggle over the division of an essentially limited total product. Instead, the economic interests of our capitalist class will not be hindered but helped by planning for mass abundance. Workers and businessmen face a common problem" (p. 102).

The only economic argument advanced in support of this thesis is:

"*Exports of industrial equipment to undeveloped countries and planning for mass abundance could, together, provide a capitalist solution for the urgent immediate problem of maintaining full industrial activity and full peacetime employment.* Failure to carry through either of these possibilities would be suicidal for the capitalists themselves" (p. 104. Italics in original).

For a few months after Teheran a new economic harmony abolished the "irreconcilable conflict."

Needless to say, nowhere does one find in the volume any attempt to document its statements from the record of economic history or statistics. While numerous volumes of evidence have been produced by the National Bureau of Economic Research and other organizations indicating the relative course of wages, prices, productive capacity, capital employed, and the like, nowhere does Miss Rochester make a single reference to such or any other notable statistical studies.

Nearly half the volume is given to a highly meager sketch of the economic history of exploitation from feudalism to the present. The economic historian wishes that evidence had been brought to establish such theses as: "capitalism has been rooted in the exploitation of destitute masses" (p. 27); or "small concerns sometimes turn to the corporation form as a mean [*sic!*] of evading punishment for crooked dealings or personal liability in case of business failure" (p. 64); or "the First World War itself resulted from the clash of big business interests operating from London, Paris, and New York with their rivals in Berlin who demanded 'living space' for *their* imperialist expansion" (p. 74); or "the U.S.S.R., created by a people's revolution in which the working class played a leading role, represents the most advanced democracy yet achieved by the human race. Its governing bodies are elected by 'universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot'" (p. 98).

The flavor of the volume is, of course, anticapitalistic. No attention is paid to non-Marxist economic theory either of the classical, neoclassical, or Keynesian variety. In fact, there is no reference even to modern socialist literature such as the able treatises of Paul Sweezy and Oscar Lange. Perhaps unsophisticated repetition of portions of *Das Kapital* is all that one needs for economic salvation.

On the other hand, there is considerable reference to such hackneyed topics as the fortunes of John Jacob Astor, Andrew Mellon, and the House of Morgan. The flavor of Miss Rochester's discussion can be readily inferred from the following: "Repeatedly, in the development of American capitalism, it has appeared that capitalist wealth comes to its fullest flower only when the roots of a fortune are manured with corruption, crooked dealings, and special privilege" (p. 61).

THEODORE J. KREPS
Stanford University

CANTOR, NATHANIEL. *Employee Counseling.* Pp. viii, 167. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1945. $2.00.

In a concisely written 150 pages the author presents his concept of the uses of the techniques of clinical psychology with industrial personnel. The purpose, as stated, is "to make a contribution to the rapidly growing field of personnel counseling." The author makes no attempt to survey the entire field of industrial relations, but limits himself to the subject indicated by the title—counseling and interviewing programs in industry.

Subject matter has been organized in three parts. Part One, "The Problem," includes a brief résumé of the historical development of counseling procedures, and a definitive exposition of the aims and applications of industrial counseling programs. Part Two, "The Approach," deals with basic psychological theory and the function of the employee consultant—as the author conceives them. Case studies, from the writer's records, are used for illustrative material. Part Three, "The Organization," outlines the method of development of the counseling program and concludes with a discussion of the relationships of the counseling program to employee and union, supervision and manage-

ment. Line and staff functions, as found in different companies, are mentioned but not described in any detail. No decision as to what constitutes the "correct" administrative setup is imposed.

The author concludes by positing the thesis that in the postwar era "companies will lead or lag according to their progressiveness in recognizing the worker as the core of their enterprise and in doing something about it now for the future."

A selected bibliography of nearly seventy publications, most of which have recent copyright dates, is appended. This listing is more than the usual miscellany of somewhat related works tossed in by the average author to add a scholarly touch. This bibliography represents points of view divergent from, as well as those related to, the concepts presented by the author. As source material for those interested in the cogent problems of employee relations and industrial development, this list is definitely recommended.

As a whole, the author does a workmanlike job in presenting his viewpoint. Perhaps in places a further elaboration would not have been amiss, but there is the feeling that the writer has purposely streamlined his book so that active, busy men will read rather than skim.

Many psychologists will take exception to the chapter on "The Psychology of Adjustment." As presented here, the entire counseling program would seem to center on a resolution of the "will-guilt conflict." Other approaches, such as simple emotional catharsis, concepts of adult immaturity, the "humanizing" of management's relations with the worker, are not given much recognition. It is true that the author's views are philosophically and psychologically sound, providing one belongs to the same school of thought. It is also true that the existence of other sound and logical approaches to the problems of employee counseling has been understressed.

To summarize, this book is a valuable contribution to the literature on employee relations. It is written for those who have done, or will do, other reading in this field. Since it is timely, concise, and readable, it is recommended to those who wish to keep abreast of developments in industrial personnel procedures in general and employee counseling in particular.

DALE L. JOHNSON

Chicago, Ill.

BOOTHE, VIVA, and SAM ARNOLD. *Seasonality of Employment in Ohio*. Pp. xv, 247. Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University, 1944. No price.

It is somewhat unfortunate that this very useful study of the seasonality of employment in Ohio should be published somewhat later than the related document *Planned Dovetailing of Seasonal Employment* by Sam Arnold. Here, in this comprehensive study of the quantitative data on seasonal employment in Ohio, are to be found the working tools relied upon in working out the proposals in Mr. Arnold's book. Under the circumstances, some of the comments made in reviewing Mr. Arnold's book (reviewed in May 1945 ANNALS) are applicable to this more basic document.

In this study we find the most comprehensive collection of data on the seasonality of employment that has as yet been made available. The authors have done an excellent job in organizing this material for effective use.

For the economist, the chief values would seem to lie in reducing this mass of material to workable indices of the extent of seasonality, and thus providing a means for eliminating the seasonal factor for purposes of more basic analyses of unemployment phenomena.

Among the potential users of the specific indices of seasonality of employment are the agencies and employers concerned with merit rating under unemployment compensation, and those industries interested in either regularizing their own employment, developing seasonal marketing plans, or possibly in dovetailing seasonal employment along the lines suggested in Mr. Arnold's book.

The particular method used in constructing the indices seems well suited to the purposes of the authors, and possesses the great merit of simplicity.

Just how important this type of analysis may become depends upon the relative

significance of seasonal unemployment. It may well be that the greater importance of other factors in the total unemployment picture calls for turning our energies more toward a solution of the problems of cyclical and structural unemployment. In such case, only limited use may be made of this very suggestive tool for minimizing seasonal unemployment.

It may be noted in passing that the authors, in introducing the material, place great stress on the so-called rhythmic factors in unemployment, such as the seasonal, cyclical, and secular; and appear to give inadequate attention to frictional and structural unemployment. However that may be, this book is an important contribution to the whole analysis of unemployment, and undoubtedly represents one of the most constructive attacks on seasonal unemployment that has been developed by economists.

W. H. STEAD
Vanderbilt University

WARNE, COLSTON E., *et al.* (Eds.). *Yearbook of American Labor,* Vol. I: *War Labor Policies.* Pp. xvii, 655. New York: Philosophical Library, 1945. $7.50.

In spite of the large number of yearbooks of various sorts, there has been lacking a labor yearbook ever since the Rand School suspended publication of its volumes some years ago. This wide gap is fortunately now to be filled by the Institute of Labor Studies of Northampton, Massachusetts. This organization is headed by Professor Dorothy W. Douglas; and Dr. Katherine Du Pre Lumpkin is research director. The Institute has a distinguished research advisory board, and as one of its projects it inaugurates with this volume, the *Yearbook of American Labor,* an editorial board consisting of Professor Warne, Professor Warren B. Catlin, Dr. J. Raymond Walsh, Professor Dorothy W. Douglas, and Miss Constance Williams, senior economist with the National War Labor Board. The objective of the book is to bring contemporary labor developments together in a single compact yearbook, and the subject of war labor policies has been fittingly chosen for this first volume.

The project has a most auspicious start in having brought together the best compilation of labor material available and having selected outstanding authorities and timely subjects for the content of the volume. The list of the thirty-eight contributors is a roster of some of the best-informed and best-known authorities in labor research, activities, and administration. To mention but a few—one should really list all—the group includes, aside from the editors, Carroll R. Daugherty, Marshall E. Dimock, Frank P. Graham, William Haber, Lois MacDonald, Carey McWilliams, and George W. Taylor. These and other authorities seem to have taken their assignments seriously, so that the chapters represent an almost uniformly high level of descriptive and factual material.

The content is broad. Part I, dealing with the status of labor, reviews the situation with respect to the cost of living, labor legislation, the developments in union agreements, and labor's strike record. Part II, on labor and the Government, reviews the work of the National War Labor Board, the National Labor Relations Board, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the War Manpower Commission, the Labor-Management Production Drive, and the progress in social security. Part III, on case studies of organized labor, contains chapters on the aircraft industry, coal, shipping, railroads, steel, and shipbuilding. Part IV, on special labor groups, reviews the problem of the Negro and other minority groups, and the status of agricultural labor, women in industry, child labor, and government employees. Part V, on wartime union policies, deals with labor's attitude toward wages, manpower controls, co-operation, and production. Part VI deals with international relations of American labor.

Professor Dorothy Douglas contributes the concluding chapter on "A Balance Sheet of Labor—1944," which summarizes the chief gains and losses of labor during the year. This is an excellent summary, although colored somewhat by the personal viewpoint with regard to what is good for

labor and for society. In the Appendixes there is a most useful topical record of labor news and labor events for 1943–44 by Miss Lumpkin, and a roster of labor unions and other factual information.

The style of the various contributors seems almost universally readable, and the format of the book, although marred by obvious typographical errors, is excellent. As a whole the volume is one which almost any student of labor relations will want at his elbow, and it gives promise of being a notable and necessary addition to the annual literature in this field.

HERMAN FELDMAN
Dartmouth College

Report of the Urban Planning Conferences Under the Auspices of the Johns Hopkins University. Pp. xix, 245. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. $2.75.

The sixty-four members and chairmen of these six week-end Urban Planning Conferences held in 1943 were mostly administrators and technicians, not in urban planning but in transportation, housing, finance, population, and other specialized fields. The activities and facilities they described in papers and later discussed, as these appear in this volume, might have been more related to comprehensive civic development had more urban planners participated.

The only discussion recorded in full is that on airports and air traffic. Following a paper on the relations of aviation to urban planning presented by Mr. William A. M. Burden, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, many participants proposed schemes for providing elaborate facilities for commuter planes, helicopters, and vast new commercial airfields. Only Mr. Bryn J. Hovde, at that time administrator of the Pittsburgh Housing Authority, debated whether the large capital investments in airports which all thought wise, are justified. He remarked, ". . . but as far as public funds are concerned, they should be spent so that they will produce the greatest human values."

A wartime conference such as this indicates the great change in our thinking which our increased production has brought about. For example, Mr. Warren Vinton, chief economist of the Federal Public Housing Authority, estimated that if we are to retain our 1943 production of 150 billion dollars (in 1944 it was 200 billion dollars) we should spend 12 to 13 billions a year in residential development. This is even much higher than the 7 or 8 billions a year proposed at various times by Professor Alvin Hansen. Housers, economists, and planners are coming to realize that our cities can and must be rebuilt, not within thirty or forty years, as we heard in the economic crisis of the 1930's, but in ten or fifteen years. Unfortunately we still have not made adequate provision for facilitating, attracting, and safeguarding the use of private capital in large-scale urban development and redevelopment, a needed major outlet for equity investment.

Mr. Philip M. Hauser, assistant director of the Bureau of the Census, contributed one of his usual excellent papers, entitled "Ecological and Population Factors in Urban Planning." Mr. Glenn McLaughlin, now of the War Production Board, in the following discussion stated that to predict the future population of an urban area we must also predict the changes in its economic base. However, an important item, the effect of our changing national income on our population growth, characteristics, and distribution, was not indicated.

Short papers on public health and child care were included—two very much ignored aspects of community planning. Among the other papers are ones on highways, railways, industrial development, urban geography, recreation, construction, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company housing plans, and the architectural problems of urban planning. There are also several papers on the governmental framework and administration for city planning. These latter subjects, which are much discussed at the annual meetings of the national city planning organizations, might have been omitted from this series of conferences.

It is encouraging to find some data in conferences such as these on physical techniques and their changes. Many urban planners with their discovery of the demographic and administrative problems of

planning in recent years have partly overlooked the imperativeness of land use and community facilities' planning based on the social and economic needs of their municipalities.

MARTIN MEYERSON

Philadelphia

OXFORD UNIVERSITY AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH INSTITUTE. *Country Planning, a Study of Rural Problems.* Pp. vi, 288. London: Oxford University Press, 1944. $2.50.

This report is a splendid example of planning technique. Maladjusted situations in the area to be planned are the products of slow natural economic and social changes which have taken place over decades, even over centuries, of time. The result is farms too small, local units of public administration too small, houses poorly located, population in the area greater than is needed to carry on the agricultural work—in toto, a whole set of situations which, institutionalized over past decades, now thwart the people of the area in their desires and attempts to live in a modern world.

The concept of the planners is that while practically every situation requires something approaching revolutionary change, such change cannot be expected, because the situations are products of past decades and thus laden with inertia. The technique of planning, therefore, consists primarily of four things: (1) An analysis of situations as they are, (2) a blueprinting of what ideal adjustments would be, (3) an attempt to make persons concerned with these situations aware of the almost certain bad results if adjustments in the direction of efficiency are not made, and (4) alternative ways of making progress toward ideal adjustments.

Only one illustration of the planning process can be given. The committee, after analyzing the very bad system of farm organization, says:

"(1) The holdings should be compact, accessible, and convenient to work;
(2) the ploughland should be in one piece, and with as little soil variation as possible;
(3) farms should be large enough to admit of mechanical cultivation, from which it follows that:
(4) Severally, they should be about 450 acres and upwards in size.

"Such a *plan* could be achieved only at the expense of a great disturbance not only of occupiers but owners. This does not destroy its value, however, as something to be kept in view as an indication of the direction in which reforms should move."

The committee then lays down an ideal scheme of farm organization but does not recommend this utopian scheme. Rather it states the dire results which will follow if adjustments are not progressively made in the direction of the plan, and points alternative methods by which that progress can be made.

Every other situation is handled in the same way, and in detail. The reader cannot clearly see the needs for planning in the "survey area" and the reasons for approaching the problems in this fashion unless he reads the whole document carefully. It is not easy reading, but is vitally interesting to anyone concerned with regional or area economic and social planning.

CARL C. TAYLOR

Washington, D. C.

LORWIN, LEWIS L. *Time for Planning.* Pp. xxii, 273. New York: Harper & Bros., 1945. $3.00.

For over a decade Mr. Lorwin has been recognized as a staunch exponent of economic planning, but in this book he brings forth a program not only for economic planning but also for planning in nearly all phases of human activity. In offering his advanced and colored views he frankly states that this volume has a "mission," that mission being "to point the way in which man in the twentieth century may live in peace and in productive work, and renew his faith in his capacity to realize the ever-living ideals of a fuller life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" (p. xx). To attain these ends he would have every one of us start planning immediately and on a grand scale. City planning, state planning, regional planning, national plan-

ning, hemispheric planning—none of these would do. What is needed is world planning.

Mr. Lorwin states that such planning has to be undertaken if we hope to save democracy. On that point he will find only a few to disagree with him, but when in his program he outlines his planning method and indicates by whom this is to be executed, then he should be prepared for a strong opposition. For instance, when he leaves nearly everything only to "social-minded experts," to "technicians with a large social outlook," and to "men of imaginative thinking" (pp. 63, 75–76), he definitely rejects co-operation of many classes. When he questions the capacity of the middle class (pp. 73, 150), he deliberately eliminates the largest segment in modern society which has also been the backbone of democracy. And when he repeatedly shows his impatience over the "slow methods of parliamentary procedures" (pp. 63, 71), he clearly means that he has no use for democratic processes, even though in his "decalogue of democracy" (p. 83) he seems to pay lip service to such processes. He is for "rationalization" and "right organization" of industry (p. 33), for controls of nearly all economic and financial activities, including of course price control (p. 31), for the modification of the suffrage, for placing collective bargaining on a "scientific level" (p. 65), for joint industrial councils, for "public interest capitalism" (p. 183), for helping to build and develop foreign countries, for "balanced expansion" (p. 180), for the expansion of our foreign trade, for international trusteeship over "colonial areas" (p. 261), and lastly for "social-energic relativism" (p. 250).

The late John Morley once complained that while his predecessors wisely "considered the great art of government in connection with the character of man, his proper education, and his potential capacities," his contemporary reformers were laboring in mid-air half the time. If Morley were alive today he would properly add that the reformer-planners of our day are in mid-air nearly all the time.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
The Library of Congress

HUTT, W. H. *Plan for Reconstruction.* Pp. viii, 328. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. $4.50.

Can a national economy reconcile the full utilization of its productive resources with both distributive justice and personal liberty? To the thesis that it can, which he has long ably defended, Professor Hutt, of the University of Cape Town, returns in this book. In part, he deals with the process of Britain's reconversion to a peace economy. Mainly, however, he has to do with a more persistent and disheartening problem: with the fact that powerfully organized workers and employers restrict output in order to increase their shares of the national output. Their chief reason, he contends, for imposing restrictions and opposing their removal is that they see no other way to make their personal incomes secure. Accordingly he proposes an arrangement under which income security is to be attained without restrictions on production.

To illustrate the central proposition, we may begin with a reference to wages. (The argument holds also for rent and interest payments.) A wage payment has two aspects—cost and income. To the employer, it is a cost; to the laborer, income. As a cost, the wages of any given grade of labor should be as nearly equal as possible to the rate of productivity of the labor in industry as a whole. This is certainly the best guide for distributing labor economically between different occupations. But it does not follow that the personal incomes of individual or organized workers should be at this rate. When, for example, a depression is driving down the prices of products generally, it may be that the usual money incomes of millions of workers should be nevertheless maintained—perhaps to induce the spending of money which employers would hoard, perhaps for reasons of equity or politics. Yet it is clear that employers must either decrease wage costs or else discharge labor until what remains is worth what it costs. In short, wage costs and worker incomes cannot be treated as equivalents. The same thing is true when the values of labor in different occupations are shaken up by changes in products, methods of pro-

duction, or import duties. If worker incomes fully reflect changes in the values of trades, some workers gain and others lose heavily through no merits or faults of their own. And, what particularly concerns the author, the same fact confronts us whenever we seek, in the public interest, to remove the restrictions with which organized laborers (and businessmen and professional people) enhance the value of their services. As the change threatens their personal security they resist, and so effectively that politicians learn to see the matter as they do.

The author proposes that workers be protected by means of guaranteed minimum incomes as a substitute for the security which trade unions and wage fixing appear to give them. The principle to be used in determining minimums is that of established expectations. (As a long-range standard of distributive justice, equality of opportunity is to be sought.) Provisionally, prewar incomes, except abnormally high ones, are to be guaranteed. The funds required to make good the guarantees are to be raised not by taxation but by a system of wage pooling, effected by a proportional levy on wages. The bulk of such funds (e.g., three-quarters) will go into a pool from which grants will be paid to workers whose incomes fall short of their minimums. The rest will go into a reserve from which eventually payments will be given to the "good risks" who have put into the pool more than they have drawn from it. Receivers of grants will not be allowed to determine their own hours or occupations, and they may be required to undergo training for new jobs. To safeguard against an excessive "demand for leisure," wage rates may progress with increases of hours and regress with decreases. Property holders will be secured, during reconversion to a peace economy, by a similar system of pooling incomes; eventually, by a spreading of investment. With distributive security assured, the removal of restrictions on the use of resources is to be effected primarily through a commission (three judges, three economists, and three experts) empowered to suppress monopoly and restrictive practices in general, including strikes and lockouts, and, in certain cases, to expropriate wasted resources. In addition, competition will be stimulated, and "yardsticks" provided, by means of state-owned corporations, which are to be denied monopoly power and privileges to restrict.

The distinctive contribution of the book cinsists in its exceptionally full treatment of the proposition that the incomes of persons need not be hitched close to the productivity of their productive agents: that property rights in agents can be modified greatly. Although our whole system of private charity and public finance recognize this, writers too rarely make the distinction clearly, or, if they do make it, treat understandingly both cost and income sides of payments for productive power. Karl Polanyi (*The Great Transformation*) is vague on the distinction. Veblen is weak on the cost side. A. C. Pigou (*The Economics of Welfare*) is clear on both sides. Hutt goes farther than Pigou, however, in developing the implications of the distinction. In this skilled product of an experienced economist there is surcease of fiscal panaceas and also of the sort of "Social Plan" which provoked the famous diatribe of Stephen Leacock. Statesmen can well afford to give this book serious study.

BRUCE KNIGHT
Darthmouth College

HUSZAR, GEORGE B. DE. *Practical Applications of Democracy*. Pp. xvi, 140. New York: Harper & Bros., 1945. $2.00.

Democracy has been put through severe tests, and it has passed many such tests. But its success in the past has been almost solely in the political sphere; in economic and social spheres it still remains to be tested. That test, perhaps the severest, looms large on the horizon. In this little book the youthful author outlines some means and methods by the adoption of which he believes democracy will not only be saved from "a reaction to laissez-faire" but will also receive new life. His practical device is the creation of "problem-centered-groups" in all communities. These groups, composed of citizens, will deal with specific problems. This method will promote "do-democracy" as opposed to "talk-

democracy." It will give a sense of participation to each citizen. It will create a "dynamic community life" and lead to "constructive action." These groups, to work effectively, must meet around a *round table,* for this will promote "the formation of democratic togetherness." Thus we shall have democracy working at the base of society; but to have it properly functioning, it must be connected with the centralized authority by advisory committees. Thereby "integrated decentralization" will be brought about. By the working of these two sets of agencies we shall embark upon the practical applications of democracy.

The author has apparently read a good deal in sociology and is deeply immersed in Freudian psychology; but it is safe to assume that he has read little else. His definition of democracy as "a kind of society resulting from an attitude of mind" (p. 52) is at least partial proof for the above assumption. His notion that "today, more than ever, we need mental hygiene" (p. 102) is meaningless to one living in an orderly society; and his perverted idea that ours is "a neurotic society" (p. 104) cannot be shared by any sane soul unless he be hopelessly lost in up-to-date psychiatry in which such words as "at-homeness," "togetherness," and "belongingness" seem to be common. Yes, the practical application of democracy may very well be the severest test of our age, but that cannot be promoted or facilitated by what is outlined in this book.

A. O. SARKISSIAN
The Library of Congress

PUSEY, MERLO J. *Big Government: Can We Control It?* Pp. xx, 240. New York: Harper & Bros., 1945. $2.50.

Armed with a commendatory foreword by Charles A. Beard, journalist Pusey, of the *Washington Post,* reviews the tendencies in American national government which he believes menace democracy and liberty, and prescribes a series of reforms to reconcile the latter with the need for expanded governmental activity. The first part of the study is a recitation of the facts of great size, huge costs, and wide range of activities of the Federal administrative agencies. While Pusey is hopeful that the war expansions will recede, he accepts the prospect of the permanent continuance of "Big Government." For its success he insists that better organization and greater efficiency must be attained than has been in evidence to date, and he generally approves the recommendations for such change made by the Brownlow committee. But "Big Government" must also develop stable and consistent policies built on established principles, in place of improvisation and special favors to pressure groups—particularly labor groups—which he charges against the Roosevelt administration.

Pusey is particularly alarmed by the shift of power from Congress to the President during emergencies. This reached dictatorial status in the demand by Roosevelt (September 7, 1942) that Congress repeal parts of the Emergency Price Control Act within twenty-three days, "or else." He protests the late President's sweeping interpretation of his war powers, which "hangs as an evil portend [*sic*] over the future of constitutional democracy" (p. 57). In many other ways the Roosevelt administration has "outrun the law"—e.g. by huge lump-sum appropriations to be used as "blank checks," and through the lending powers of the government corporations and other loan agencies which have been endowed with lending powers of over thirty billions.

Prior to 1937 the dangers from "Big Government" had the countercheck of the Supreme Court, our "Watchdog of Liberty." Since then the President has so packed the Court with New Deal politicians that it "has opened up the floodgates of Federal powers." Pusey is particularly apprehensive over the decisions which have rubbed thin the distinction between the interstate commerce power and local activity, thus converting our government from one of limited to one of almost unlimited powers. He feels that it is as much the duty of the Court to preserve our separation-of-powers theory of government as it is "to keep the door open to growth of our society within the constitutional framework."

Pusey's identification of liberty and de-

mocracy with the American check-and-balance system limits his proposals for reform. Accordingly he rejects Henry Hazlitt's suggestions for a parliamentary system, which he believes in fact means cabinet dictatorship. Instead he urges the strengthening of Congress by reorganizing its internal structure and practice à la Roland Young's and Robert Heller's suggestions. He would also rationalize the regulatory agencies along lines proposed by Professor Cushman and the Acheson committee. There are a few constitutional changes that should be made. One of these would deprive the Senate minority of its veto over treaties; another would enact the two-term tradition into fundamental law; and a third would abolish the electoral college system in favor of direct voting for the President. Pusey also advocates an easier mode of constitutional amendment. But all these alterations do not compare in importance with the preservation of our "grand old charter" which "embodies the greatest idea that has emerged from the struggles of men to govern themselves."

Pusey's is a thoughtful discussion of fundamental issues, but it is conditioned throughout by two major premises: (1) that the American check-and-balance system is essential to democracy, and (2) that "collectivism" is incompatible with liberty. If, as in the case of the reviewer, one does not share these assumptions, one will seriously question many points in the diagnosis and reject the adequacy of the remedies proposed.

CHARLES MCKINLEY

Reed College

NORRIS, GEORGE W. *Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris.* Pp. xiv, 419. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945. $3.50.

We in the United States have always taken pride in our men and women who overcame great handicaps and went on to significant achievements. This has been particularly true when the handicap was that of poverty. George W. Norris, who died a year ago after a forty-year career in Washington, fits perfectly into the pattern. His father died when he was three years old, his only brother died of wounds suffered in the Civil War, and his mother was left with a pioneer farm, a very small son, and six daughters. Three older girls had married, and a daughter born after the father's death died in childhood.

This autobiography, written in the months preceding Norris' death, tells the story of a frugal boyhood, of an education attained after grave handicaps had been overcome, of a long struggle to establish himself as a lawyer. It gives a picture of many phases of frontier life, and is a monument to the tenacity and vision of our pioneers. *Fighting Liberal* has been criticized for its clumsy, awkward style and for its sometimes confusing arrangement; it is guilty on both counts. If George Norris had remained a country school teacher or a small-town lawyer, this volume would never have been published. *Fighting Liberal* is an important book because its author was a great man.

For forty years, ten in the House of Representatives and thirty in the Senate, Mr. Norris was a prominent member of Congress. He will be remembered for his leadership, as effective as courageous, in many popular causes. Perhaps the fight against "Cannonism," the struggle for TVA, and the singlehanded campaign for the "Lame Duck" amendment are Senator Norris' best-known accomplishments. This volume offers much pertinent information on all three, but it also reveals the author's interest and participation in many other efforts to strengthen and improve our democratic system.

In this last appearance before the people whom he served so faithfully and so long, George Norris establishes his own personal greatness, entirely aside from the services which he performed. *Fighting Liberal* reveals its author as a man with humor, sentiment, and deep loyalty; above all, it discloses a man of great tolerance and objectivity. He felt intensely about many of the great struggles in which he participated, yet his appraisal of opponents is marked by a respect for their sincerity and a total lack of personal bitterness.

George W. Norris represented the best of American traditions. He was a liberal leader with courage, vision, tenacity, and

nobility of character. His contributions to an improving democracy were both many and mighty.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
C. Sp. T.—USCGR

MONAGHAN, JAY. *Diplomat in Carpet Slippers: Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Affairs.* Pp. 505. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1945. $4.00.

MONAGHAN, JAY (Comp.). *Lincoln Bibliography, 1839–1939.* Vol. I, pp. xlv, 519; Vol. II, pp. xi, 560. Springfield, Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library, 1945. $5.00 (set).

Whenever a historian feels moved to add fictional trimmings in order to lend zest to his narrative, in these eyes at least he stands guilty until proved innocent. I am convinced that imaginary conversations and undocumented soul-searchings add to the interest of a work not nearly as much as they detract from its authenticity and value as a lasting contribution to our annals. Quite frankly, then, it is in a mood of gingerly suspicion that I have read Jay Monaghan's *Diplomat in Carpet Slippers,* for all his merited reputation as an honest and earnest scholar.

Mr. Monaghan has chosen a challenging and somewhat neglected theme. Our foreign relations during the Civil War—in particular, those with Great Britain and France—seemed to careeen wildly from one crisis to another; but because they never quite spilled over into catastrophe, their story has always been obscured by the actual and bloody strife at home. Since these recurrent problems, however acute, were always solved, there must have been wisdom and resourcefulness exercised to prevent them from broadening into open conflict. Yet the picture is one well worth re-creating, even though hardly in the form the author has chosen to give it.

Mr. Monaghan is a professional scholar, and no one is less fitted by training to employ the slick, well-ordered techniques of the stage and screen. History in the round may have some broad distinguishable trend, but the disorderly details of which it is the sum simply do not lend themselves to the manicured approach. "Wilson" and "Pasteur" prove bad history in almost the precise degree that they are good theater. Attempting what even a trained practitioner could accomplish only at the expense of truth, to recast history as a well-made story, is it any wonder that the author has failed? His preliminary work has been excellent. He has done a monumental job of research, and I think he understands the implications of the facts he has amassed. Yet the technique which he has so unfortunately adopted leads him into error both in emphasis and in timing. For the purpose of dramatizing Lincoln's share in the conduct of foreign affairs, Mr. Monaghan has found it necessary to minimize the part played by our representatives abroad, especially Charles Francis Adams; and he makes out Seward to be a veritable bull in the china shop, almost a fire-breathing, maladroit oaf.

Today, with all our resources for instantaneous communication, our ambassadors perform acceptably if they do little more than convey, observe, and make themselves agreeable. But during the Civil War three weeks had to pass before instructions based on their dispatches could come back to our representatives. Those weeks could not be lived in a vacuum, so that much of our foreign policy was set by independent decisions made on the spot, or by the manner—whether truculent or timid—in which formal instructions were carried out. No one who has examined Henry Adams' work can fail to be impressed, even after making allowance for the feeling of a son for a distinguished father, by the very real sense in which that father had from time to time more influence on our policy vis-à-vis England than either Lincoln or Seward.

Our great President had much to do with our foreign policy, and his contribution was always as subtle and effective as it was slow to develop. That was his unfailing technique. But his place in history is not improved by the effort to make him appear dominant.

Mr. Monaghan has made a more substantial, if less pretentious, contribution to the study of Lincoln in his two-volume bibliography. As far as it goes, this chronological record of publications about Lincoln will never need much added save

new titles to render it complete and up to date. One might wish that the cross index at the end of the work may some day be much amplified, since in its present form the single clue to subject matter is the very dubious one to be gained from the titles. It is also to be hoped that a further publication will list those works—such as the biographies and collected papers of Lincoln's contemporaries—which shed so much light upon Lincoln even though he may not be their central figure.

ALPHONSE B. MILLER
Philadelphia

WITTKE, CARL. *Against the Current: The Life of Karl Heinzen (1809–80)*. Pp. x, 342. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. $3.75.

Karl Heinzen was a true republican in every phase that that word connotes. This German radical—for Heinzen meets that term admirably—was active in all causes that in any way would aid the underdog in his fight for survival. His reputation was made in the 1848 German revolution. This unsuccessful venture was but the beginning of a restlessness that was to dominate his entire life.

In 1850 Heinzen came to the United States. His move to this country was not for the purpose of making a home for his family, but rather to find a haven from which to disseminate his radical propaganda. While his major theme was a democracy for Germany, the pages of the *Pionier* were filled with cries for the abolition of slavery, equal rights for women, and many other reforms that were far ahead of the times.

One of Heinzen's major faults, and the one that did much to neutralize his effect, was his stubborn refusal to recognize or consider honest opponents (p. 321). His difficulties with Carl Schurz, Friedrich Hecker, and William Lloyd Garrison are proof positive of the man's temperamental inability to get along. He was the typical German who would give no quarter once the challenge had been accepted.

Heinzen loved America, not with the real love of a true immigrant, but with a halfhearted infatuation for a country that was following, only in part, the true idea of democracy. He was ever critical, ever scolding in the pages of the *Pionier*. This critical attitude cost him many subscribers and often brought him to the brink of bankruptcy.

This German radical was indeed many years ahead of his time. He concerned himself with municipal reform and advocated the now known city-manager type of government (p. 211). He strongly opposed militarism because he was convinced that war was the tool of bankers (p. 254). His opposition to communism and to Karl Marx led him to describe that dreamer as "a cross between a cat and an ape . . ." (p. 240). But with all these forward-looking reforms and advanced ideas, Heinzen missed being great because of a lack of tact and diplomacy.

Professor Wittke, always the thorough, precise historian, has given us a well-rounded study of a true revolutionist. It is a work that will stand with Claude Fuess's life of *Carl Schurz*. Schurz and Heinzen were direct opposites, yet the products of the same revolution. This biography is important in that it pictures the typical German mind, and in many cases the arrogant German immigrant's attitude toward the United States. It has a tendency toward making one think in terms of new immigration laws and more stringent examinations for citizenship.

JAMES J. FLYNN, CSP(X)
Office of Naval History
First Naval District, Boston

REES, JOHN RAWLINGS. *The Shaping of Psychiatry by War*. Pp. 158. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945. $2.50.

For those who are concerned only with winning the war, the first two chapters are most important. For those who want to contribute to a peace worth winning, the last—which is the third—chapter is most significant. The former group need hardly read the last chapter, but the latter group must read all of the book; for in "The Frontiers Extend" and "Opportunities Emerge" are revealed the detailed organization and methods of British Army psychiatry, and in them are recorded results,

and the conclusions drawn, which form the foundation for "The Way Ahead."

The author has also done a very practical thing: he has prepared an appendix called "The Tasks of Psychiatry" in which he has summarized the whole book, still retaining the division into "Psychiatry in Army" and "Psychiatry in Civilian Life." There is a parallelism in these two parts that is inescapable, and definitely not fortuitous.

This book represents Dr. Rees's Salmon Lectures. Dr. Rees is the distinguished director of the Tavistock Clinic in London; also, as he says, he has spent practically one-third of his thirty years as a physician in uniform—in the First and Second World Wars. The Salmon Committee made a most fortunate choice when inviting Dr. Rees, who knows whereof he speaks, from practical experience.

The book is so full of frank, penetrating, common-sense observations that it is difficult to select only one or two for quotation in a review, but, as examples: "We are talking a great deal about social medicine these days. Psychiatry is largely social medicine and it is certainly true that social medicine is mainly psychiatry, and all its experiments and developments must be colored by a psychiatric approach. Just at the moment we have a greater need for good medical sociologists than for good clinicians, though we assuredly need both. The good clinician will have his maximum contribution to make to social medicine in a few years when he has grown into a more sociological approach to his task" (p. 51).

"The total annual cost of the comprehensive psychiatric services of the British Army equals the cost of the British contribution to running the war for an hour and twenty minutes. It should not be so difficult after the war to convince governments that funds made available for progressive, scientific, and health activities will pay a positive dividend and much of it quite quickly" (p. 135).

"I have always thought that the four professions most liable to be chosen by those with marked feelings of inferiority are the law, the church, teaching, and medicine, all professions in which you can talk down to people and in which they can't answer back. It may be for some reason like this that medicine as a whole has been somewhat superior and exclusive and unwilling to align itself on any basis of equality or even through co-operation with other groups such as psychologists and sociologists whose disciplines are fully as exacting" (p. 34). What is sauce for the patient is sauce for us doctors. *Gnothi seauton!*

This reviewer recommends the book to all those with sociological, medical, and administrative interests.

JOSEF A. KINDWALL, M.D.
Milwaukee Sanitarium

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ANNOUNCEMENT

After sixteen years as associate editor of THE ANNALS, Professor Donald Young has tendered his resignation. We owe him a special debt for the good reputation enjoyed by our Book Department, and wish him success in his new and responsible work as the newly elected executive director of the Social Science Research Council, New York City.

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